

S. Fedyukin

THE GREAT
OCTOBER
REVOLUTION
AND THE
INTELLIGENTSIA
PROGRESS



BOOKS
ABOUT
THE
USSR

"At this turning point in history one must not stand at the cross-roads and wait—one must have will for action, for building and constructive work, and we, scientific people, who have always given our strength to serve mankind, should not vacillate."

Professor V. Bekhterev

"Accept or not accept? Such a question never existed for me.... This is my Revolution!"

V. Mayakovsky, poet

"I even before announced firmly that I would not separate myself from the Russian people or abandon them whatever happened. That is how I behaved from the beginning of the Revolution up to the present time...."

General A. Brusilov

S. Fedyukin

THE GREAT
OCTOBER REVOLUTION
AND THE INTELLIGENTSIA

How the Old Intelligentsia Was Drawn
into the Building
of Socialism

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С. ФЕДЮКИН

ВЕЛИКИЙ ОКТЯБРЬ И ИНТЕЛЛИГЕНЦИЯ

На английском языке

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The intelligentsia and the revolution.... This is one of the many social questions posed by the Great October Socialist Revolution which has awakened especial interest all over the world, causing not a few arguments, incorrect assessments and perversions of the truth.

At the turn of the century capitalism entered its last stage of development—the imperialist stage. The time of revolutionary upheavals was drawing near. In Russia, where the conditions for revolution grew up especially quickly, it became necessary for the proletariat to take upon itself to fulfil the most revolutionary of all the tasks of the international working-class movement of that time—to lay down the path to socialism.

INTRODUCTION

In the ranks of the Party founded by V. I. Lenin, highly educated members of the intelligentsia of the period conducted widespread political agitation amongst the workers, directed the workers' movement on to the revolutionary path, helped the proletariat to master Marxist theory and to arm itself with proletarian class ideology.

V. I. Lenin, a brilliant revolutionary thinker, strategist and tactician, came to the fore not only of the more advanced workers but also of the progressively minded members of the intelligentsia who had taken up the positions of the working class and become professional revolutionaries.

It is just as important to consider the fundamentals of the questions involved. The classics of Marxism-Leninism had advanced and comprehensively substantiated the proposition that the working class, under the conditions it was in of economic and spiritual oppression, was not able to cultivate socialist consciousness within itself purely by its own strength. Socialism had to be brought to the workers' movement by the vanguard—that is by the Marxist party, into whose ranks together with the more advanced workers were pouring the propertied classes' educated representatives who had gone over to the positions of the

proletariat: the intelligentsia. In this way, the best part of the intelligentsia naturally went not "around" but into the very thick of the revolutionary army of the proletariat, into its forward ranks.

V. I. Lenin underlined the role of the revolutionary intelligentsia even as early as the beginning of the remodelling of society along socialist lines by the revolution's newly-born Soviet state. In the Soviet Government itself, there worked, led by Lenin, a multitude of outstanding revolutionaries, politicians and statesmen, dedicated to solving the complicated problems of the revolutionary remodelling of life in Soviet Russia from really scientific positions. The Party was carrying out the programme of building the state relying on, in Lenin's expression, "a staff of workers really abreast of the times", and on "the best elements that we have in our social system". To such elements V. I. Lenin firstly assigned the more progressive workers, "who are absorbed in the struggle for socialism", and secondly "the really enlightened elements"—"elements of knowledge, education and training".*

In his Report on the Centenary of the Birth of V. I. Lenin, the General Secretary of the CC CPSU L. I. Brezhnev said: "It called for all-penetrating depth of thought, breadth of outlook and boldness of idea to preserve clarity of orientation in a Russia disrupted and ploughed up by war and revolution, in the labyrinthine entanglement of socio-economic tendencies, political forces, and contradictory views and moods, and to find and present in a theoretically faultless form the main, principal lines of advance towards socialism. And that is just what Lenin did."**

The author has not set himself the task of analysing in detail the role of the part of the intelligentsia which fought in the ranks of the Bolshevik Party against autocracy and which together with the proletariat effectuated the Great October Socialist Revolution and built socialism. In this book, the reader's attention is called to another problem—the problem of the relations of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government with the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia inherited by the young socialist country from the bourgeois-landowner system and which for a long time remained under the influence of the old world outlook and of bourgeois psychology.

To solve this problem the Communist Party had to make its way

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, pp. 487, 488, 489.

** L. I. Brezhnev, *Lenin's Cause Lives On and Triumphs*, Moscow, 1970, pp. 25-26.

on new, unexplored paths since it had to find answers to questions which no one had ever posed before.

The leader and theoretician of the Party V. I. Lenin believed that the enlistment of the services of the bourgeois intelligentsia to build a new society was an indispensable condition for the victory of socialism. It was he who formulated the basic principles by which to govern relations with the old intelligentsia, the most important of which were: the enlistment of the services of the whole intelligentsia, irrespective of its political outlook, to the building of socialism, control of its activity, with the workers and peasants learning from the bourgeois specialists, and the re-education of the intelligentsia in the spirit of socialism. "The bourgeois intellectuals," said Lenin, "cannot be expelled and destroyed, but must be won over, remoulded, assimilated and re-educated."*

When the proletariat of Russia became the ruling class in October 1917, it did not have at its command a sufficient number of specialists to help manage the state and the national economy, to ensure the defence of the country and to further developments in science and culture. At that time the enemies of Bolshevism announced that the proletariat should not have ventured to seize power as it did not have enough intelligentsia cadres. The historical experience of the Land of Soviets disproved such affirmations: the working class of Russia found the only correct solution and without waiting for a new socialist intelligentsia to be formed, it took the reins of state into its own hands.

Socialism first brought into general practice a system of planned management of social life. From the first years of the existence of Soviet power the Party required the creation of a new intelligentsia. This task was fulfilled by degrees. However, the training of a new intelligentsia is a highly complicated process, demanding a lot of time and a great expenditure of resources. The young republic did not have such reserves at its command at that time. And it is for this reason that in the early period of the existence of the Soviet state the problem of the enlistment of the old intelligentsia to co-operate with Soviet power was of prime importance.

V. I. Lenin pointed out: "We cannot build it [our state] if we not utilise such a heritage of capitalist culture as the intellectuals."** To create a governmental apparatus and a regular army, to restore and further develop the national economy, to raise the

*V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 115.

** Ibid., Vol. 28, p. 215.

cultural level of the masses, required a multitude of specialist cadres in all areas of the economy, science, technology and military affairs. And even though the greater part of the bourgeois intelligentsia neither understood nor accepted the October Revolution, and later also distrustfully met the Communist Party's plans for the radical reform of the country, it was impossible to do without it. This is one of the dialectical peculiarities that were found during the formation of a socialist society in Russia.

It became necessary for Lenin to lead and sustain a stubborn struggle of principle against the opportunist elements in the Party who denied the life-or-death necessity of using the old intelligentsia. The intelligentsia was a social element without which it was impossible to build socialism; Lenin devoted much time and effort to make this only correct view to be accepted as the general Party line.

Mention should also be made of the immense influence that V. I. Lenin had on the intelligentsia as a political activist, a leading figure in science, and in the widest sense of the word as a member of the intelligentsia himself. His vast knowledge and found erudition, his political tact in solving "awkward" questions, his thorough knowledge of the ins and outs of the Russian intelligentsia, all played a not insignificant role in winning over the sympathy of the educated members of the old society.

The Communist Party, the state, economic and military agencies devoted maximal attention to the problem of drawing the intelligentsia to the task of building socialism. It is hard to find in the early years of the existence of Soviet power a single Party or trade union congress, or a Congress of Soviets which did not in one form or another deal with the question of the policy of the working class towards the bourgeois intelligentsia, the ways and means of attracting it to the building of socialism and the defence of the country. How important this problem was to the young Soviet Government can be seen by the fact that the 8th Congress of the RCP(B)* which took place in March 1919 and which accepted the second Party Programme (the tasks of the first one had been completed with

* RCP(B)—Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). From 1898 (1st Congress) it was called the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and from 1917 the Russian Social-Democratic Party (Bolsheviks). At the 7th Congress (1918) it was renamed the RCP(B). In connection with the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the 14th Party Congress changed the name of the RCP(B) to the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). At the 19th Congress it was given its present name—the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

the victory of the revolution) contained a special section dedicated to the question of bourgeois specialists.

Attracting and re-educating the old intelligentsia, the Party at the same time concentrated its attention on the formation of specialists from the workers and peasants. However, the old intelligentsia continued to play a most important role in the economic and cultural life of the country. Lenin wrote: "Like any other class in modern society, the proletariat is not only advancing intellectuals from its own midst, but also accepts into its ranks supporters from the midst of all and sundry educated people."*

The Party and the working class had to do a lot of work to ensure the co-operation of the better qualified section of the old intelligentsia in the building of socialism. Great successes were obtained in this field, but there were also serious failures. Guided by its successes and correcting its mistakes, the Communist Party established a correct mutual relationship between the working class and the intelligentsia. History testifies to the fact that any country which is embarking on socialist development inevitably comes up against the problem of attracting the old intelligentsia and the formation of new specialist cadres from the workers and peasants. For this reason the Soviet Government's experience has been put to use in other socialist countries though with due regard to their national and historical particularities.

The experience of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries shows that only an unswerving conformity to the Leninist line can ensure that the Communist and Workers' Parties establish correct mutual relations between the working class, its Party and the intelligentsia, and incorporate the intelligentsia into active and constructive work for the building of a new society.

Today the Soviet intelligentsia is a thirty-three-million-strong army of scientists, technicians and cultural workers. The intelligentsia continues to grow rapidly, and in the last few years the rate of growth of the scientific and technological intelligentsia has exceeded that of other social groups. This was to be expected since it is the natural result of scientific and technological progress, which itself is the result of the Party's policy, correctly reflecting the objective demands of the development of socialist society.

In the course of the socialist transformation of the country a new type of intelligentsia emerged which was radically different from the bourgeois one. Workers and peasants scaled the heights

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, p. 198.

of knowledge and became scientists, engineers, agronomists, teachers, doctors, artists, administrators, and officers in the Soviet Army. Bourgeois sociologists, in their attempts to pervert the truth about socialist reality, affirm that in the Soviet Union the intelligentsia forms an "élite", a special "thinking part" of society, a kind of "state bourgeoisie", which does not permit ordinary people to join it. Here is just one example but it says a lot. A survey was carried out of over 1,100 engineering and technical workers at the Ural Turbo-Engine Factory, and the information showed that 44.4 per cent of them were from workers' families, 25.6 per cent from peasant ones, 24.3 per cent from white-collar ones, and finally 5.7 per cent from the families of specialists. From this example it is clear that there can be no talk of some kind of "hereditary castes", of the formation of an "élite", etc. The Soviet intelligentsia is fully representative of the people from which it is drawn and to whom it is tied by the closest of ties.

The Soviet intelligentsia differs from the intelligentsia of pre-revolutionary Russia not only in its social composition but also in its national one. All the different nationalities living in the Soviet Union have, under socialism, formed their own national intelligentsia cadres.

The Soviet intelligentsia also differs radically from the bourgeois intelligentsia in its world outlook and in its ideological and political outlook. Collectivism, public-spiritedness and a high sense of civic duty are characteristic of it.

Socialism not only changed the social and moral make-up of the intelligentsia, but also set it new creative tasks. The building of a new society supposes not just an all-round development of the productive forces but also the education of the whole Soviet people in the spirit of a scientific communist world outlook. The battle to form the new man is one of the most important parts of the wide range of activity of the Soviet intelligentsia, and above all of the artistic intelligentsia, since it plays an immense role in the ideological and cultural life of the country.

The intelligentsia has a considerable contribution to make in the founding of the material and technological basis of communism. Scientists, engineers and technicians are a powerful creative force in Soviet society. In recent times they have made many important discoveries and attained notable successes in key branches of science and technology.

An objective historical analysis of the fortunes of the Russian intelligentsia after the October Revolution conclusively disproves the fabrications about the "Golgotha" of the Russian intelligen-

tsia by bourgeois reactionary researchers and publicists, who allege that the intelligentsia rejected Soviet power and fought against it, and that the Bolsheviks crushed the old intelligentsia, forcing the best of them to emigrate and denying their civil rights to those who remained. As a rule, bourgeois researchers take no interest either in the traditions of democratism in the outlook of a considerable part of the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia, or in its love of the people and of its country, or in the immense influence which the ideas of socialism had on it. Even the fact of the old intelligentsia's co-operation with the Soviet Government is attributed by them to absolutely trivial reasons: the need for "a crust of bread", or fear of the "Bolshevik terror".

The most widely circulated version tells of the "cruel constraint" that forced the intelligentsia to serve the political ends of the Bolsheviks. Bourgeois historians try to instil in the reader the idea that V. I. Lenin founded a "system of violence and constraint" as the basis of the mutual relationship between the working class and the intelligentsia.*

The author saw it as his duty to provide a counterweight for the arguments of bourgeois historians, by giving an objective tracing of the process of the transition of the old intelligentsia to the positions of the Soviet Government, and in this way demonstrate the invalidity of the bourgeois version.

But what is to be understood by the term "transition"? There is no reason why a person could not contribute his work in one or other Soviet establishment, conscientiously fulfilling his assigned work, and still remain by his political beliefs an opponent of the Soviet Government, an "internal émigré". The transition of one or other member of the intelligentsia to the positions of socialism can only be considered to have been realised when that person has become Soviet in his own personal convictions. Therefore, the author thought it imperative to show the ways in which the old intelligentsia came to an understanding of socialism.

The attention of this work is directed in the main at the intelligentsia which met the October Revolution with hostility or else took up a neutral position awaiting the outcome. What was the Communist Party's and the Soviet state's policy towards that intelligentsia, what forms of influence were suited to them,

* William Henry Chamberlin, *Russia's Iron Age*, Boston, 1934; John S. Reshetar, *A Concise History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, New York, 1960; Fritz Löwenthal, *Das kommunistische Experiment. Theorie und Praxis des Marxismus-Leninismus*, Köln, 1957; A. S. Counts, *The Challenge of Soviet Education*, New York, 1957; Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, New York, 1959.

what results were achieved—the elucidation of these questions forms the basic part of this work. The book deals in the main with the Russian intelligentsia, though the evolution of the intelligentsia of other peoples of the Soviet Union is also of great interest for the historian and could be the subject of special research.

It should be underlined that this work encompasses the period from October 1917 to the middle of the 1930s when, along with the building of the foundations of socialism, the transition of the intelligentsia to the side of the Soviet state was completed. By that time a new society had been formed in the Soviet Union, composed of working people and free from class antagonisms, and a new Soviet intelligentsia had in the main taken shape. However, it is not the purpose of this book to elucidate the role and situation of this new intelligentsia.

Chapter One THE INTELLIGENTSIA IN THE FIRST YEARS OF SOVIET POWER

THE INTELLIGENTSIA'S ATTITUDE TO THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

There are many heroic pages to the history of the Russian intelligentsia, and in it many names of glorious fighters for the freedom of the people.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, when Russia became a capitalist country, the democratic intelligentsia had already amassed considerable experience in the political struggle against serfdom* and autocracy.

Under the capitalist system the intelligentsia is a heterogeneous body both in its class stand and in its political outlooks. It fills its ranks with people from the exploiting classes and with people from the exploited ones. In accordance with this it (or rather its individual groups) expresses the aspirations and interests of the classes which it serves. V. I. Lenin wrote that "the intelligentsia are so called just because they most consciously, most resolutely and most accurately reflect and express the development of class interests and political groupings in society as a whole".**

The entrance of the proletariat into the political struggle divided the intelligentsia. Its more revolutionary elements were forging ever tighter and more solid links with the proletariat, while at the same time the consolidation process of the bourgeois strata of the intelligentsia was taking place and they were rapidly evolving to the right.

The petty-bourgeois intelligentsia, whose main distinguishing

* Serfdom: the right of the feudal landowner to dispose of the person, labour and property of peasants "belonging" to him. The basic principle of serfdom was the binding of the peasant to the land. The remnants of serfdom in Russia, which remained after the reform in 1861, were liquidated by the Great October Socialist Revolution.

** V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 7, p. 45.

characteristics are political instability, class amorphousness and indefinite struggle aims, also entered the scene. When there is a rise of the revolutionary tide this intelligentsia is capable of bravely joining battle and taking to the barricades. But at the very first reverses, and even more so in defeat, it flings itself into panic-stricken flight, and it is not rare for it to end up in the enemy camp.

Side by side with the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois intelligentsia a proletarian, Social-Democratic intelligentsia which did massive work in propagating Marxism amongst the working-class masses of Russia was taking shape. It absorbed these best representatives of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois intelligentsia, who had already adopted the point of view of the proletariat, and brought them to the revolutionary battle. The more advanced worker-revolutionaries also poured into the ranks of the Social-Democratic intelligentsia. The Bolshevik Party armed them with knowledge of revolutionary theory and brought them up to the level of organisers and leaders of the workers' movement.

In preparing the working class for the revolutionary battles Lenin and the Bolshevik Party devoted much attention to the setting up of sound mutual relations between the proletariat and the intelligentsia. The political line of the Party was to leave the liberal-monarchist intelligentsia in isolation, denouncing its agreements with tsarism and its notorious "above parties" attitude. This, of course, does not mean that the Party refused to co-operate with the progressive elements of the bourgeois intelligentsia. The attitude of the Bolsheviks to the democratic intelligentsia was completely different. While criticising its instability and vacillations between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the Bolsheviks involved the democratic intelligentsia in the revolutionary battle for general democratic demands and the overthrow of autocracy.

The events of the first Russian revolution of 1905-1907 showed that the democratic intelligentsia, powerless on its own, could, when united with the working masses under the leadership of the proletariat, become an important force in the battle against autocracy. The intelligentsia took an active part in the stormy events of 1905.

But, when the first Russian revolution was defeated and reaction raged through the country, many members of the intelligentsia, especially those with liberal inclinations, hastened to repent of their "revolutionary sins" and began in all kinds of ways to abuse the revolution and slander Social-Democracy.

However, it would be a mistake to believe that the whole intelligentsia moved away from the people and betrayed the revolution. Its best representatives in the persons of the socialist, Party intelligentsia, worked indefatigably to prepare a new revolutionary upsurge, and to train the masses for the decisive class battles.

The new revolutionary advance (1912-1914) brought about a revival of enthusiasm amongst sections of the intelligentsia. The influx of members of the intelligentsia to the Bolshevik Party and other political parties opposed to autocracy resumed, and congresses of teachers and some other groups in the intelligentsia were convened. The democratic intelligentsia indignantly protested against the savage shootings of the workers on the Siberian river Lena, during their strike in 1912, and the reprisals against the revolutionary sailors of the Baltic Fleet in 1913. However, this revival connected with the general revolutionary upsurge was interrupted by the world war.

The bellicose policies of the autocracy were supported by the landowners and the upper strata of the business and industrial bourgeoisie. Wide sections of the middle bourgeoisie, the bourgeois intelligentsia and people in liberal professions were also infected by chauvinism, at least at the beginning of the war.

The war uncovered all the rottenness of the autocratic regime and the fact that it was doomed. The Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, from the very start of the war advanced the slogan of the defeat of tsarism in the war, of changing it from imperialist to civil war. The defeat of the tsarist troops on the front, the economic dislocation, the sharp fall in the standard of living of the working people, and the growing revolutionary-mindedness of the masses, all played their part in the leftward shift of the intelligentsia.

But in the upper strata of the intelligentsia there was still no talk of the revolutionary overthrow of tsarism. V. B. Stankevich, a prominent activist of the Menshevik Party,* wrote concerning the attitude of the "people from the society" to the coming revolution: "Everyone reacted very negatively to the possibility of popular action, fearing that once called forth the

* Menshevism: an opportunist trend in Russian Social-Democracy. It appeared in 1903 at the 2nd Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP). At this congress the majority of Social-Democrats voted for the Leninist programme for revolution and its principles for the organisational build-up of the Party, and the minority voted against. Thence the names Bolshevik and Menshevik (*bolshinstvo* in Russian means majority and *menshinstvo* means minority). On the eve of the Great October Socialist Revolution the Mensheviks once and for all crossed over to the bourgeois counter-revolutionary camp.

movement of the masses could take an extreme Left direction, and that this could make for extraordinary difficulties in the running of the war. Even the question of transition to a constitutional regime aroused serious misgivings and the conviction that the new government would be unable without strong measures to uphold order and prevent defeatist propaganda.”*

But under the pressure of the popular masses, inspired by the Bolsheviks, the centuries-old monarchy collapsed in February 1917. In just a few days the revolution swept it away. The bourgeois intelligentsia rushed to recognise it, and announced it as its revolution.

Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies were set up in Petrograd and other cities. In the Petrograd Soviet, as in many others, the elected leading body—the Executive Committee—had a majority of Mensheviks and members of the bourgeois intelligentsia. In Petrograd a Provisional Government was formed under the chairmanship of Prince Lvov.

So as to prevent any further development of the revolution and to ensure the undivided power of the bourgeoisie, and also to carry the war to a “victorious finish”, several members of the bourgeois intelligentsia—Kerensky, a lawyer, Professors Milyukov, Kishkin, and Manuilov, Shingarev, a doctor, Peshckhonov, a writer, and others—joined the Provisional Government. Shootings at crowds of demonstrators and punitive expeditions against workers began.

The overthrow of the monarchy and the setting up of a bourgeois republic especially suited the interests of those groups of the intelligentsia who were employed in the spheres of capitalist production and the state apparatus.

The Russian intelligentsia supported the actions of the Provisional Government. “War to the victorious finish” was a slogan which gained great popularity in these circles. The Provisional Government's call to war against the “German barbarians”, “in the name of freedom and eternal peace”, led A. N. Tolstoi into errors and even Maxim Gorky came to believe it. The writer V. G. Korolenko also yielded to the general craze that had taken hold of the Russian intelligentsia, and in March 1917 had an article, “The Motherland Is in Danger”, published in *Russkije vedomosti* (The Russian Gazette), in which he called on society to be prepared for “action, battles and the shedding of its own and others' blood”.

* V. B. Stankevich, *Vospominaniya 1914-1919 gg.* (Reminiscences of 1914-1919), Berlin, 1920, p. 65.

However, the wide masses of workers were not willing to exchange tsarist for bourgeois oppression, nor to shed blood for that purpose. About this V. I. Lenin wrote: “The specific feature of the present situation in Russia is that the country is passing from the first stage of the revolution—which, owing to the insufficient class-consciousness and organisation of the proletariat, placed power in the hands of the bourgeoisie—to its second stage, which must place power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest sections of the peasants.”* The country inexorably moved towards socialist revolution. And as soon as the working class put the question of socialist revolution and of the dictatorship of the proletariat into the order of the day, a considerable portion of the intelligentsia withdrew from the revolutionary movement, since its final aim was not to have the working class in power but to set up a bourgeois republic in Russia.

The events that took place between February and October 1917 once again confirmed that the mass of the intelligentsia can go together with the proletariat only in the battle for general democratic freedoms, in the battle for socialist revolution it is an unreliable ally. This affected even some unstable elements who called themselves “Bolsheviks”. The resolution of the 6th Party Congress (1971) noted that “the flow, which began in 1905, of the intelligentsia from the ranks of the proletarian party became massive after the February Revolution, when the class content of the activity of our Party inescapably clarified the attitude of the non-proletarian elements to it.”***

The Great October Socialist Revolution which took place in the night of 24-25 October 1917**** shook the whole country, brought into being the most deep-lying social processes, drawing into its whirlpool all classes and strata of society. And if the classes can be said to have sufficiently clearly defined their attitude to the socialist revolution, it is impossible to say the same of the intelligentsia—an interclass substratum. Connected with various classes, including hostile ones, by its origins, business and other relations, the intelligentsia's political make-up made it a very motley and heterogeneous group. An

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 22.

** KPSS v rezolutsiyakh i resheniyakh syezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK (The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences and CC Plenary Meetings), Vol. 1, Moscow, 1970, p. 499.

*** The Gregorian Calendar was introduced in the country on 14 February 1918 (the so-called New Style), therefore the date of the Revolution is now considered to be 7-8 November 1917.

eclectic world outlook, unstable principles and vague social ideals were to a considerable degree the characteristics of the Russian intelligentsia.

In defining the position of any given member of the intelligentsia in the revolution, class (origins or social position) did not always play a decisive part. The history of the intelligentsia in Russia of the time contains so many paradoxical situations that usual notions do not always apply. For instance, General Baron von Taube commanded the Soviet forces in Siberia and died in Kolchak's torture-chambers, whereas Kornilov, who led the counter-revolutionary forces to battle against the workers, was the son of a military clerk and an illiterate Kazakh woman. Prince Potocki, on orders from the Soviet Government, conducted the restoration work in the Baku oilfields, and the "democrat" Savinkov organised anti-Soviet conspiracies and uprisings. The nobleman Blok wrote the word *Revolution* with a capital letter, and another nobleman Bunin edited a whiteguard newspaper.

Therefore to attempt to define the positions of individual members of the intelligentsia in the socialist revolution purely from the point of view of their social position would not always have accurate or objective results. It is not possible to assume that if a member of the intelligentsia was of worker or peasant origin, he would necessarily advocate their interests. On the other hand, a member of the intelligentsia of noble or bourgeois birth would not inevitably be a defender of the landowners and capitalists. Such exceptions do not, of course, change the general correctness and justice of the class approach to the analysis of social phenomena.

A section of the intelligentsia, understanding what progressive changes in the destiny of the country would be brought by the new social system, recognised the October Revolution and placed its knowledge and experience at the service of the Soviet Government. Those days saw quite a few famous scientists, engineers, writers, artists, doctors and others cross to the side of the revolutionary people.

One of the first members of the old intelligentsia to take the side of the Soviet Government and heatedly support it, was the remarkable Russian materialist scientist, K. A. Timiryazev. His articles and letters, addressing the intelligentsia, played a notable part in attracting scientific, cultural and artistic workers to the building of socialism.

When on his deathbed, Timiryazev called for the Communist doctor B. S. Vaisbrod, and in the presence of his son communicated his last words, which were to the Communist

Party and to Lenin: "I have always tried to serve mankind, and I am glad that at this fateful moment in my life I can see you, the representative of that Party which truly serves mankind. The Bolsheviks, pursuing the Leninist policy, are, I am completely convinced, working for the happiness of the people and will lead the people there. I was always yours and with you.... Please convey to Vladimir Ilyich my admiration for the genius with which he solved world-important questions in theory and in practice. I consider it my good fortune to have been his contemporary and a witness of his great actions. I admire him deeply and want this to be known to all."* These words became a symbol of faith for those members of the intelligentsia who unreservedly recognised the Soviet state.

Amongst the first who enthusiastically greeted the revolution were two great Russian poets of the twentieth century — Alexander Blok and Vladimir Mayakovsky. "Accept or not accept? Such a question never existed for me.... This is my Revolution!" said Mayakovsky. In his article "The Intelligentsia and the Revolution", published on 19 January 1918, Blok called on the intelligentsia: "With all your body, all your heart, with your whole consciousness — listen to the Revolution."

The author of deeply lyrical verse, Blok wrote in those harsh days the poem "The Twelve", which spoke with a voice straight from the squares and the streets full of people:

*Keep in revolutionary step!
Indefatigable, the enemy dozes not!...
To get the bourgeois
We'll start a fire,
A worldwide fire....*

Bravely and decisively breaking away from the old world, Alexander Blok addressed himself to the intelligentsia with a call to help the revolutionary people with its knowledge and talent. To the question put by one of the bourgeois newspapers: "Is it possible for the intelligentsia to work with the Bolsheviks?" he replied without hesitation: "It is possible and it is its duty." Blok was able to understand the social essence and the worldwide historical meaning of the October Revolution. "The importance of the historical moment we have lived through," he wrote shortly after the victory of the revolution, "has brought about a leap in time of several centuries.... One

* *Kommunistichesky trud* (Communist Labour), 29 April 1920.

sees ever more distinctly that ours is not an intermediate epoch, but a new era..."*

The poet V. Y. Bryusov quite naturally and simply offered his co-operation to the new government. In his autobiography he says: "Towards the end of 1917 after the October Revolution I was already working with the Soviet Government."**

Similar facts were to be noticed in the artistic circles as well. One of those who became conscious of the profound meaning of what was happening was the well-known singer Leonid Sobinov. The famous stage director Yevgeny Vakhtangov without hesitation recognised the October Revolution: "The Revolution has divided the world with a red line into the 'old' and the 'new'."*** He told his students: "*Open the window*: let the fresh air come in. Let life come in. There is no need to fear life. We must go on *together* with life."**** Some writers and artists welcomed the revolution, understanding that it would open the way to new forms of artistic creativity. In the very first days of the revolution Vsevolod Meyerhold placed his talent at the disposal of the revolutionary nation.

The well-known lawyer and social activist, A. F. Koni, also offered his services to the new government. This senator, academician and member of the State Council welcomed the October Revolution as a new era for mankind.

As soon as Soviet power had been established in Kozlov, the Russian plant-breeder I. V. Michurin came forward and announced his agreement to work for the revolution. "I accepted the October Revolution as a fact of life," he wrote, "as a just and inevitable historical necessity, and immediately appealed to all honest agricultural specialists to take the Soviet Government's side and unhesitatingly follow the path of the working class and its Party."*****

The eminent Russian engineer and metallurgist, M. K. Kurako, warmly welcomed the October Revolution. The new government was enthusiastically greeted by the talented mining engineer, Professor M. M. Protodyakonov, and the eminent specialist in energetics, R. E. Klasson, also immediately placed

* A. A. Blok, *Sobraniye sochinenii* (Collected Works), Vol. 8, pp. 132-33.

** Valery Bryusov, *Stikhotvoreniya, Poemy* (Poems), Moscow, 1958, p. 11.

*** Yevgeny Vakhtangov, *Materialy i statyi* (Documents and Articles), Moscow, 1959, p. 166.

**** Boris Zakhava, *Vakhtangov i yego studiya* (Vakhtangov and His Studio), Moscow, 1930, p. 77.

***** I. V. Michurin, *Sochineniya* (Selected Works), Vol. 1, Moscow, 1948, p. 609.

all his knowledge and experience at the disposal of the revolution.

A future academician, the geologist A. D. Arkhangelsky, saw the development of the revolution in a village of the Ryazan gubernia* and wrote: "I understood what a great thing had been achieved, even though I was only vaguely conscious of the perspectives open before us. I came to the decision that now was the time to change my attitude towards the state and to begin to help the young government to build a new life. In January 1918 I went to Moscow to put this into practice."**

The names of just a few of the outstanding cultural, scientific and artistic workers have been mentioned here. But with them thousands of "rank-and-file" members of the intelligentsia unhesitatingly accepted the new government, amongst them doctors, teachers, agronomists, actors and artists. The first Soviet People's Commissar for Education, A. V. Lunacharsky, said: "We can gratefully remember dozens of great names and think of hundreds and maybe thousands of unpretentious toilers who immediately or almost so, but absolutely sincerely began to work for the defence and construction of the new, socialist land."*** The best of the democratic intelligentsia not only welcomed the arrival of the revolution but, together with the workers, soldiers and peasants, "were making" it.

To say it was mere chance that part of the intelligentsia took the side of the revolutionary people and accepted the October Revolution is impossible. It is incorrect to suppose that in the decade preceding the revolution the whole intelligentsia sided with the reactionary camp. In certain parts of it democratic traditions lived on and called the intelligentsia to the service of the working people. It was fidelity to the best and genuinely democratic ideals of the revolutionary intelligentsia that led many scientists, technicians, writers and artists to break with their old outlook and to make work for the liberation of the people the aim of their life. The October Revolution was greeted by them as a great storm, preparing the soil for the economic and cultural rebirth of Russia. Many members of the progressive intelligentsia also understood the fact that the Bolsheviks

* Gubernia—the largest unit of administrative and local government. The division of the country into gubernias was eliminated during 1924-1929 when the USSR was divided into regions, districts and territories.

** Quoted in: V. A. Ulyanovskaya, *Formirovaniye nauchnoi intelligentsii v SSSR, 1917-1937* (The Formation of Scientific Intelligentsia in the USSR, 1917-1937), Moscow, 1966, p. 66.

*** A. V. Lunacharsky, *Ob intelligentsii. Sbornik statei* (On Intelligentsia. Collection of Articles), Moscow, 1923, p. 42.

were the true spokesmen and defenders of the interests of the people.

To explain the position of this part of the intelligentsia it is also necessary to bear in mind the classically accurate definition of such situations given by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. In the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* they wrote: "...in times when the class struggle nears the decisive hour, the process of dissolution going on within the ruling class, in fact within the whole range of old society, assumes such a violent, glaring character, that a small section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and joins the revolutionary class, the class that holds the future in its hands."* This is what happened to a section of the old Russian intelligentsia. At the time of the bitterest class clashes, it was able to rise above the outlook of the bourgeoisie and the nobility, with whom it had close links, understand the historical necessity for the socialist revolution, and join the revolutionary proletariat. A motivating factor in this decision was its bitter dissatisfaction with the political system in pre-revolutionary Russia, and its critical view of Russian reality.

However, only a comparatively small section of the intelligentsia frankly went over to the side of the people, accepting the October Revolution and recognising the Soviet Government. A large part of the intelligentsia was not able to comprehend the events that were taking place and took up neutral positions, awaiting the outcome and announcing its "non-interference" in politics. These members of the intelligentsia were mostly from the petty-bourgeois strata. They did not want to go against the people and so did not come out against the Bolsheviks, despite the fact that, according to them, they were "usurpers", but who, as they could see, had the support of the workers and peasants. Many of them continued to work in enterprises and institutions, but only did so because of "grievous necessity". They did not believe that the workers and peasants, under the leadership of the Bolsheviks, could found a powerful state.

But at the same time this intelligentsia realised that its work was indispensable for the people. For example, in Petrograd a meeting of the union of engineers in December 1917 passed a decision stating that Russian engineers did not support the idea of sabotage and would take part in the business of restoring the

* K. Marx and F. Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Moscow, 1969, pp. 56-57.

national economy, but that nevertheless they did not share the ideology and tactics of the Bolsheviks.

Many even of the more liberal-tending intelligentsia who had enthusiastically welcomed the overthrow of tsarism did not, after the socialist revolution, wish to be involved in the events which were taking place, and believed that the revolution was a very grave calamity for Russia. Here, for example, is an extract from the memoirs of Academician L. A. Orbeli, about the feelings of the great Russian physiologist I. P. Pavlov: "Ivan Petrovich took the October Revolution very much to heart, and believed that the nation had been destroyed, and that the warring powers would split it asunder."* It took him years to be able to appreciate the importance of the socialist revolution to the destiny of the nation, and he then became a fervent Soviet patriot. Pavlov was not alone in his pessimism. Several prominent scientific and artistic figures openly prophesied that the new conditions in Russia would mean the death of culture.

The permanent secretary of the Academy of Sciences, S. F. Oldenburg, bitterly told his colleagues in a speech about the activity of the Academy in 1917: "The Russian people has neither withstood this historic test nor the great world struggle; dark, ignorant masses gave in to the deceptive temptations of shallow and criminal promises: Russia has come to the foot of its grave."

Many members of the intelligentsia were gripped with a deep pessimism, taking the collapse of the rule of the bourgeoisie, a class which they considered to be the only bearer of culture, as the death of culture in general. In terror and despair they mourned Russia's past, not seeing a gleam of hope in the events which were shaking the country.

Sizeable groups of scientists, writers, teachers, doctors, engineers and artists announced that they were "outside politics" and did not wish to be involved in the current events. It should be said that many of these "neutrals" would have honestly supported the Soviet Government had they not been prevented from doing this by the fear of the revolutionary people and of the ghost of excesses and impending destruction of culture and cultural values, resulting from their lack of understanding of the people.

A significant section of the intelligentsia not only did not accept the socialist revolution, or at least occupy a neutral

* L. A. Orbeli, *Vospominaniya* (Reminiscences), Moscow-Leningrad, 1966, p. 83.

position towards it, but took the path of sabotaging Soviet Government measures or actually fighting it. Civil servants and specialists in various enterprises started to stay away from work as a sign of protest against the seizure of power by the working class, and frustrated government measures of vital importance to the people, trying to discredit the new government in the eyes of the working people.

Sabotage took extremely varied forms. The most common form was desertion from the services, strikes, ignoring the instructions of the organs of the Soviet Government, the blackballing of civil servants and specialists who were co-operating with the new government, slipshod work, etc. Sabotage and strikes by workers of government enterprises and municipal departments did great harm to the normal life of the towns and cities. Public transport halted, electric power stations stopped and hospitals closed their doors. Supply departments hindered the provision of goods and fuel to the population.

Various groups of the intelligentsia were involved in sabotage, but the strikes which were most sharply felt were those of the teachers and medical personnel. On a call from the counter-revolutionary leadership of the All-Russia Union of Teachers on December 2, 1917, the teachers of Moscow joined the strike by the Moscow city council workers. Out of 4,000 teachers only a few continued to hold classes. The anti-Soviet teachers struck for three months. In Petrograd too the teachers struck. There were also short strikes in Ufa, Yekaterinburg and Astrakhan. Local branches of the Teachers' Union waged a wide campaign of support for striking teachers, collected funds, organised protest meetings against government measures, and carried out anti-Soviet agitation amongst the pupils in schools.

The administration of the N. I. Pirogov Society of Russian Doctors or Pirogov Society sharply criticised the "seizure" of power by the Bolsheviks, and called on all medical workers to sabotage Soviet Government measures in the public health field. The scale of the strikes and sabotage in medical institutions was considerable in Moscow and Petrograd. Added to this, resolutions with a call not to enter into dealings with the Bolsheviks were made by the administrations of the unions of medical assistants, nurses and pharmacists.

The Bolshevik doctor Z.P. Solovyov wrote at that time: "Doctors of all kinds and levels, from doctor-generals to ordinary country 'people-loving' doctors, fired by the 'ideological' sabotage that was being propagated, draped themselves in the hired, cheap, second-hand toga of the 'fighting intellectual

proletariat', and effortfully, thoroughly destroyed what they controlled of the system for providing the masses with medical and health care."* And in January and February 1918, because of the dislocation, the hunger and the cold, typhus began to spread in Moscow.

The bourgeois professorate, although it did not give up teaching in the institutions of higher education, was nevertheless mostly hostile to the Soviet Government. In November-December 1917, its top levels openly announced that they did not recognise the new government, and that they considered the Bolsheviks to be usurpers. Some professors and teachers blackballed those colleagues of theirs who had begun to co-operate with the Soviet Government and maligned the democratic students.

The students, who came for the most part from the well-to-do strata, were also hostile to the revolution. Remembering one of his first visits to a university at that time, Lunacharsky wrote: "I remember the sinister impression that I, a very recently appointed, so to speak 'new-born' People's Commissar, received when I appeared in my new capacity at one of Leningrad's higher institutes. It is true that the anonymous pencil-written warning I got on a piece of grey paper, that I would be met with chemical obstructions, did not come about, but all round me there were wolfish eyes. The young men and women crowding out the auditorium were all looking at me as at an enemy."**

The new government was also boycotted by a considerable portion of the technological intelligentsia. Its views were expressed by the All-Russia Union of Engineers, an organisation which appeared soon after the February Revolution, with his work *The Song of the Death of the Russian Land*. ests of engineers, but in fact taking an active part, on the bourgeois side, in the political battle against the working class.

The clearest statements of attitude by that section of reactionary specialists were made in delegates' speeches and in the resolutions at their union congress which took place in early January 1918 in Moscow. The congress resolved to forbid the members of the union to join, or support by their knowledge and experience, organisations whose line was to contribute to the "disintegration of industry".

* *Izvestiya sovetskoi meditsiny* (Soviet Medical Bulletin), No. 2-3, 1918, p. 3.

** A. Lunacharsky, "10 let rabfakov" (10 Years of Workers' Faculties), *Krasnoye studenchestvo* (Red Students), No. 11, 1929, p. 2.

In certain circles of the artistic intelligentsia, the victory of the October Revolution was greeted with particular hostility and, in the first days after the revolution, a number of theatres in Moscow and Petrograd stopped their performances as a sign of protest against the Soviet Government. A large section of the Alexandrinsky Theatre troupe announced its intention to sabotage all the actions of the Soviet state. Amongst the most irreconcilable were the leading actors of the troupe. V. N. Davydov and Y. M. Yuriev.

The reactionary intelligentsia declared that those who co-operated with the Soviets were traitors, and subjected them to victimisation and ostracism. This is a contemporary newspaper account of one of the meetings of a writers' society: "The *Sreda* [Wednesday] society of belles-lettrists held its regular session at which about 60 people—writers, poets, journalists and guests, amongst whom Ivan Bunin, Yevgeny Chirikov and others, were present. Yuli Bunin was in the chair. After the discussions, Mr. Orlov, with the permission of the chair, made an announcement: 'Gentlemen, in our midst at this moment there is one person, a writer, who should not be here. We all know him—it is Mr. Serafimovich, who has just accepted a post as editor of the literary and artistic section of the paper *Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies' Moscow News*. By this action, he has allied himself with those who have seized power and so should have no place amongst us....'

"Yevgeny Chirikov declared: 'I wish to speak against Mr. Serafimovich, even though he was once my colleague on journal *Znaniye* [Knowledge]. I can side with him no longer.... I would not shake hands with him....' "*

Valery Bryusov was also victimised by his former writing colleagues: his membership of various literary societies was withdrawn, he was blackballed, etc.

Part of the intelligentsia did not limit itself just to ignoring the new government or to short-term sabotaging in the first months of its existence, but became the ideological enemy of the socialist revolution.

The major section in this group was composed of officers, the reactionary professorate, and many of the more important lawyers and engineers. There were also representatives of the democratic strata of the intelligentsia, such as doctors, teachers and others. Reactionary writers and publicists played

* *Izvestiya Moskovskogo Soveta rabochikh i soldatskikh deputatov* (Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies' Moscow News), 6 December 1917.

the role of troubadours to the counter-revolutionary intelligentsia.

A pompous protest meeting against the actions of the Soviet Government took place on 26 November 1917 in the Soleil cinema in Petrograd. Amongst the participants were Mensheviks and also unaffiliated writers: V. Bazarov, F. Dan, V. Zasluch, A. Potresov, A. Peshekhonov, D. Merezhkovsky, Z. Gippius, F. Sologub and others. A special one-day issue of a paper, the *Protest-Paper of the Union of Russian Writers*, was printed for the meeting, with typically headlined articles: "The Red Wall", "Churls", "Servants of the Devil", "Profaners of an Ideal", "Violators".

The writer A. Remizov responded to the October Revolution with his work *The Song of the Death of the Russian Land*. This was a heart-rending cry, expressing with unusual completeness and accuracy the powerless rage and biblical despair of those whose factories and estates had been confiscated in October 1917. "Ragged and dumb," he wrote, "I stand in the desert where once was Russia. My soul is scaled. All, all that I had, has been rent asunder, my very clothes have been torn from my back. What do I need? I do not know. Nothing can be of use to me. There is no reason for living. Anger boils in my soul, powerlessly boils: for half a life has been burnt away for that Russia, which now has turned into nothing when it could have been all.... Understand, our life drags on unendurably." *

This section of the intelligentsia had mixed political views. One part consisted of heated monarchists who had not abandoned hopes of restoring the "rightful ruler" to power; another part represented the bourgeois parties who were fighting the Bolsheviks and the working class in the name of "true democracy", or in other words, a bourgeois republic. There were even members of the intelligentsia who called themselves revolutionaries and socialists in the ranks of the most rabid counter-revolutionaries. However, all these people with all their different political convictions were brought together and united by one thing: hatred of the Bolsheviks, of the Soviet state, and of the dictatorship of the working class.

The counter-revolutionary intelligentsia were unscrupulous in their choice of methods of fighting the Soviet state. Joining the whiteguard detachments, co-operating with the interventionists, organising conspiracies and rebellions, writing slanderous

* *Skify* (Scythians), Vol. 2, Petrograd, 1918, p. 197.

articles in the home bourgeois press and abroad — anything was good enough for a “respectable” member of the intelligentsia in the fight against the workers and peasants.

Why did the intelligentsia, which declared itself a people’s intelligentsia and even more loudly proclaimed its love for its “lesser brethren” the workers and peasants, for the most part take up a position hostile to the Soviet Government, entering into sabotage, strikes and counter-revolution? There are several reasons. The first obvious one is that many members of the intelligentsia were closely tied to the exploiting classes—the bourgeois and the nobility. Some of them came from these classes and had, so to speak, a “blood relationship” with them, occupying privileged positions which, of course, they did not want to lose.

Furthermore, the bourgeois intelligentsia could not come to terms with the fact that it was neither it, nor the bourgeoisie whose interests it defended, but its “lesser brethren” the workers and peasants, who held the key posts in the revolutionary government.

It should also be taken into consideration that many members of the Russian intelligentsia either belonged to bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties, such as the Cadets,* the Mensheviks and the SRs,** or if not formally members, had sympathetic feelings for their programmes. The Cadets, Mensheviks and SRs supported the saboteurs both morally and materially, and for this purpose used funds from various public organisations, bank loans, ministerial funds, etc.

The leadership of the mass unions to which the intelligentsia belonged, such as the All-Russia Union of Engineers, the All-Russia Union of Teachers, doctors’ and students’ associations and others, played a considerable role in determining the attitude of the intelligentsia, since it was, as a rule, Menshevik-SR or Cadet, and by its authority and direct pressure obliged union members to strike and to organise protest meetings against the Soviet state. There was a strong sense of co-operation and solidarity in such organisations, and the power of that “comradeship” caused many people to side with the anti-Soviet feelings of the leadership.

* Cadets: Constitutional Democrats. The main party of the imperialist bourgeoisie in Russia. It was formed in October 1905 and wanted to preserve tsarism in the form of a constitutional monarchy. It tried to attract the peasantry to its side.

** SRs: Socialist-Revolutionaries. A petty-bourgeois party which made its appearance in Russia towards the end of 1901 and the beginning of 1902.

Finally, a negative influence was exercised on the intelligentsia by the anarchist slogans of the Proletcult* with its call to “throw overboard” bourgeois culture, by the hare-brained plans of some Soviet educational, cultural and artistic figures, such as the destruction of the old schools and theatres, the running-down of universities to the level of being simply propagandists for science, etc. To many teachers, for example, and not without reason, the suggestions for the redesigning of schools which were announced by certain workers of the People’s Commissariat for Education in the first months of the existence of the Soviet state, seemed absurd. Thus it was proposed to liquidate all school classes, abolish lessons and homework, do without programmes and textbooks, introduce the election of teachers by pupils, etc. Naturally, such Leftist suggestions plunged many teachers into confusion and, to defend their schools from destruction, they came out against the new state.

On the subject of these excesses A. V. Lunacharsky correctly pointed out that they were used for anti-Soviet purposes by the reactionaries. “The oppositionary, counter-revolutionary teachers even rejoiced at the implacability of these rebuilders and the sharpness of their slogans. It allowed them either to contribute to the destruction with their own hands and say afterwards—‘Look what the Bolsheviks have led us to’, or to sit it out from their old positions, saying: ‘We do not know how to move a single step towards your far-off stars.’”**

In the bourgeois press of that time it was often possible to see affirmed that the sabotage and strikes by sections of the intelligentsia were retaliations against the forcible measures which the revolutionary government had taken against certain groups of the population, including the intelligentsia—arrests, dismissals from work, evictions from flats and private residences, etc., and that the Bolsheviks had “set” the workers against the intelligentsia. But it was in fact the other way round. The reactionary intelligentsia and its press set the philistines against the representatives of the revolutionary state and incited them to anti-Soviet actions. From the very first the

* Proletcult: abbreviation of Proletarian Culture, a cultural organisation founded in September 1917. The main aims of this organisation were to a large extent mistaken, such as the incorrect theory it propagated about founding a “pure proletarian culture” in isolation from preceding artistic developments. The organisation broke up at the beginning of the 1930s.

** *Narodny komissariat po prosveshcheniyu. 1917-1920 (Kratky otchet)* (People’s Commissariat for Education, 1917-1920. A Review), Moscow, 1920, pp. 4-5.

Soviet Government treated the intelligentsia as trustworthy and tried in all ways to ease its situation, calling on it to join in creative work. And it was only when the anti-Soviet position of certain circles of the intelligentsia became clear, when it answered calls for co-operation with sabotage and strikes, that the Soviet organs were obliged to resort to coercion.

On that subject V. I. Lenin wrote: "The sabotage was started by the intelligentsia and the government officials, the bulk of whom are bourgeois and petty bourgeois.... It was inevitable that the workers and peasants should be enraged by the sabotage of the intelligentsia, and if anybody is to 'blame' for this, it can only be the bourgeoisie and their willing and unwilling accomplices."

He continued: "Had we 'incited' anybody against the 'intelligentsia', we would have deserved to be hanged for it. Far from inciting the people against the intelligentsia, we on the contrary, in the name of the Party, and in the name of the government, urged the necessity of creating the best possible working conditions for the intelligentsia."*

Thus only a part of the intelligentsia honestly went over to the side of the people. The majority either worked against the Soviet state or took up a neutral position. The Communist Party had before it a vast amount of work to do to win round to the side of the Soviet Government not only those who were vacillating but also the hostile sections of the intelligentsia, to re-educate it and to use its knowledge and experience for the reinforcement and defence of the first socialist state in the world.

THE DEFEAT OF SABOTAGE. THE INTELLIGENTSIA'S TRANSITION TO CO-OPERATION WITH THE SOVIET STATE

One of the first steps taken in establishing contact between the Soviet Government and the intelligentsia was the overcoming of sabotage. It was imperative to get the intelligentsia away from the influence of the big bourgeoisie and induce it to come to the service of the nation. As early as 15 November 1917, on the instruction of the Soviet Government, the People's Commissar for Education, A. V. Lunacharsky, made a speech

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 230.

in which he called on the intelligentsia to help the working people: "Come to its help. It is full of strength but surrounded by misery. Glory belongs to those who in the difficult hour of trial by fire find themselves on the side of the people.... Shame on those who pass it by. And know that the riot, the outrageous rebellion by the intelligentsia against the working people, can, if it goes on, litter an already hard road with new thorns—but it will never stop the wheels from turning. The people calls you to work together.... There is no way back to the past."

Sabotage by the intelligentsia was not a universal phenomenon. Only certain sections of the intelligentsia were involved in it, and then mostly in the towns: civil servants, teachers, doctors. It should also be noted that not all teachers, doctors and civil servants went on strike. Many protested energetically against such forms of fighting the revolutionary state and publicly announced their disagreement with the political policies of the anti-Soviet leaders of the intelligentsia's unions, and their resignation from those unions.

The example was given by the few Communists amongst the intelligentsia who were members of those unions. They bravely and decisively advocated the only correct position—that of full support for the Soviet Government and for the fight against the inspirers and organisers of sabotage. At the executive meeting of the Pirogov Society of Doctors on 26 December 1917, a letter from the doctor Bolshevik I. V. Rusakov was made public concerning the decision of the executive of the society to call a strike, and in which he vigorously protested against this decision and announced his resignation from the society. A similar letter was sent to the society by the doctor Z. P. Solovyov. The Communist doctors M. F. Vladimirsky, N. A. Semashko, V. A. Obukh and others carried out a great deal of explanatory work amongst the medical workers, introducing them to the purposes and essence of the Soviet state and calling on them to enter into active co-operation with it.

The strikes by medical personnel brought a wave of protests, both from the population and from the doctors who had remained true to their doctors' duty. Some soldiers who were being treated in one of the infirmaries protested against the stoppage by the medical personnel, and asked the doctors not to leave without help, food or fuel, soldiers who had suffered in the war. The resolution taken by the students of the Higher Women's Courses (Internationalists) expressed complete solidarity with the students from the courses who were replacing the saboteurs. The district committee of the Yauza city hospital resolved not to distribute food to the strikers and to consider

them dismissed. At the same time it expressed its profound gratitude to the medical workers who had not abandoned their duties.

The transition process of the healthy elements to co-operation with the Soviet state was also taking place amongst the teachers. The hostile position of the leadership of the All-Russia Union of Teachers towards the Soviet state called forth protests from the population, and many teachers as well demanded that the criminal sabotage be brought to an end and that schools should not be made into a weapon of the political struggle. Letters arrived at the editorial offices of magazines and newspapers in which teachers announced their breaking with the counter-revolutionary ruling clique of the union. Here is one of such collective letters: "We, the undersigned, protest against the actions of the All-Russia Union of Teachers which takes the side of the enemies of the people in this decisive moment, supports the saboteurs and expels from the union the more valuable teachers for their political convictions. We wish to protest, and believe it to be no longer possible to remain in such a union, and therefore announce our resignation from it." Even those who were under the powerful influence of the counter-revolutionary leadership of the union protested against the policy of sabotage. At the demand of the Moscow teachers, a referendum was held at the end of February 1918 about the question of the strike. Of 1,305 voters 1,289 voted for the ending of the strike.

More and more artistic workers came forward, having decided to co-operate honestly with the new state. Thus, in the Alexandrinsky Theatre mentioned above as one of the centres of sabotage, there were forces which were loyal to the Soviet Government's call. At the head of this group was the actor Uralov. As one contemporary reports, at the time when the saboteurs were at their most violent and wanted to interrupt the performances and even close down the theatre as a sign of "protest", I. M. Uralov, together with Y. P. Korchagina-Alexandrovskaya, M. P. Domasheva, A. A. Chizhevskaya and P. I. Leshkov, were among the actors urgently having prepared a new play to be put on instead of the one wrecked by the saboteurs. The influence of these actors who supported the Soviet state increased.

However, in the beginning of 1918, a group of about 35 people announced their resignation from the theatre, and A. V. Lunacharsky was obliged to remove from the directorate of the theatre one of the inspirers of the sabotage, F. D. Batyushkov. This was followed by a threat of collective resignation. Looking

at the list of those "leaving" the theatre, Lunacharsky remarked: "Well, my friends, it may be sad, but without them, we do not need the Alexandrinsky Theatre." This did not, however, make him falter in his determination, and he continued in his effort to explain to the artists what the people and the Soviet state expected of them. His patient, supple and wise policies came out victorious in the end. Slowly the life of the troupe of the Alexandrinsky Theatre settled back to normal.

Every day more and more members of the intelligentsia became convinced that they had been deceived and used as blind weapons in the hands of the bourgeoisie and its lackeys in the fight against the revolutionary people. The measures taken by the Soviet Government to improve the situation of the intelligentsia, for the protection of cultural values, such as progressive innovations as the introduction of the new orthography, the separation of the Church from the state and the schools from the Church, the firm policies of the Soviet Government in questions vital to the life of the country, all had a part in showing the widest strata of the intelligentsia that the new state was acting in the interests of the people, including the interests of the intelligentsia. All the honest intelligentsia of Russia was breaking with the counter-revolution and going over to co-operation with the Soviet state.

But at the same time the Soviet state had to bring in measures of coercion against the more uncompromising saboteurs and strikers. In December 1917, on the initiative of Lenin, the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission for the Fight Against Counter-Revolution and Sabotage was set up. This was necessary in order to ensure the most rapid elimination of opposition by the overthrown classes and their lackeys in the bourgeois intelligentsia. The Commission waged a decisive war against sabotage, exposing and punishing those who inspired and organised it.

Sabotage did great damage to the young Soviet Republic, and fighting it was complicated and hard since the intelligentsia used the one weapon which the workers did not have—knowledge.

From its earliest days the Soviet state, the Party and the working class deployed hundreds of talented organisers, who successfully replaced the defecting specialists. The more educated Communist workers took charge of banking, national education, and many factories and workshops. For example, the ex-sailor Bolshevik, N. G. Markin, was given the duty of bringing the activities of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs back to normal. He directed the publication of secret diplomatic documents—secret tsarist anti-popular agreements. However,

though progressive workers could be used mainly to form the governmental apparatus, it was otherwise in those spheres of economics and culture which demanded special knowledge. There it was impossible to do without the intelligentsia as bearers of knowledge.

The defeat of sabotage consisted in getting the specialists engaged in sabotage to return to their work and obliging them to carry out their duties. It should be noted that harsh repression was not employed at that time against those engaged in sabotage. Confiscation of funds, short-term arrests of the leaders, deprivation of rations and pay stoppages were virtually the only punishments used against saboteurs.

This was a battle, but rather than a battle against the intelligentsia as such, it was against deserters from the labour front who were condemning the people to extra suffering. Like any legal government, the Soviet Government had the complete right, even from a bourgeois legalistic point of view, to oblige those citizens who refused in the name of preconceived political aims to fulfil their direct duties to the state.

The Soviet state punished not only the organisation of sabotage but also the victimisation of members of the intelligentsia who had gone over to the Soviet platform. It protected them from persecution by reactionaries and gave them moral support.

By the spring of 1918, sabotage by the intelligentsia had in general been suppressed. The most important reasons for the change in attitude of the intelligentsia was the triumphant march of Soviet power across the country and the breaking of the old and creation of a new state apparatus.

The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly* destroyed the counter-revolutionary forces' hopes for a rapid victory. This unavoidably told on the attitude of those groups which were sabotaging the new state. Thus the delegates to the Moscow Gubernia Teachers' Congress, in a resolution on their relations to the Soviet state, noted that the political situation had taken a

* The Constituent Assembly in Russia was a representative body. The convening of the Constituent Assembly was prepared by the Provisional Government in 1917 under pressure from the masses. The elections took place in November, but with electoral rolls that had been drawn up before the October Revolution. For this reason counter-revolutionary parties predominated in it. The Constituent Assembly convened on 5 (18) January 1918 in Petrograd refused to confirm the decrees of the 2nd Congress of Soviets on land, peace and the transfer of power to the Soviets, or to ratify the Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People. On 6 January the All-Russia Central Executive Committee dissolved the Constituent Assembly.

sharp turn towards the transfer of the whole governmental apparatus, both in the centre and in the localities, into the hands of the Soviets of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies. The congress recognised that it was "impossible for the teaching profession to use strikes as a collective demonstration against this state", and declared that it believed it was imperative for teachers to enter into an active relationship with Soviet power.

It should also be noted that termination of sabotage by the intelligentsia was to a certain extent connected with the resumption by Kaiser Germany of military activity against the Soviet Republic in February 1918. This was particularly true of the doctors who were on strike. Their position, in the face of the general popular wave to repulse the enemy, was particularly ambiguous and difficult, attracting the hatred of the people for them as being to all intents and purposes the allies of the German invaders. This was one of the reasons for the decision taken by a meeting of Moscow medical workers on 2 March 1918 to set up a medical corps to serve the Red Army. The All-Russia Union of Nurses and the students of the Military Academy of Medicine also offered their services for the sick and wounded. The famous micro-biologist D. K. Zabolotny took charge of the work of the anti-epidemic detachments.

The foreign military intervention, undertaken by the Entente countries, and the intensification of the Civil War also speeded up the process of division in the intelligentsia, and its change of course to co-operation with the Soviet state. Large sections of the intelligentsia began to offer it their services. For example, in March 1918 A. P. Karpinsky, the president of the Academy of Sciences, communicated in a letter to Lunacharsky that the workers of the Academy had become convinced of the necessity of co-operating with the Soviet Government. Many members of the intelligentsia who considered themselves to be outside politics began to take a lively interest in the political events which were stirring the country. This is confirmed by the meetings held by the intelligentsia and their appearances in the press. It was with feelings of intense indignation that all honest members of the intelligentsia met the heinous attempt on Lenin's life.

At this time the intelligentsia began to form mass organisations with a Soviet platform. Several of the new unions of the intelligentsia appeared spontaneously on the initiative of their more progressive members, but they were always given the absolute support of the Communist Party and of the Soviet

state. As early as the end of 1917 a group of medical workers in Petrograd set up a trade union which was called the All-Russia Federated Union of Medical Workers. Towards the middle of March 1918 in Moscow and Moscow Gubernia, the medical workers also organised a trade union of their own. One of the tasks which it set itself, as its charter stated, was "co-operation with the Soviet state in the organisation of medical affairs, the elaboration of medical and health questions in co-ordination with the tasks set by the Soviet state, and the organising of medical workers standing on the Soviet platform". As opposed to the counter-revolutionary All-Russia Union of Teachers, the Union of Internationalist Teachers was founded at the end of 1917, in which were united all those involved in teaching and education "who stand for social revolution".

Similar kinds of unions and associations were founded by the artistic intelligentsia—artists, actors and journalists, and also by civil servants. In early 1919, the trade unions which recognised the Soviet state had the following memberships: post office and telegraph workers—58,683 members; the workers of public and trade departments—505,241 members; bank clerks—27,234 members; pharmacists' assistants—12,613 members; the All-Russia Union of Medical Workers—97,779 members; workers in the arts—27,586 members; agronomical workers—18,557 members; forestry workers—15,007 members; in all about 800 thousand people.

The transition of the intelligentsia to co-operation with the Soviet state went especially quickly in the autumn of 1918. By this time a considerable number of bourgeois specialists was already working in Soviet departments and enterprises, in units of the Red Army, in scientific establishments, in higher educational institutions. An interesting indication of the transition of the intelligentsia to the side of the Soviet state were the joint meetings of workers and intelligentsia which took place in the autumn of 1918 in many cities across the country. Gorky and Lunacharsky took part in the organisation of these meetings. On October 6, a meeting in Petrograd of more than 20 thousand people unanimously accepted the following resolution:

"The meeting of workers and intelligentsia, convened by the Petrograd Labour Commune under the chairmanship of Maxim Gorky, having heard a series of speakers, recognises that the history of the last year has demonstrated the great popular support for the October Revolution.... The meeting considers a rapprochement imperative between the revolutionary working dictator-people and the healthy elements of the working intelligentsia, which recognises the correctness of the general

policies of the Soviet state, and is ready to wage the great battle for socialism shoulder to shoulder with the working class and the peasant poor." The resolutions of such meetings influenced wide circles of the intelligentsia, including those who had been most persistent in their refusal to co-operate with the Soviet state.

An equally clear example of the transition of the petty-bourgeois democrats to the side of the Soviet state was the change in political position of part of the membership of the Menshevik and SR parties. Fearing that it would finally lose its already disintegrating authority, the Central Committee of the Menshevik party passed a resolution on 17-21 October 1918, calling on the party to refuse to co-operate politically "with classes hostile to democracy". In its resolution of 14 November, the Central Committee of the Menshevik Party expressed its readiness to "finally and irreversibly" break off its alliance with the bourgeoisie and to "take up an unconditionally hostile attitude to the interference of foreign plunderers...". The Mensheviks announced their recognition of the Soviet system "as a reality, and not as a principle". Notwithstanding their last reservation, which showed that the Mensheviks remained in principle enemies of Bolshevism, the announcement of their intention to stop actively fighting against the Soviet state was regarded as positive by the Soviet Government.

A similar line was also taken by the Right SRs. The resolution of their conference on 8 February 1919 called on the Right SR organisations to fight the whiteguards and the interventionists. The conference spoke out against attempts to overthrow the Soviet state by armed force and forming a bloc with the bourgeoisie.

The Communist Party had a clear understanding of the fact that the social character of the petty bourgeoisie conditioned its permanent vacillations in accordance with the correlation of forces at a given time, and that the petty-bourgeois parties were unreliable fellow-travellers who were capable both of vacillations and betrayals, as was shown in the course of further events. But despite all these vacillations and betrayals by the Menshevik and SR democrats, the Bolsheviks supported the transition of these parties to the side of the Soviet state, for in the long run it was not the petty-bourgeois parties who were important but the petty-bourgeois masses in whose number was included the intelligentsia.

V. I. Lenin wrote on this subject: "It is not enough to encourage this change of front and amicably greet those who are making it. A politician who knows what he is working for must

learn to *bring about* this change of front among the various sections and groups of the broad mass of petty-bourgeois democrats if he is convinced that serious and deep-going historical reasons for such a turn exist." But this does not mean, he continued, that one must refrain from suppressing enemies. "It would be farcical to attempt to 'convince' or generally to 'psychologically influence' them. But it would be equally foolish and ridiculous—if not more so—to insist only on tactics of suppression and terror in relation to the petty-bourgeois democrats when the course of events is compelling them to turn in our direction."*

The reasons for the petty-bourgeois democrats' move to the side of the Soviet state at that time should be looked for above all in the policies of the Communist Party towards the intelligentsia, and also in the changes which took place towards the autumn of 1918 in the internal and international situation of the Soviet Republic. This period, coming after the revolution, taught the intelligentsia a lot. It saw that the Soviet state was firm, and that the popular masses under the leadership of the Bolsheviks were striving to restore the economy, preserve cultural values, and set up honest co-operation with the intelligentsia. In his article "The Valuable Admissions of Pitirim Sorokin" Lenin showed the basic reasons for the petty-bourgeois democracy's move to a policy of co-operation with the proletariat and for the destruction of its illusions. These were, firstly, the collapse of German imperialism, the annulment in November 1918 of the Brest Treaty, which was in many ways an obstacle to the rapprochement of the intelligentsia to the Soviet state, and secondly, the relentless unmasking of belief in "pure democracy" by the current of events.

The signing in March 1918 of the extraordinarily severe Brest peace treaty with Germany was brought about by the necessity to get respite from the war and to prevent German imperialism from stifling the revolution. This peace was considered by most of the intelligentsia to be "humiliating" and "shameful" and a betrayal. "The bitterness, resentment, and violent indignation provoked by this peace were easy to understand..."** wrote Lenin. All this created the greatest difficulty in morally winning over the intelligentsia to the side of the Soviet state.

An important reason for the move by the intelligentsia to the side of the Soviet state was that the events of the Civil War clearly showed the intelligentsia that the intervention and the

whiteguard counter-revolution were threatening to destroy Russia. The intelligentsia of Russia was faced with the choice: either there would be a Soviet state, defending the interests of the working people, or a bourgeois republic under the control of Anglo-American imperialism, re-establishing reaction all over the world.

That part of the intelligentsia which had strong patriotic feelings, and to whom the national independence of Russia was important, became daily more convinced that this independence was being upheld only by the Bolshevik Party, and so decided to serve the Soviet state. The famous Soviet physicist A. F. Ioffe in his book *My Life and Work* wrote this about how he went over to the side of the Soviets: "I did not immediately comprehend the meaning of the October Revolution. At first I took the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks as just one episode in the revolution, a part of the effort to end the war, and I thought that the decisive role would belong to the peasantry, which was now armed as a result of demobilisation, though not capable of holding power. However, after spending the summer in the Crimea, where a bourgeois government was being upheld by the German occupying army, my position was finally determined by the attempt on Lenin's life in Moscow and the vicious hatred of the Crimean liberals for the proletariat. I already had no doubts: here, a bright future ahead with the proletariat, and there, a wretched, rotting past with the bourgeoisie. When I returned to Leningrad in September 1918, I firmly resolved to link my fate with the Land of Soviets and cast my lot in with the building of the future." Ioffe's path to the Soviet state was typical of that of many of the intelligentsia.

The move by the intelligentsia to co-operation with the Soviet state was rapidly taken into consideration and put to use by the Communist Party. V. I. Lenin wrote a series of articles in which he analysed the reason for the rapprochement of the petty bourgeoisie to the proletariat and formulated the tasks of the Party in this new situation. In a speech on 27 November 1918 at a Moscow Party workers' meeting, Lenin pointed out the necessity of putting to maximum use the move by the intelligentsia to the side of the Soviet state and of attracting ever more detachments from it to the building of socialism.

The activity of the Communist Party in this direction grew particularly after the decisions of the 8th Party Congress which stated the principle for the relations of the Party to the intelligentsia into the Party Programme and pointed out the vital importance of putting its knowledge and experience to use in the

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 191.

** *Ibid.*, p. 187.

interests of the building of socialism. The resolutions of this Congress had a great influence on the change in attitude of the working masses towards the intelligentsia and on the change in attitude of the intelligentsia itself.

The correct line of the Communist Party, based on an analysis of the objective correlation of the class forces and the social character of the intelligentsia, gave positive results. The Soviet state brought more and more specialists into its apparatus. Scientists, engineers, teachers, doctors, military specialists and other intelligentsia groups came forward to serve the Soviet state.

The Communist Party was keenly aware of the fact that vacillations on the part of the intelligentsia towards the bourgeoisie would still continue, and that at the slightest success of the counter-revolution, a section would cross over into the enemy camp, and later, at another change in the situation, return back to the service of the Soviet state. Lenin taught that this instability of the intelligentsia was not to be feared, that its vacillations were inevitable. "But through all these vacillations we shall be enlisting groups of cultured intellectuals into the ranks of Soviet workers, and we shall cut off those elements that continue to support the whiteguards."*

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 182.

Chapter TWO THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S POLICY TOWARDS THE OLD INTELLIGENTSIA

V. I. LENIN ON THE USE OF BOURGEOIS SPECIALISTS AS A FORM OF CLASS STRUGGLE

The working class of Russia began the building of socialism under extraordinarily complicated and difficult conditions. The World War had exhausted the weak economy of the country. Industry was experiencing a grave shortage of workers, raw materials and equipment. The productive forces in agriculture had also been undermined. The population of the vast country went hungry. The internal counter-revolution, supported by foreign imperialists, was bitterly resisting the power of the workers and peasants.

An immensely difficult task stood before the working class and the revolutionary government faced by an almost complete absence of qualified cadres necessary for the running of the state, the national economy and the army. It is natural that in the early period of the existence of the Soviet state, the task of attracting the old intelligentsia to the building of socialism, the defence of the country and the training of new worker and peasant cadres should be of especial significance. V. I. Lenin said at the 8th Party Congress: "The question of the bourgeois experts has arisen in the army, in industry, in the co-operatives, everywhere. It is a very important question of the period of transition from capitalism to communism."*

The history of revolutionary struggle had never seen large-scale use by workers and peasants of specialists who either had alien ideologies or were, in many cases, positively hostile. This problem had never even been worked out theoretically. Lenin noted: "When we included the question of

* *Ibid.*, p. 178.

bourgeois specialists in the revolutionary programme of our Party, we summed up the Party's practical experience in one of the most important questions. As far as I remember the earlier teachers of socialism, who foresaw a great deal of what would take place in the future socialist revolution and discerned many of its features, never expressed an opinion on this question."*

In solving the problem of attracting the intelligentsia inherited from the old society by the proletarian state, the Communist Party was led by the propositions of principle and practical directions worked out by Lenin.

In many of his works concerned with the pre-revolutionary period, Lenin brought to light the class nature of the intelligentsia as a social stratum, vacillating between the basic classes in society, and mapped out the ways and means of making use of the bourgeois specialists. In his work "Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?" (September 1917), V. I. Lenin wrote that after the seizure of power the proletariat would avail itself of the services of economists, engineers, agronomists and other specialists, but would necessarily subordinate them to the control of workers' organisations.

Lenin devoted special attention to this problem after the conquest of power by the proletariat, when the young Soviet Republic set itself the aim of using all the advances achieved under capitalism in the scientific, technological and cultural fields, in the interests of the socialist reorganisation of Russia. Lenin believed that socialism should begin to be built on the technological and economic basis left behind by the old society, making as much use as possible of the bourgeois intelligentsia which embodied in itself, in its knowledge, ability and experience, the "spiritual" side of capitalist production. "But it is not enough to crush capitalism," he pointed out. "We must take the entire culture that capitalism left behind and build socialism with it. We must take all its science, technology, knowledge and art. Without these we shall be unable to build communist society. But this science, technology and art are in the hands and in the heads of the experts."**

Lenin warned that the task of attracting the cadres of the old society to the building of socialism—notwithstanding their political outlook—was complicated and difficult, but that at the same time it was of immense importance to the proletariat. It was not by chance that he defined the use of the intelligentsia as

* V. I. Lenin. *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, pp. 153-54.

** *Ibid.*, p. 70.

one of the forms of class struggle.* But it is a distinctive form of class struggle, sharply differing from such forms as suppressing resistance from the exploiting classes, civil war and others.

It was a form of class struggle not against the intelligentsia as such, but for the intelligentsia.

If the proletariat carried out a policy of suppression of resistance from the former exploiting classes, then in relation to the old intelligentsia the Communist Party set itself the task of "exerting systematic and guiding influence on it (which also equals struggle, but of a special kind, overcoming a certain resistance, but, true, one of a completely different sort...)."** At the same time the objective of this form of class struggle was not only to influence the intelligentsia. Persevering and systematic work had to be done by the Communist Party to change the attitude of the workers, the working masses, towards the intelligentsia. Moreover, it was also necessary to secure united opinions and actions within the Party itself, suppressing Left sectarian and nihilistic feelings amongst a section of the Communists. This form of class struggle was, therefore, many-sided, complicated and not without dialectical contradictions.

V. I. Lenin believed that an indispensable condition of enlisting the old intelligentsia to the building of socialism was the setting up of control on its activity by the working class and its Party. The Communist Party and the working class called on the intelligentsia to co-operate actively. The working class had been prepared for the political leadership of society by all its previous experience in the class struggle, and it had no intention of relinquishing this leadership to anyone. The victorious proletariat was not very experienced though in what concerned the practical implementation of its dictatorship, "the techniques of administration", that is the ability to organise the economic and cultural life of the country on a scientific basis, and it was necessary for it to acquire this knowledge. This is why Lenin considered that workers and peasants should systematically and perseveringly study from the intelligentsia, from specialists in scientific, technological, cultural and military affairs. There are many examples of how Lenin very sharply criticised the bureaucratic conceit, the very idea that there was no point in the working class learning from the defeated bourgeoisie. He pointed out: "Our job is to attract, by way of experiment, large

* *Ibid.*, Vol. 30, p. 98.

** *Leninsky sbornik* (Lenin Miscellany), III, Moscow-Leningrad, 1925, p. 494.

numbers of specialists, then replace them by training a new officers' corps, a new body of specialists who will have to learn the extremely difficult, new and complicated business of administration."*

For Lenin the problem of the participation of the old cadres in Soviet construction was inseparably connected to the general question of attitude towards the cultural heritage of the past. Time and again he noted that it was actually the working people who were the heirs to "the sum of human knowledge", that if they did not assume this heritage, if they did not master all the achievements of world culture, they would not be able to proceed to the building of the culture of the future—socialist culture—and, accordingly, they would not be able to build socialism. Lenin believed that there was an absolute necessity for creative mastery and the rebuilding of the culture founded throughout the development of mankind.

A clear-cut definition of the Communist Party's attitude to the cultural heritage of the past was also important to win over morally the cultural forces of the nation, as it would only be when the bourgeois intelligentsia would see for themselves that the advanced strata of the workers did not only value culture, but also helped to carry it to the masses, that they would change their attitude towards the proletariat and be morally defeated. They would then begin to come over to the proletarian side.

Tendentious notions of the downfall of culture in general and of the end of civilisation being brought by the revolution were at that time quite widely accepted amongst the old intelligentsia. The "passing" of culture was mourned by members of the old, bourgeois intelligentsia which, confused, despairing and anguished, repeated old prejudices, frightened and frightening itself. It blamed the working people for the petty-bourgeois strata's anarchism, which frightened and repelled it. Academician S. F. Oldenburg described later his sufferings during that difficult time. "The danger was particularly great for culture—the roots of which went back to the former way of life and which for that reason often seemed either completely unacceptable or only barely so to the new system. It was therefore exceptionally difficult to find the right path. There were moments when it seemed that culture would die and together with it science, when it seemed that nobody needed them in this great overturning which was so quickly accomplished."

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 248.

The pessimistic views of the historical and moral processes that had been brought about by the October Revolution fired the Menshevik and SR writers. And it has to be said that many of the old intelligentsia, falling prey to concoctions about the end of civilisation supposedly being brought about by the Bolsheviks, and not seeing anything except for the breaking up of the past, openly announced that they were not going to work under the Soviet state.

The task was made harder by the fact that V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party were obliged to fight the nihilistic position which had been taken by the Proletcult. Using the people's immense thirst for knowledge and culture, the Proletcult set up a countrywide network of workers' clubs, literary circles, art studios and acting courses. All this was certainly very needed and useful. However, the Proletcult leaders' line was radically different from that of the Communist Party. They affirmed that a major task for the working class was to create a "special proletarian culture", completely rejecting the heritage of previous generations. The best creations of human genius were rejected by the Proletcult on the basis that they had been made in the time of an exploiting society. These "revolutionaries" called for the destruction of museums, saying "Set fire to Raphael", "Trample on the flowers of art". They proposed to abolish the teaching of history and classical literature in schools, to shorten the natural science course, etc.

The ideologists of the Proletcult were scornful of the old artistic intelligentsia, believing that the task of building proletarian culture could only be entrusted to the forces of the proletariat alone, with all the scientists, actors, artists, engineers and others coming from their midst. Even their very notion of the character of proletarian culture amounted to a rejection of the ideological and figurative content of art and of its aesthetic value.

Lenin ruthlessly exposed the Proletcult ideologists as unrealistic dreamers who could do considerable harm to the state and to the people. Speaking to the 3rd Congress of the Komsomol in October 1920, he said: Proletarian culture "is not clutched out of thin air; it is not an invention of those who call themselves experts in proletarian culture. That is all nonsense. Proletarian culture must be the logical development of the store of knowledge mankind has accumulated under the yoke of capitalist, landowner and bureaucratic society".*

* *Ibid.*, Vol. 31, p. 287.

At the same time Lenin and the Communist Party underlined that to inherit the culture of the past and to make this heritage one's own did not mean to be indiscriminate in one's choice of cultural material. They persistently fought against attempts to approach the cultural heritage in a vulgar or sweeping way, and against assertions that unreserved and uncritical use of all the elements of the old culture was possible. Inheriting the culture of the preceding society meant that it was necessary to sever from it all that was stagnant, reactionary and anti-popular, and put all its valuable, healthy and democratic elements to the service of the new society.

As has been said above, a considerable section of the bourgeois intelligentsia met the October Revolution with hostility or took up a neutral position towards the proletarian state. What was the attitude of the Soviet state towards the different groups of the intelligentsia?

As regards the intelligentsia which joined the counter-revolutionary and interventionist camp, a pitiless war reaching terror was waged against it. But if this intelligentsia began to vacillate, and from hostility turned to neutrality or co-operation with the Soviet state, then agreements and good-neighbourly relations were established with it.

There was nothing surprising or unexpected in a certain section of the intelligentsia occupying a neutral position in relation to the workers' and peasants' state, and announcing that it was "outside politics", since there is no such thing as a revolution which conquers and convinces immediately and which immediately inspires trust. It would be naïve to think that immediately after the seizure of power by the proletariat all the classes and strata of society would adopt a socialist world outlook. Hence, the point at issue was not that of turning the revolution's opponents into allies in two days flat. The aim of the Party was to attract the intelligentsia which called itself neutral to come to reinforce the new society, and to win it over morally. In addition, Lenin considered neutrality to be a necessary step in the progress of the intelligentsia towards recognising the idea of socialism: "... from hostility to Bolshevism first to neutrality and then to support of Bolshevism".*

Of course, under conditions of bitter class struggle, the neutrality of the petty bourgeoisie and of the intelligentsia is no more than a fiction, a plain political prejudice. A member of the

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*. Vol. 28, p. 190.

intelligentsia considering himself to be neutral, was capable, at the slightest success of the counter-revolution, of crossing over into the camp of the enemies of the Soviet state. Nevertheless this unsteady, vacillating, indefinite neutrality was recognised and served to reinforce the Soviet state. Had the Communist Party taken the neutrality of the intelligentsia as absolutely wrong, and fought it in the sense that to be a neutral was to be an enemy, real or potential, then, in the expression of V. I. Lenin, it would have cut the grass from under its own feet. And developing this thought he added: "And when they say they want to be neutral and live on good-neighbourly terms with us, we shall reply: 'That's just what we want.'"*

Besides, Communists made judgements as practical people: in a situation of acute shortage of qualified cadres it was imperative to use the neutral apolitical intelligentsia, and extract the most from its position. It was necessary to enter into agreements with it and to make compromises. Furthermore, it would have been a mistake to be afraid of the reactionary character of some or other elements as it was inevitable that some would be so during the initial period of the existence of the Soviet state. In fact it was imperative to attract them as much as possible to the building and defence of the socialist state.

The neutrality of the intelligentsia was, until a given moment, useful to the Soviet state. In its ideological outlook the intelligentsia, especially its upper levels, stood closer to the bourgeoisie than to the working class, so that if, in the name of an illusory "apoliticism" and "neutrality" it did not go over to the side of counter-revolution, but co-operated with the Soviet state, this had to be taken as positive. Had the opposite been the case, the enemies of the revolution would have won, and the Soviet state would have lost a considerable number of highly qualified cadres. It was at that time preferable to the Soviet state that a certain part of the intelligentsia should remain non-Party, apolitical and neutral, rather than that it should take part in an active fight against the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Recognising the neutrality of the intelligentsia as in fact objectively useful to the Soviet state, the Communist Party at the same time explained to the intelligentsia that it should abandon its neutral positions, that to live in Soviet society and not take up its interests and aspirations was impossible.

The Leninist policy of attracting the bourgeois intelligentsia to the management of the economy and the army and to the

* *Ibid.*, p. 212.

building of culture was subject to sharp attacks from the opportunist groupings, and especially from the "Left Communists".* Thus, early in 1918, in their *Theses About the Present Moment*, the "Lefts" replaced a sober analysis of the situation and a realistic stock-taking of forces by demagogic ranting about how Lenin was conducting a policy of "restoring the leadership of the capitalists", "bureaucratic centralisation of the Soviet Republic and unpractical bargains with bourgeois and petty-bourgeois dealers". At a time when the proletariat was having to solve complicated organisational questions, the "Lefts" continued to meet with hostility the practical measures taken by the Party for the organisation of the economy, especially in questions to do with the employment of bourgeois specialists. The "Left Communists" attitude that specialists were nothing but a parasitic element basically unnecessary to production only helped the enemies of the Soviet state.

This was made more complicated by the fact that the demagogic slogans of the "Left Communists" found a response from some workers. The "Lefts" readily used the natural—in such situations—distrust of the working masses for the specialists as accomplices of the bourgeoisie, to counter the Leninist policy of using the cadres of the old society as much as possible in the building of socialism.

Lenin sharply criticised the "Left Communists", and defined their position as deeply shameful and a complete renunciation of Marxism. He said that the "Lefts" had not understood all the complications and particularities of the forms of class struggle which the proletariat had to wage after the seizure of power. They did not take into consideration that not all of the historical contradictions arising out of capitalism could be settled by the mere seizure of power and expropriation of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat, or that the working class could settle these contradictions only by a long and stubborn class struggle.

In fact the anarchists did not differ in any way from the "Left Communists" on the question of the old intelligentsia. Slandorously accusing Lenin of being "in complicity with the bourgeoisie", they demanded the adoption by the state power of measures of mass repression against the intelligentsia as the main method of bringing influence to bear on them. The anarchist A. Y. Ghe in a speech at a meeting of the All-Russia

* "Left Communists": a faction in the Communist Party, formed in December 1917 during the time of the Brest peace treaty with Germany. The Party's struggle against "Left Communists" was a struggle on a whole series of basic questions of Marxism-Leninism in the new historical situation.

Central Executive Committee* announced that "the only way to make the specialists work, was to threaten them with the firing squad".

Especially stormy arguments developed on the subject of attracting the officers of the old army to the defence of the country. This was a very complicated question, and to solve it correctly was of such vast importance for determining the Party's general line on the intelligentsia and for the defence of the country that the 8th Party Congress took it up for consideration.

The majority of the participants at the congress supported Lenin, and condemned the views of the "Left Communists" and others opposed to attracting the old intelligentsia to the building of the Soviet state. The congress not only approved the Leninist line on attracting the bourgeois specialists, but also wrote a special section into the new Party Programme which ran: "...The task of developing the productive forces demands an immediate, broad-based and all-round use of the scientific and technological specialists left to us by capitalism, despite the fact that the majority of them are undoubtedly impregnated with bourgeois views and habits.... The Party must, in close union with the professional associations, carry on its earlier line; on the one hand, not to make even the smallest political concession to the given bourgeois stratum and mercilessly suppress any counter-revolutionary impulse however feeble, and on the other, equally pitilessly to fight the sham-radical which in its ignorance and arrogance, considers that the workers can overcome capitalism and the bourgeois system without learning from the bourgeois specialists, without using them, and without much schooling in joint work with them."**

But even after the policy of attracting the bourgeois intelligentsia to the building of socialism had been given official standing as a Party programme provision, articles and speeches against the Leninist line by certain sectarian-inclined Communists did not cease. Very soon after the 8th Party Congress A. G. Shlyapnikov, who was at the time head of the Central Bureau of the Trade Unions, published in *Pravda* (The Truth) in March 1919 his article "The Specialists", in which he accused the Party leadership of "indulging the specialists", and imputed to the

* All-Russia Central Executive Committee: until 1937 it was the highest legislative, administrative and control body of the RSFSR. It was elected by the All-Russia Congress of Soviets, and functioned until the election of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR.

** *KPSS v rezolutsiyakh i resheniyakh syezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK*, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1970, p. 52.

Party the slogan "Everything for the specialists". Shlyapnikov tried to indict the Central Committee of the Party for alienation from the working class and servility to the bourgeois intelligentsia, and demanded that the Party refuse the services of the specialists.

At the beginning of 1920 the battle around the question of attracting the intelligentsia flared up again—due to the behaviour of the so-called "democratic-centralist" group,* which advocated "boundless collective leadership" in the management of the national economy, and worked against one-man management and the centralisation of state management. They did not openly speak against the use of the bourgeois specialists but, like the "Left Communists", tried to use the distrust of the specialists felt by some workers for their own aims.

The "democratic-centralist" group was utterly defeated at the 9th Party Congress in the spring of 1920. In his speech at the congress V. I. Lenin showed the complete bankruptcy of this group's arguments. He consistently upheld the provisions in the Programme on attracting bourgeois specialists to the management of the economy under control and guidance from the Party and the state. Supporting the Leninist line, the congress, in an expanded decision, "Specialists in Industry", again underlined the importance of the question of specialists in the restoration and development of the productive forces of the country, reaffirmed the programme demands concerning the bourgeois specialists, and stated absolutely categorically that all Communists should remember the task of drawing the old specialists in on a large scale to the production life of the enterprises.

Opposition to the Party line on the question of the attitude towards the intelligentsia also came from the so-called "workers' opposition".** The oppositionists announced in demagogic attacks on the CC of the RCP(B) that serious errors were being committed in using the bourgeois intelligentsia, and that it was not scientific or technological specialists who were being encouraged to co-operate but the former organisers of the capitalist economy whom it was unjustifiable to trust too much.

* The "democratic-centralist" group was anti-Party, and worked against centralised state management, against one-man management and encouraging the old intelligentsia to take part in production. In fact this group rejected Party and state discipline and the leading role of the Party in the Soviets and trade unions.

** "Workers' opposition": an anti-Party group which rejected the leading role of the Party and of the dictatorship of the proletariat, on the basis that the trade unions were the highest form of working-class organisation.

In her pamphlet *The Workers' Opposition* issued in 1921, A. M. Kollontai*, pointing out the difficult material conditions of the working class and also some occasions when individual specialists were incorrect in their relations with the workers, said: "...The worker feels and sees that with each step the specialists ... are throwing out the ignorant workman.... And the Party, instead of checking this element alien to the workers and to communism, indulges it."

The opportunists brought up this question at the 10th Party Congress, and moved a project for a resolution which purported to show that the policy of the CC of the RCP(B) was biased towards lack of trust in the creative powers of the working class and conciliatory towards the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeois-functionary castes. In a speech at the congress Lenin said that the statement that the specialists were offending the workers, that the CC did not trust the working class and did not allow workers into leading bodies was purest demagoguery. "We are on our last legs for want of men and we are prepared to take any assistance, with both hands, from any efficient man, especially if he is a worker."**

The congress dealt a smashing blow to the "workers' opposition" platform. 514 delegates voted for the CC resolution and 45 for the "workers' opposition" one. The other anti-Party demands of the "workers' opposition" were rejected, along with its demand for an expression of no confidence in the policy of the CC of the Party towards the intelligentsia.

At the end of 1922, the question of the attitude to bourgeois culture and the old intelligentsia was again brought up in the pages of the central press by the opponents of the Leninist line. On 27 September 1922 an article by V. Pletnev, "On the Ideological Front", was published in *Pravda*, in which the author advocated a nihilistic attitude towards the intelligentsia and science. He put forward the thesis that the new culture could be built with merely the help of the proletarian intelligentsia, and wrote: "And only when the proletariat has its own scientists in all branches of knowledge, its artists in all branches of fine arts—only then will the task we have set ourselves be accomplished."

V. Pletnev could not see a place in the new society for the

* A. M. Kollontai (1872-1952): professional revolutionary and active participant in the armed October uprising. She was a member of the "Left Communist" group and later of the "workers' opposition". Since 1923 she was a prominent activist in social, state and political matters in Soviet Russia, and was the first woman diplomat.

** V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 205.

intelligentsia which had been educated in a non-proletarian environment before the revolution. This led him to reject the role of the whole intelligentsia as such, and to lack confidence in its capabilities. He did not understand that socialism possessed a great force of attraction, and that the better part of the intelligentsia would be drawn to the advanced teaching of its epoch, and that it was ready to go to any sacrifice in the name of great ideals. It was this very power of attraction of socialism that V. I. Lenin had in mind when, as early as April 1919, in his pamphlet *The Achievements and Difficulties of the Soviet Government* he laughed at those who dreamed of building socialism with clean people grown in hothouses, and said that communism was capable of bringing the most different strata of the population into its sphere of influence.

He recommended that every specialist who worked conscientiously and efficiently should be cared for like the apple of one's eye.

Lenin believed that to ignore the knowledge and experience of the intelligentsia, and that to counterpose the working class and the intelligentsia was conceded communism as well as being one of the first and most dangerous evils, which ought to be fought on the same level as bribe-taking. Lenin believed that this was particularly harmful where it concerned mutual relations with the intelligentsia. Here, he taught, it was imperative to have immense tact, the ability to use a special approach, and in each case to take the particular member of the intelligentsia's work interests into account, and to see that the specialist was getting satisfaction from his work and recognised its usefulness to society.

Pletnev's article, "On the Ideological Front", started a discussion with N. K. Krupskaya, I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov and Y. A. Yakovlev taking part. It was followed very closely by Lenin. When Skvortsov-Stepanov in his article "What a Specialist Is and How He Is Made", published in *Pravda* on 28 October 1922, presented the thesis that "the proletarian dictatorship will collapse ... if these specialists are not our own specialists, such as see their aim to be the consolidation and development of the dictatorship of the proletariat", Lenin directly pointed out in a letter to the author, that this was incorrect. "We shall not have such specialists for a long time, until the *bourgeois* specialists, the *petty-bourgeois* specialists have disappeared, until *all* the specialists have become *Communists*."* Lenin wrote that since it would not be soon

* V. I. Lenin. *Collected Works*, Vol. 35, p. 557.

that we would have our own specialists, the use of the old specialists, and their education and re-education, would be a long-term business which would continue until "the end of the dictatorship"* of the proletariat.

On 24 and 25 October 1922 an article was published in *Pravda* by the assistant head of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the CC of the RCP(B), Y. A. Yakovlev, entitled "On 'Proletarian Culture' and the Proletcult", in which he subjected to critique from a Leninist position V. Pletnev's mistaken propositions on understanding culture in general and on the necessity of "socialising" science and art by forcibly smashing the old culture at a blow and then remaking it. In his criticism of Pletnev, Yakovlev wrote that his scornful attitude towards people from non-proletarian strata could only lead to a falling out between the Soviet state and the intelligentsia. "In a country in which the peasantry form the vast majority of the population," he wrote, "the very existence of the Soviet state depends on the question of whether one is to learn with the aid of the professors, engineers and popular teachers left to us by capitalism how to fight against darkness and ignorance and raise the cultural level of the working masses. *It is necessary at all costs to learn this and direct the cultural work of the popular and secondary school teachers, of the university professors, into channels determined by the interests of the proletariat.*"

In the course of the discussion, the Proletcult and vulgarised theories received their final criticisms, and the Leninist view of culture and attitude towards the intelligentsia became preferred.

From the October Revolution until the time when the bourgeois intelligentsia had in its entirety moved over to the socialist position and had become Soviet not only in name but in inner conviction, the Communist Party policy with regard to the old intelligentsia did not undergo any changes in its principles. The Party firmly and consistently put into practice a policy of attracting in all possible ways the old intelligentsia to the building of socialism and the defence of the country, and encouraging those who honestly helped the Soviet state, re-educating in the spirit of socialist ideology those who had doubts or were vacillating, and decisively suppressing any counter-revolutionary intentions in the reactionary section of the intelligentsia.

In solving the problem of the old intelligentsia, the Communist Party showed the greatest political tact, restraint, flexibility

* Ibid.

and wise patience. In its congress, conference and plenary meeting decisions, the Party Central Committee repeatedly underlined that the bourgeois ideology of the old intelligentsia had to be overcome by the continuous educational work of the Communists and the working class. But the fact that there were some remnants of this ideology was not something on which to base a rejection of the co-operation of its bearers.

At the same time it should be noted that the Party, while doing everything possible to influence the old intelligentsia's understanding of its place in the building of the new society, and creating the necessary conditions for it to work fruitfully, also vigilantly stood guard over the class interests of the proletariat without making the slightest ideological concession.

That was the general Party policy towards the old intelligentsia. But it was not enough to chart a correct policy, it was necessary to work out methods for its implementation, to plan ways of attracting the bourgeois intelligentsia to the socialist side, and expend vast efforts to fulfil in reality the concrete demands of the Party Programme.

WAYS AND MEANS OF ATTRACTING THE INTELLIGENTSIA TO THE BUILDING OF SOCIALISM AND THE DEFENCE OF THE COUNTRY

The Communist Party and V. I. Lenin came up against great difficulties in determining the methods of attracting the old intelligentsia to the service of the socialist state. It was difficult to expect that the bourgeois intelligentsia which had served the capitalists, and the workers and peasants who had overthrown the bourgeois state rule, would find from the first a common tongue and establish relations based on mutual trust and comradely co-operation.

The Communist Party and the Soviet Government devoted much attention, time and effort to the setting up of co-operation between the intelligentsia and the working people. This work was carried on from the very first days of the revolution until the time when the overwhelming mass of the intelligentsia had finally gone over to the socialist position.

Already in the first period of the revolution, the Communist Party was faced by an extremely complicated task: to find such ways and means of attracting the bourgeois intelligentsia to co-operating with the Soviet state, which would, on the one

hand, guarantee maximum effectiveness for the specialists' work, and on the other, allow the intelligentsia to be helped to change their world outlook.

This stratum's privileged position under capitalism, and the socialist state's urgent need for highly qualified cadres, as well as the conditions of the class struggle, determined the methods to be used by the Communist Party and the Soviet state for attracting the bourgeois intelligentsia to the building of socialism and the defence of the country.

There arises first the question as to the place the element of coercion occupies in the measures taken by the Party and the Soviet state in relation to the bourgeois intelligentsia.

According to bourgeois historians, it was Lenin who allegedly proposed "violence to and persecution of" the intelligentsia. In turn, some Soviet researchers and writers describe Lenin's position as "non-resistant" and ready to forgive anything from any enemy. Both these points of view are incorrect. Lenin was an exceptionally humane person, and he found any form of violence by one person on another hateful. Lunacharsky described how Lenin repeatedly told him: "A great scientist or a good specialist in any field should be spared to the extreme, even if he is a reactionary."* But where it was a question of the destiny of the revolution, of the lives of millions of workers and peasants, who were being menaced by the counter-revolutionary actions of conspirators and whiteguard agents, there Lenin was an adamant and firm person. He pointed out that the desperately difficult position in which the young Soviet Republic found itself meant that "without systematic and merciless repression of the exploiters' opposition, without being unhesitant before any bourgeois-democratic formulae, not only a socialist but a democratic revolution is unthinkable, just as there are no serious measures which it would be unthinkable to use in the fight against the crisis and the devastation caused by the war".**

Lenin's attitude towards the counter-revolutionary minded intelligentsia can be examined in his correspondence with M. Gorky in 1919, which arose for the following reasons. In the summer of that year the advance of the whiteguard general Yudenich brought about a tense situation in Petrograd and the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission took measures to sup-

* A.V. Lunacharsky, "Intelligentsia i ego mesto v sotsialisticheskome stroitelstve" (The Intelligentsia and Its Role in Socialist Construction), *Revolyutsia i kultura*, No. 1, 1927, p. 29.

** *Leninsky sbornik*, XXXVI, pp. 24-25.

press moves by counter-revolutionary forces from within. On 14 June general searches were carried out in the bourgeois districts of Petrograd with the help of workers' detachments, during which a large quantity of weapons was confiscated. To prevent further conspiracies large-scale arrests were made, and amongst those arrested were a number of professors, engineers, artists and teachers. Some of these had not taken a direct part in the conspiracies, and others had become involved in the whiteguard organisations "by imprudence or by over-credulity". A considerable proportion of those arrested were however active members of the counter-revolutionary underground. Questioning them produced abundant material which made it possible to uncover anti-Soviet underground organisations in Petrograd, Moscow and other towns.

Without waiting for the results of the investigation Gorky wrote a letter forwarded to Lenin by the president of the Military Academy of Medicine, V. N. Tonkov, in which it may be supposed (the original of the letter has not been found) he expressed his indignation at the arrests of the intelligentsia. According to Tonkov, there was even a sentence in the letter which ran: "If the situation of the scientists is not changed, I shall leave the Bolsheviks and go over to the Whites." In his answer to Gorky, Lenin wrote:

"Dear Alexei Maximych,

"I received Tonkov, and even before that and before receiving your letter we had decided in the Central Committee to appoint Kamenev and Bukharin to check on the arrests of bourgeois intellectuals of the near-Cadet type and to release whoever possible. For it is clear to us that there have been mistakes here, too.

"It is also clear that in general the measure of arrest applied to Cadet (and near-Cadet) people has been necessary and correct....

"You utter incredibly angry words about what? About a few dozen (or perhaps even a few hundred) Cadet and near-Cadet gentry spending a few days in jail *in order to prevent plots like that of the surrender of Krasnaya Gorka*, plots which threaten the lives of *tens* of thousands of workers and peasants.

"A calamity, indeed! What injustice! A few days, or even weeks, in jail for intellectuals in order to prevent the massacre of tens of thousands of workers and peasants!...

"To the 'intellectual forces' who want to bring science to the people (and not to act as servants of capital), we pay a

salary *above the average*. That is a fact. We take care of them. That is a fact. Tens of thousands of officers are serving in our Red Army and are winning victory, despite the hundreds of traitors. That is a fact."*

Such was Lenin's genuine humanity.

It is well known that the workers' and peasants' state did not take revenge on its class opponents for the sole reason that they were formerly members of the exploiting classes. In no bourgeois state after the overthrow of feudalism had there been such humanity and tolerance for class opponents, as that of the proletariat in Russia. Indeed, in the first months of its existence, the Soviet state did not even envisage setting up any special punitive bodies. "After the Revolution of October 25 (November 7), 1917," said Lenin, "we did not close down even the bourgeois newspapers and there was no mention of terror at all. We released not only many of Kerensky's ministers, but even Krasnov who had made war on us."**

At that time there were in the country Revolutionary Military Committees, one of the tasks of which was simply to isolate temporarily those elements which could hinder the strengthening of the new state. The Revolutionary Military Committees were limited to powers of short-term arrests, and widely used their right to set free arrested persons on their word of honour. However, even these measures were met by a strong opposition from the bourgeois intelligentsia, who shouted out about terror, about "violations of freedoms", and "limitations of the individual's rights".

In fact the first death sentence for a political crime was only carried out in July 1918 on some Left-SR mutineers. The Soviet state did not take revenge on the intelligentsia for having served the exploiting classes, or for the fact that a large section of it did not recognise the October Revolution and even made evil use of the peaceableness of the new state.

But further intensification of the class struggle in connection with the developing Civil War (and it was a certain section of the intelligentsia which was also to blame for this) forced the Soviet state to use a severer punitive policy, including that against the counter-revolutionary minded intelligentsia. But in all these cases it was a question not of being a member of the intelligentsia, but a counter-revolutionary. Incursions by the

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 44, pp. 283-85.

** *Ibid.*, Vol. 29, p. 515.

interventionist forces largely furthered the intensification of the class struggle in the country. After the Left-SR mutiny in Moscow, and the criminal attempt on Lenin's life in August 1918, the Soviet state announced the Red terror against class enemies who had taken up arms against the dictatorship of the proletariat. This emergency measure was a reply to the many terrorist actions, conspiracies and uprisings which had been organised by the remains of the overthrown classes with the help of certain sections of the intelligentsia.

But even in conditions of Civil War and intervention the Soviet state approached with extreme care the question of calling intellectuals to account.

On 14 December 1918 a decree was published signed by V. I. Lenin on the procedure for arresting responsible civil servants and specialists, which fixed a definite framework for the actions to be used by the pertinent authorities.

An order of the Presidium of the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission on 17 December 1919 stated: "The arrest of a specialist must only be resorted to when it is established that his work is directed towards the overthrow of the Soviet state. To arrest him only for being a former nobleman, or for having at some time been an employer and exploiter, is forbidden if he is doing his work industriously."*

The White émigré, S. P. Melgunov, had published in Berlin in 1924 a book entitled *The Red Terror in Russia*, in which he highly dramatically described the "bloody exercises" of the "pitiless Chekists".** Melgunov was in fact arrested by the Cheka in 1919 for having taken part in a counter-revolutionary conspiracy which had as its aim the overthrow of the Soviet state and the murder of revolutionary leaders. And how was he treated by the Soviet state, by the "Cheka Commissars"? Melgunov was sentenced by a revolutionary court to a short term of imprisonment, and in 1921 released and allowed to go abroad. So in fact Melgunov was a witness not of the "senseless and stupid" cruelty of the Soviet tribunals but of their mercy towards the conquered enemy. And there were not a few people who, like Melgunov, fought against the Soviet state and who not only had their lives spared by the state but were allowed to go abroad.

* *Iz istorii Vserossiiskoi chrezvychainoi komissii, 1917-1921. Sbornik dokumentov* (History of the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission, 1917-1921. Collection of Documents), Moscow, 1958, p. 346.

** Chekist: worker in the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission, from its Russian initials which are pronounced "Veh-Chek-Ka".—Tr.

Examples such as Melgunov's, of a counter-revolutionary and demagogue being freed without punishment, were one extreme. But there was another too. It would be naïve to deny that the Red terror was able completely to avoid unnecessary sacrifices, mistakes and discrepancies in measuring guilt and dealing out punishment. These did happen. Local Party and Soviet bodies made mistakes in their work with the intelligentsia, at the bottom of which, as was noted by Lenin, was the fact that "people are using the power crudely".* In the white heat of an unusually fierce class struggle there were mistakes caused by mutual hatred on both sides.

These were the result of the insufficient political experience of some of the people in power, but the Party and Soviet bodies took steps to avoid these mistakes and injustices.

The severe repressive measures taken by the Soviet organs of state power during the Civil War years were of a temporary nature. As early as January 1920, before the war was even over, the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the RSFSR Council of People's Commissars** decided to abolish capital punishment. But even during this period, when the emergency law on terror against the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie was active, the Soviet state and its punitive bodies only resorted to repression when all other methods had been exhausted and the enemy had not laid down his weapons.

Waging a decisive war against the counter-revolutionaries, the Soviet state at the same time called on the cadres of the old, exploiting society to co-operate with it, offering them important military and economic posts according to their knowledge and experience and regardless of their political convictions. Even those members of the intelligentsia who, having stumbled on the slippery path of "non-acceptance of the revolution", had fallen into the counter-revolutionary camp, were attracted to co-operation. If these people genuinely regretted their mistakes, the Soviet organs showed tactfulness and care in their relations with them.

A blanket approach to people and their fates was a method foreign to the Soviet state. If an ally, or at least a helper, could be made from an enemy, then the Soviet state was willing to attempt the experiment, and was, as a rule, not disappointed in

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*. Vol. 28, p. 220.

** The Council of People's Commissars was until 1946 the highest executive and administrative body in the USSR. The Council of People's Commissars was reorganised by a law of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in March 1946 into the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

its hopes. There was, however, a certain risk in this, and there were failures.

The Soviet state welcomed each move by the bourgeois intelligentsia towards the side of the working class. "We value everyone who is willing to work,"* underlined Lenin. But at the same time the working class severely but fairly punished those who tried to fight it with weapons in their hands.

The question now was as to the ways and means of drawing the bourgeois intelligentsia to the building of socialism.

One method was to use the intelligentsia, especially the highly qualified intelligentsia, in the old, bourgeois way, that is to say with a high rate of pay so that it could have better material standards of living. The Soviet state was not sparing of funds for this purpose. In the difficult years of devastation, war and hunger, highly qualified specialists received the highest salaries, up to five, six or more times greater than the salaries of People's Commissars or the Head of State—V. I. Lenin.

Considerable attention was paid to the material conditions of the intelligentsia. The Soviet state did all it could for the intelligentsia in those hard times. As early as the end of 1917 and beginning of 1918, teachers' monthly pay was greatly increased. Of course, the sharp fall in the buying power of the ruble meant that this was only a small help, but to do more than that then was impossible. Later a whole series of governmental decisions were taken to improve conditions for various categories of the intelligentsia. In 1919 in Petrograd a special commission was set up at M. Gorky's instigation to improve the standard of living of scholars, which saw to the distribution of food rations and sought to improve the living conditions of scientific, technological, literary and artistic workers. Later such commissions were set up in other large towns, and in Moscow the Central Commission for the Improvement of Conditions of Life of Scientists was founded.

This Soviet Government policy was not always met with understanding by certain circles of the intelligentsia, who saw in the high pay and improved living conditions the intention of the Soviet state to "buy" their knowledge and experience. In March 1919 a professor at the Voronezh Agricultural Institute, M. P. Dukelsky, addressed himself to Lenin in an open letter in which he declared that the Soviet state was hoping to "buy" the intelligentsia and have them work with the perspective of a "comfortably-filled stomach". Dukelsky wrote that without

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 294.

inspiration or creative demands not one specialist would give anything, however much he was paid for his work.

The very fact that a member of the intelligentsia, a professor from the old formation, should address himself in an open letter to the head of a workers' and peasants' state is in itself noteworthy. It shows that the mass of the intelligentsia did not hermetically seal itself off, that the Soviet state's calls for co-operation found a definite response from the people who were a long way from a socialist outlook.

In his letter Professor Dukelsky expressed the moods, thoughts and feelings of many members of the old Russian intelligentsia. This is why V. I. Lenin believed it to be absolutely necessary to answer his letter, which he did in the pages of *Pravda*. He wrote that there was no question of any "buying". After all, the work of the intelligentsia had been highly paid before, so that in Soviet times, though lower than the former ones, sufficiently high salaries were being maintained for it. This it was impossible to call buying off. In the same letter Lenin explained to the intelligentsia that if it would regard with understanding, sympathy and a feeling of comradeship the exhausted soldiers and overstrained workers, embittered by centuries of exploitation, then manual and non-manual workers would draw closer together at an extremely rapid rate.* This letter of Lenin's played an important role in attracting to co-operation with the Soviet state those sections of the bourgeois intelligentsia which were still vacillating.

High rates of pay to attract the highly qualified cadres of the old society were not able to play a definitive role in guaranteeing their co-operation. The Communist Party chose moral influence and the overcoming of lack of faith in socialism as a basic and effective method of attracting the intelligentsia. Those who still did not understand the tasks and aims of the socialist revolution could not be alienated.

However the leaders of the country and the Party understood that it was impossible to re-educate the whole intelligentsia and most of all that part of it which had had capital before the revolution, thus, in fact, not differing from capitalists. It was necessary not to teach them but to expropriate them; they had to be made to subordinate themselves to the Soviet state.

But in what concerns a considerable section of the intelligentsia which was devoted in its work although not capable of immediately reconciling itself to the loss of its privileged

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, pp. 228-32.

position in the old society and breaking away from bourgeois traditions, there the task of using and subordinating it to the Soviet state was directly connected to that of giving it a socialist re-education in the process of large-scale economic and cultural building.

When the working class attained power there developed enhanced possibilities for proletarian influence on all the healthy elements of the non-proletarian classes and strata of society, including the intelligentsia. The proletariat and its Party had at its disposal such powerful means of influencing the masses as revolutionary enthusiasm, discipline, organisation, moral weight, confidence in the rightness of its cause, and most important of all, the strength and veracity of its ideology and the greatness of its aims, in the name of which it had risen to struggle.

Successfully to attract the cadres of the old society demanded organisation, comradely discipline in the masses, proletarian influence on all the rest of the population, and the setting up of conditions under which each member of the bourgeois intelligentsia would see that he could only do his work together with the Communists, who were close by guiding the masses and enjoying their absolute trust.

At the same time it was necessary to create around the bourgeois intelligentsia a situation of trust, goodwill and co-operation and respect for its work without refraining from organisational influence on it. These propositions were written into the Party Programme accepted in 1919, and were repeatedly reaffirmed in Party decisions.

Together with its demands for comradely relations towards the intelligentsia from the working people, the Party also showed the intelligentsia that it could earn the trust of the workers and peasants only if it took up a corresponding attitude and related in a comradely way to the working people, embittered by centuries of exploitation.

The task of reforming the psychology and changing the world outlook of the intelligentsia was highly complicated. It was far from a calm and smooth process. Its currents, zigzags and turns were caused by the specifics of the internal and international situation of the Soviet state and in the end by the successes of the building of socialism. The task of re-educating the bourgeois intelligentsia and of using its knowledge and experience most rationally was only able to be fulfilled by the Party with the help of social organisations, first among which were the trade unions.

The Communist Party devoted much attention to drawing the

intelligentsia, especially the part of it connected with production, into the trade unions. In its decisions at the 9th Party Congress (1920) it noted: "The prejudice against the higher technological personnel in establishments and enterprises joining unions must be finally overcome. By allowing engineers, doctors, agronomists and others into their unions, the trade unions are helping these elements to experience comradely co-operation with the organised proletariat, to enter into the active work of Soviet construction and are also acquiring the workers with special scientific knowledge and experience that they need."*

The main questions to which the trade unions devoted especial attention in their work with the intelligentsia were the defence of its working interests, drawing it into the building of socialism, raising its level of political awareness, and strengthening its links with the working masses.

A considerable role in the re-education of the intelligentsia, and in more actively drawing it into the building of socialism, was played by the various congresses, conferences, seminars, courses, gatherings and meetings of the intelligentsia.

In October 1921 the 8th All-Russia Electro-Technological Congress was called. Over 1,500 people took part in its work, in particular examined in depth questions to do with the electrification of the country. Many sceptically minded specialists went to the congress with misgivings that its work would turn out to be no more than an agitation meeting about electrification. However, the businesslike approach to the questions, the wide range of the Communist Party's projects and the full trust in the competence of the delegates shown by the leaders of the Soviet state, melted away the specialists' distrust. "The most important achievement in the work of the congress," one of its participants later recalled, "was, it can be said, the sharp change in attitude of the majority of the delegates." Such congresses and conferences which were held nearly every year on individual scientific, technological and cultural subjects were an important school for the education of the intelligentsia.

The positive role played by various kinds of societies and associations—scientific and technological societies, writers' and artists' associations and others—in changing the outlook of the intelligentsia should also be noted. These were centres where creative ideas were used in solving concrete questions of the development of the socialist national economy and the education of the new man.

* *KPSS v rezolutsiyakh i resheniyakh...*, Vol. 2, p. 160.

Finally, the Soviet state's plans and practical work in the economic reconstruction of the country had an immense influence on the outlook of the bourgeois intelligentsia. During the preparation and putting into practice of these plans scientists and technologists worked out a new approach to the solving of the practical tasks of organising production. They were enchanted by the novelty of the principles of socialist planning, by the idea of combining different branches of production, the rational distribution of the productive forces, etc. All this awakened the creativity of the specialists who were genuinely dedicated to their work, and aroused sympathy for the new state in them. Though by no means all of them shared or understood the political aims of the Bolsheviks, they could well see and understand that the Bolsheviks were practical people who knew what they wanted and how to organise work effectively.

This is why the constructive plans of the Communist Party and the Soviet state could not fail to inspire the better part of the intelligentsia. In a letter to V. I. Lenin on 28 November 1918, the chairman of the Scientific and Technological Department of the Supreme Economic Council, N. P. Gorbunov, recounts:

"After yesterday's consultation on the Kara-Bogaz project, its role, and the role of Baku and the whole Caspian region as a world centre of the future chemical industry ... the professors who came specially from Petrograd to this meeting stayed with me for a long time afterwards and enthusiastically spoke about the new work and plans.... They themselves are beginning to be carried away, and their enthusiasm is beginning to fire their sceptical colleagues."

There were many cases in those days of hundreds of specialists arriving at an enterprise highly sceptical of the Bolsheviks' plans and of their ability to restore the normal work of the factory or workshop. But after a little time had gone by and, caught up in the labour enthusiasm of the working masses, and carried away by the idea of the economic rebirth of the country, they became good production leaders and gradually learnt to see everything from a different angle.

The specialists were becoming convinced that the socialist state was creating the very conditions that opened an unlimited field for the application of their knowledge and talent to creative work. "Our ideas and the aims which we have set ourselves," wrote F. E. Dzerzhinsky, "are so grandiose, so great, that people with knowledge can be (and are being) captivated by the greatness of our mass creation, the creativity of a collective of workers and peasants."

"We can captivate to an even greater extent than capitalists did in a capitalist system."*

The successful solution of such complicated and daunting problems in which the destiny of large groups of the intelligentsia was involved, for instance, the Leninist plan for the electrification of the country, the liquidation of illiteracy, the building of the Turkestan-Siberian Railway, of the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine, the creation of new branches of industry, the tempo of industrialisation and collectivisation, all this could not fail to attract the scientist, engineer, teacher or agronomist who enjoyed his work. The aim of socialist production to use all the achievements of science, technology and culture not just for the enrichment of a small group of people but for the good of the whole nation was a powerful motive force which induced the old intelligentsia to make a final move over to the side of socialism.

The best workers of the Party worked on attracting the intelligentsia to the building of socialism and the defence of the country. In putting the Leninist policies concerning the old intelligentsia into practice, they ceaselessly and on their own initiative did extremely important work in winning it over morally.

The Soviet press was of great help to the Communist Party in this matter. The newspapers *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* and the magazine *Bolshevik* and many others often published material which analysed the processes taking place in the intelligentsia, and printed articles which helped the intelligentsia to work out a correct and scientific outlook.

The historical experience of the Land of Soviets showed that the methods of working with the intelligentsia devised by the Communist Party, and the determining of ways for transition to a position of co-operation with the Soviet state, were the only correct ones. The moral winning-over of the intelligentsia, its sharing in the interests of the revolutionary people, the trust in the experience and competence of the specialists, and the personal contact of the intelligentsia with the worker and peasant masses, helped the Communist Party to solve the immensely complicated task of tearing the intelligentsia away from the bourgeoisie and re-educating the bourgeois intelligentsia to become a socialist one. This was a durable process. It was a long path but the correct one.

* F. E. Dzerzhinsky, *Izbranniye proizvedeniya v dvukh tomakh* (Selected Works in 2 vols.), Vol. 2, Moscow, 1957, pp. 157-58.

THE MILITARY SPECIALISTS

The Civil War prevented the workers and peasants of Soviet Russia from launching on the full-scale construction of the socialist basis. The peaceful respite came to an end and the Soviet state had to gather all its strength to repulse its numerous enemies.

With the intensification of the Civil War and the renewed onslaughts of the military intervention, the task of defending the country, of building the Red Army and a leadership for military operations became of paramount importance. The fate of the first socialist state in the world depended on how successfully the Communist Party dealt with this task. Qualified cadres with experience, ability and knowledge were needed to get work started in industrial enterprises to supply the needs of the front, to mobilise scientific strength for defence, and to provide the army with commanders.

In January 1918 a Soviet Government decree, signed by Lenin, initiated the founding of the Red Army. Workers and peasants volunteered to join its ranks, and later recruitment to the Red Army was carried out on a basis of conscription and mobilisation. It had, however, only a very few experienced commanders in its ranks. Thousands of people devoted to the cause of the revolution, soldiers and sailors, non-commissioned officers of the old army and navy who had been through the bitter lessons of the World War, were nominated to commanding posts. Schools and courses to train commanders were organised. Many commanders appeared in the course of the Civil War which was a school well able to provide military experience. The commanding cadres of the Red Army played a

major role in achieving victory for the Soviet state over the numerous enemies of the revolution.

The Communist Party enlisted on a broad base to the building of the Soviet Armed Forces military specialists from the old army and fleet, even though there were serious difficulties, mainly of a political nature, connected with this.

In pre-revolutionary Russia the officers' corps had served as one of the main bulwarks of autocracy. Tsarism had implanted an intense caste feeling in officers, and educated them in a spirit of devotion to the throne and hate of the working masses. However, the growth of the revolutionary movement in the country had caused a section of the officers to reconsider their political convictions.

The World War played a considerable part in the officers' corps progress to the Left. It was not only workers and peasants dressed in soldiers' greatcoats who understood that the people did not need the war: the best section of the officers came to the same conclusion. It should also be kept in mind that during the war the regular commanders representing the more reactionary section of the officers had been to a considerable extent diluted by the call-up from the reserves who were foreign to the traditions and views of the tsarist military clique. The command also had a relatively broad intake from members of the petty bourgeoisie and even workers. The February Revolution too promoted to a large extent the democratisation of the officers' corps.

The October Revolution divided the officers' corps into several groups. One of these, relatively small in number, immediately sided with the workers and peasants. There are well-known cases of former high-ranking officers coming to official bodies of the Soviet state and offering their services to the revolutionary people. As early as under the Provisional Government N. M. Potapov, aide-de-camp to the Chief of Staff and a quartermaster-general, came over to the Bolsheviks. This move by a prominent general had a great influence in determining the political position of many of the higher-ranking officers of the old army.

Many of the commanders of the old army, even though they did not voluntarily enter the service of the new state, nevertheless from the very first unhesitatingly carried out its orders. Their transition to the Soviet side was accomplished externally in a smooth way without the painful vacillations and doubts that can accompany such cases.

A considerable section of the officers did not recognise the Soviet state but did not enter the path of open war against it,

instead taking up a temporising position. These were mainly officers from the petty-bourgeois strata. They did not want to fight against the people and therefore did not come out against the Bolsheviks who, as they could see, enjoyed the support of the broad working masses.

Finally a group of officers of about equal size was closely linked to the exploiting classes and openly crossed over to the counter-revolutionary camp to form its strike force. They were in the main representatives of old Russia, and by principle implacable enemies of the workers' and peasants' state. To fight them cost many sacrifices.

Taking into consideration the acute lack of experienced commanders in the Red Army, Lenin set a bold task, but one based on a concrete analysis of the situation, of attracting bourgeois military specialists to the building of the Red Army and to the defence of the young Soviet Republic from the attacks of its numerous enemies. It was not only a question of overcoming the doubts of the "neutrals", but also of attracting the vacillating elements away from the counter-revolutionary camp to the side of the revolutionary people.

Lenin was the first Marxist in the world to raise the question of enlisting bourgeois military specialists to the building of a new type of army.

He was able, in a most complex situation, to see that without the use of the knowledge and experience of the former military specialists it would be impossible to build the workers' and peasants' army, and that if such an army was not available within the shortest possible time it would be impossible to preserve the gains of the socialist revolution.

Lenin's solution to this question was supported by the majority of the Central Committee and local Party organisations, and prominent Party and state activists also agreed with him. However, there was not at that time full unity in the Party in this regard. Individual Party functionaries and a certain section of rank-and-file Communists came out against the Leninist line. For example, the members of the CC of the Party, G. Zinoviev, V. Volodarsky and M. Lashevich wrote in the *Petrogradskaya Pravda* in April 1918 that the bourgeois military specialists should be taken on "as our batmen", and that when the need for them had passed they should be thrown away like "squeezed lemons which are not needed any more". All this obviously did not contribute towards reaching mutual understanding between the Soviet state and the intelligentsia.

Another section of Party members feared that in allowing former generals and other officers into the Red Army, the

Communist Party was weakening its position among the masses and was objectively creating a situation suitable for the restoration of the power of the bourgeoisie.

Taking advantage of these feelings, "Left" Communists demagogically announced that V. I. Lenin was allegedly conducting a policy aimed at restoring the old officers' corps and the command of the tsarist generals. That a considerable section of Communists did not understand nor believe that former officers of the tsarist army could be placed in the service of the revolution, and could go against their own class, was a serious obstacle. It was not accidental that Lenin devoted much care to explaining to those who were confused and to convincing the doubters that it was absolutely imperative to enlist military specialists in the Red Army, and finally to extending the persistent fight against the confirmed opponents of this sole correct line and breaking their resistance.

In the second half of March 1918 a meeting was called at which were present representatives of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs and a group of former tsarist generals who had recognised the Soviet state. At this meeting a considerable section of military Communist workers spoke against enlisting regular officers in the Red Army.

Lenin decisively rejected such views, underlining how imperative it was to master military science and methods of military leadership for which it was necessary to learn from the military specialists.

Difference of opinion in the Party on the question of the use of military specialists in the Red Army again arose at the end of 1918 when articles by the "Left" Communists, V. Sorin and A. Kamensky, were published in *Pravda*. Sorin, in his article "Commanders and Commissars in the Army in the Field", sharply criticised the projected regulations on the mutual relations of the Military Revolutionary Councils and army and front commanders, in which the commander was allowed sole say in military questions. He described the Party's policy of using military specialists for the defence of the country as a premeditated surrender of power in the Army to the tsarist generals, as a line directed towards the weakening of revolutionary vigilance of the army Communists and called to "fight decisively ... against attempts to curtail the dictatorship of the Communist Party in the Army".*

* *Pravda*, 29 November 1918.

A. Kamensky, in his article "High Time Too", expressed his complete solidarity with the author of the previous article. He wrote: "Comrade Sorin has raised the question: 'How is it that Tsar Nicholas' * commanders dare hold personal power in this country, where the working class is in power?' I will answer the comrade. They dare hold this power on the basis of certain paragraphs in the project cited by you, and it is therefore necessary to raise another question: How can those who drew up the project give Nicholas' counter-revolutionaries such rights?"** This was a libel on the policy of the Party which had by no means given former generals complete power in the army, but had, on the contrary, put them under control.

This attempt at the height of the Civil War to discredit in the central press the fundamentals of the military policies of the Party was fraught with serious consequences, and therefore the CC of the Party reacted immediately. On the same day as the article by Kamensky was published, the CC of the RCP(B) in a special resolution "On the Policy of the War Department" sharply condemned the libellous assaults made by Kamensky against the military policy of the Party. In the resolution special note was made of the fact that the policy of the War Department was not the product of the opinion of particular persons or even of individual groups, but that it was being run according to the general directives of the Party as represented by its Central Committee and under the latter's direct control. The Central Committee of the Party underlined that "the responsibility for the policy of the War Department rested wholly with the Party"***

Some local Party organisations also came out as opponents of the use of bourgeois military specialists. However, it should be underlined that the majority of local Party and Soviet organisations, as well as the Party organisations of the larger military units, correctly assessed the real situation and supported the Leninist line of enlisting military specialists to the building of the Red Army.

A considerable danger to the Land of Soviets was presented by the position taken by Trotsky and his fellow-thinkers, who blindly trusted the bourgeois specialists, bowing down before their authority. In October 1918 Trotsky raised the question of freeing all the officers arrested as hostages. The Plenary

* The Tsar Nicholas II, who abdicated on 2 March 1917 (Old Style) after the February Revolution.—Tr.

** *Pravda*, 25 December 1918.

*** *Pravda*, 26 December 1918.

Meeting of the CC of the Party held on October 25 rejected Trotsky's suggestion, declaring that "only those officers about whom it was shown that they did not belong to the counter-revolutionary movement could be freed". With Trotsky's connivance, the certifying commissions charged with the duty of thoroughly checking and selecting former commanders before accepting them into the Red Army were first broken up and in February 1919 completely disbanded.

Taking advantage of the class feelings of some honest Communists, the "Lefts" were able to attract them to their side and organise an opposition to Lenin and the Central Committee at the 8th Party Congress. The opposition, pointing to a series of cases of treachery by important military specialists, came out against their use in the Army in commanding posts in general and demanded that members of the Military Revolutionary Councils and commissars be given the right to have a say in operational decisions and that former military specialists be only engaged in consultant capacities or as military instructors without rights of command.

At the congress Lenin sharply criticised those Party and military workers who came out against the correct and judicious use of the former specialists and tried to get a return to collective leadership of the troops, to partisan fighting. The 8th Party Congress supported Lenin, and noted that even if the Red Army had had the possibility over a number of years of being systematically built up and of simultaneously training new commanders for itself, even then there would have been no objections in principle to engaging those military specialists who had "either inwardly taken the side of the Soviet state, or by the necessity of events seen it necessary for themselves to serve it honestly".*

The congress resolutions had a beneficial influence in strengthening the fighting ability of the Red Army and on the establishment of normal relations between the Red Army and the military specialists. "The military specialists," the late Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov noted, "closely followed the work of the 8th Party Congress and understood that the Party trusted, valued and cared for them. They moved considerably closer to the Red Army masses and the Party organisations. The commanders who were former officers of the tsarist army became more active and demanding in questions of discipline and service from the troops. All this was favourably reflected in their general combat readiness and

* *KPSS v rezolutsiyakh i resheniyakh...*, Vol. 2, pp. 66-67.

fighting abilities. Attempts to undermine trust in the officers of the old army were decisively cut short by the commissars, the Party-political workers and even by the Red Army men themselves.”*

The Party began to put into practice its policy of using military specialists immediately after the October Revolution. The discharge procedure of officers and military employees of the old army was determined by a special decree of the Soviet War Department in December 1917. It was forbidden to leave the army at will. Specialists who left their units without permission were duty-bound to return to their place of service.

Military specialists were engaged to participate in military actions against the enemies of the Soviet Republic. There were specialists from the old army taking part already as early as the repulse of the attacks on Petrograd by General Krasnov's troops (28-31 October 1917).

On Lenin's directives at the end of October 1917 in Mogilev was founded the Revolutionary Field HQ for Fighting Counter-Revolution, which was headed by a guards ensign, the Bolshevik M. Ter-Arutyunyan. The operations department was headed by Colonel I. I. Vatsetis, who together with his regiment of Latvian riflemen had gone over to the side of the Soviet state. During January and February 1918 the battle on the Don against General Kaledin was fought by detachments under the command of the former tsarist officers R. F. Sivers and Y. V. Sablin. In the Urals the Bolshevik warrant officer S. D. Pavlov headed the Northern Flying Squadron.

Even more former generals and other higher officers took part in the battles against the kaiser's troops, seeing this as their patriotic duty. On the initiative of Lenin, in February 1918 a group of military specialists made an organisational study for the defence of Petrograd, when it was in danger of being taken by German troops. On February 22 the plan for the defence of Petrograd worked out by this group of specialists was considered at an enlarged session of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, and immediately afterwards put into practice. It was to a considerable extent thanks to the military specialists that strong covering detachments were successfully placed on the approaches to Petrograd.

In February 1918 there arose a real danger that the ships of the Baltic Fleet would be captured by the Germans. The Soviet

* G. K. Zhukov, *Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya* (Reminiscences and Reflections), Moscow, 1969, p. 58.

Government ordered that the fleet change its base from Helsingfors to Kronstadt. Eminent specialists were engaged to lead this operation — Admirals A. P. Zelenoi and A. A. Ruzhek, Captain 1st class M. A. Petrov, Captain 2nd class L. V. Antonov, and others. Under the leadership of Admiral Zelenoi the heroic move by a total of 211 ships of the Baltic Fleet to Kronstadt was successfully accomplished.

On 19 March 1918 the Soviet Government considered the question of a Supreme Military Council and decided on the wide-scale engagement of former military specialists into the Red Army. On 21 March the Supreme Military Council, on directives from Lenin, issued a decree abolishing the election principle in the army, thereby giving wide access to the Red Army to former generals and other high-ranking officers. On 27 March the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs and the Supreme Military Council officially announced the enlistment into the Red Army of military specialists and the "introduction of military commissars as guardians of the highest interests of the revolution and of socialism".

The enlistment of military specialists into the Red Army was at first put into practice on a voluntary basis with a wide-ranging publicity campaign. However, with the growth in numbers of the Red Army due to the intensification of the Civil War and the expansion of intervention, the need for military specialists grew too. The Government found it necessary to resort to the mobilisation of former officers, and on 10 July 1918 the 5th All-Russia Congress of Soviets took the corresponding decision. On the basis of this decision a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR on 29 July 1918 announced the first (partial) call-up of officers to the Red Army.

During the course of 1918-1919 the Council of People's Commissars and the Defence Council repeatedly examined questions connected with recording the size of the forces of various categories of military specialists and their being used. In an almost complete absence of records of reserves, many officers managed to elude (and in fact completely avoided) appearing at the call-up points. Nevertheless by 15 August 1920, according to incomplete statistics, 48,409 tsarist higher officers (not counting junior ensigns and others of corresponding rank) had been called up to the Red Army. Besides this 10,300 military employees, 14,000 doctors and 26,800 less qualified medical workers served in the Red Army.*

* *Grazhdanskaya voyna 1918-1921* (The Civil War of 1918-1921), Vol. 2. Moscow, 1928, p. 95.

Military specialists from the tsarist army formed a very considerable part of the command staff of the Red Army. M. V. Frunze, who served in responsible positions in the Red Army from 1918, writes that "in the first years of the existence of the Red Army the main mass of commanders consisted of the remains of the tsarist army officers' corps enlisted by us to the task of building the army. This was an absolutely necessary stage in the process of creating the Armed Forces of our workers' and peasants' state."* According to the figures given by the Soviet historian Y. P. Petrov, the proportion of military specialists from the tsarist army in the command staff of the Red Army was more than 75 per cent in 1918, in 1919 it came to 53 per cent, and in 1920 it was 42 per cent.** It should be noted that this proportion went down, not because fewer military specialists were called up to the Red Army or because they left the service, but because the numbers of the command staff were filled by workers and peasants who had been trained at military institutes and courses or had made themselves experienced commanders at the front.

V. Antonov-Ovseyenko who was well acquainted with the situation on the fronts, points out that towards the end of the Civil War the command staff consisted of up to 6 per cent former regular officers and up to 28 per cent former war-time officers.*** These figures accord with the material provided by other authoritative sources. Thus, according to the figures prepared for the 9th Congress of Soviets (December 1921), the command staff of the Red Army contained 33.7 per cent officers and military employees of the former army.**** A similar figure was quoted by one of the most prominent political leaders of the Red Army, G. K. Orjonikidze, in a speech in 1922. He noted that there were "22.3 per cent war-time officers in the Red Army, 6.1 per cent former military employees, 5.6 per cent former regular officers, making 34 per cent or a third of the total".*****

* M. V. Frunze, *Izbranniye proizvedeniya* (Selected Works), Moscow, 1965, pp. 215-16.

** Y. P. Petrov, *KPSS—rukovoditel i vospitatel Krasnoi Armii (1918-1920)* (CPSU as the Leader and Educator of the Red Army), Moscow, 1961, p. 273.

*** V. Antonov-Ovseyenko, *Stroitelstvo Krasnoi Armii v revoliutsii* (Building the Red Army During the Revolution), Moscow, 1923, p. 31.

**** *Pyat let vlasti Sovetov* (Five Years of Soviet Government), Moscow, 1922, p. 157.

***** G. K. Orjonikidze, *Izbranniye statyi i rechi. 1918-37*, Moscow, 1945, p. 79.

Since by 1921 there were up to 217,000 commanders' of all ranks in the Red Army, and if it is taken that military specialists accounted for 34 per cent of the command staff, then it can be reckoned that there were seventy to seventy-five thousand generals and other officers from the tsarist army serving in the Red Army. Given that on 25 October 1917 there were 157,884 officers in the Russian Army (including the army in the field, rear units and social organisations but not counting the reserves) it can be seen that about half of the officer complement of the old army served in the Red Army.

The motives which led this large section of the military intelligentsia to join the Red Army were various. It can be said with certainty that the majority of them were not guided by socialist convictions. Nor was a dominating role played by personal considerations—attempting to get a high-ranking post from the new state, promotion, etc. It would also be naïve to affirm that tens of thousands of army officers were coerced into the service of the Red Army by threats and by force.

The reasons for the transition of the military intelligentsia to voluntary co-operation with the Soviet state should be sought elsewhere.

The Civil War and the foreign military intervention had an immense influence on the political convictions of the ex-tsarist army officers. Any honest person understood that the imperialists, in alliance with the whiteguard "governments", could strangle the independence and freedom of Russia and put an end to its existence as a state.

The feeling of patriotism and the urge to preserve Russia as a great power guided many officers who went over to the service of the Soviet state. Explaining the motives which aroused the military specialists to serve the new state, N. I. Podvoisky, who did considerable work building up Red Army units, writes: "... none of the best military workers from the General Staff committed sabotage but tried in all ways to assist us in building the Army, not out of political sympathy nor from any kind of personal reasons, but because many of them were genuine votaries of the state and gave our new regime what they thought it was necessary to give.... They were convinced that having taken the power into our hands, we had not thrown up the war and would not give up Russia to be torn to pieces by Germany, but that we would continue the war until the signature of a peace treaty, that we had advanced towards concluding peace, and were demanding that it be concluded on democratic, that is, the most honourable and most advantageous terms for Russia." And further on Podvoisky comes to the conclusion that all this

allowed "the formation around us of a compact, honest and knowledgeable group of general-staffers which provided a very real help in the early days of the building of the Red Army".*

The repulse of the attack by the kaiserite troops at the beginning of 1918 or that of the White Poles in 1920 were seen by the military specialists as their high patriotic duty. For example in 1918 Lieutenant-Colonel N. G. Krapivvansky led a partisan movement against the kaiserite troops in the Chernigov area. The occupiers had to detach a whole army corps against the partisans he led and the German command offered a fifty thousand gold ruble reward for the head of the courageous partisan leader.

In the spring of 1920 when the White Poles attacked Soviet Russia, V. I. Lenin noted that "even former tsarist generals consider Poland's claims unjust and are helping us".**

Without sharing the views of the Bolsheviks many ex-tsarist army officers were forced to recognise that the October Revolution was a natural occurrence, and that it was pointless to fight against it. This is how A. A. Brusilov, a tsarist general who joined the side of the Soviet state, describes it: "I even before announced firmly that I would not separate myself from the Russian people or abandon them whatever happened. That is how I behaved from the beginning of the revolution up to the present time. I understood that once a revolution had begun in such a large and complicated state as the former Russian Empire, it would not stop for whoever wanted it to, and that we had to go on to Bolshevism...."

"Obviously at the beginning of a revolution there are excesses and some confusion. It would have been unrealistic to expect them not to happen here. Who, when or however trained this people, and whoever seriously cared for it? It has long been known that revolutions do not start or finish on an order. There is the natural historical current of events which it is impossible both for Kornilov and Denikin to change.

"Belonging to my people, I could not but share their lot...."***

In 1920, when the White Poles attacked Soviet Russia, A. A. Brusilov together with the eminent army Generals A. M. Zaionchkovsky, V. N. Klembovsky, A. Y. Gutor and others, addressed themselves with a call which was published

* N. Podvoisky, "Stroitelstvo Krasnoi Armii", *Voyenno-istorichesky zhurnal* (Building of the Red Army. In: Journal of Military History), No. 12, 1968, p. 70.

** V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 137.

*** *Rossiia*, No. 3 (12), 1924, pp. 148-49.

in *Pravda*, to all former officers to "go voluntarily and selflessly into the Red Army, on the front or at the rear, wherever the government of the Soviet Workers' and Peasants' Russia sends you and to serve there not from fear but for your conscience, and by your honest service, not sparing of your life, to defend our precious Russia at all costs and not allow it to be plundered...."

But the argument most convincing to the military specialists was the policy of the Communist Party and of the Soviet state, directed towards turning Russia from an underdeveloped country into a powerful state defending the interests of the widest masses of the people, and the trust and respect which the Party and the Soviet state showed for those who had come over from the other camp and honestly served the workers and peasants.

The Communist Party and the Soviet state put the knowledge of the military specialists to widespread use. The enlistment of former officers and generals to the building of the Red Army allowed the staffing of the local military commissariats to be accelerated and their activities to be put in order, the registration of reservists to be started, the military training of workers and peasants to be organised, the process of forming the separate Red Guard detachments into regular efficient units and formations to be accelerated, and the supply to the Army of weapons, ammunition and provisions arranged.

The ex-tsarist army military specialists were of invaluable help in the organisation of the military training institutes of the Red Army and in the training of Red commanders. By October 1918, 39 command staff courses and schools had been organised. By January 1919 this number had grown to 63, and by 1921 to 153. Several academies had also begun work, including the General Staff Academy which prepared highly qualified command staff. Former officers formed practically the whole teaching staff of the Soviet military institutes. Out of 378 commanders and course teachers on the Western Front in 1920 there were 349 former officers and only 29 Red commanders, divided thus: of worker origin—31, of peasant origin—94, from the intelligentsia—236, and others—17.*

A considerable section of the old military specialists worked in many central and local institutions. For example, 184 military specialists served at the Central Artillery Department of the Red

* Central State Archives of the Soviet Army, Folio 104, File 10, Document 12, p. 30.

Army, of whom 29 were generals, 66 colonels and lieutenant-colonels, 35 captains and 54 lieutenants, sub-lieutenants and ensigns,* and in the Supreme Military Council 10 were generals, 26 colonels and lieutenant-colonels, 22 captains and 30 lieutenants, sub-lieutenants and ensigns.**

However the old military specialists were used for the most part in combatant posts with units and formations and also on the larger headquarters' staffs and military departments. There was not a single regiment or division in which there were no old military specialists on the command or with duties at headquarters. In the units and formations which were organised in the summer of 1918 in the Moscow, Petrograd, Yaroslavl and other military districts, almost the whole command staff, from platoon commanders to divisional ones, consisted of old military specialists.

Especially many former officers served in the armoured units, in the navy and in aviation, that is, in the branches of the forces which required a basic knowledge of technology. For example, by the beginning of 1919 in the air force units old officers made up 80 per cent of pilots, 60 per cent of squadron commanders and 62 per cent of front and army aviation commanders.***

Tens of thousands of military specialists honestly served the people's state from the moment they enlisted in the Red Army. Amongst them were two former colonels of the old army who held the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic, I. I. Vatsetis (from mid-1918 to mid-1919) and S. S. Kamenev (from mid-1919 to the end of the Civil War). Colonel B. M. Shaposhnikov was head of the operations department of the field HQ during the years of the Civil War, Colonel A. I. Yegorov, commander on the fronts, Lieutenant M. N. Tukhachevsky, also commander on the fronts, and Lieutenant I. K. Bagramyan, Lieutenant F. I. Tolbukhin, Lieutenant-Colonel A. M. Vasilevsky and others later became Marshals of the Soviet Union. Rear-Admiral V. M. Alftater and later Captain 1st class Y. A. Berens commanded the Republic's Navy. Major-General A. A. Samoilo successfully led the military actions of the Northern Front.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov writes: "Recalling our joint work with the officers of the old army, I must say that the

majority of them were honest and conscientious sons of their people and devoted to their Motherland. When it was necessary to die in battle with the enemy, they faced death without trembling, with dignity and military valour."*

Many military specialists gave their lives for the Soviet state and were heroes of the Civil War. When the former general A. D. Stankevich was wounded and captured, he indignantly spurned all the promises made to him by the Denikinists and was hanged. His ashes are now buried on Red Square by the Kremlin wall. The former general A. P. Nikolayev refused to serve the whiteguards and was executed for it in Yamburg. The former colonel G. K. Petrov was amongst the 26 Baku commissars who were shot by the English interventionists and the SRs on 20 September 1918.

There are innumerable similar examples. However, not all the former military specialists served the Soviet state honestly and conscientiously. There were not a few who joined the ranks of the Red Army hoping to destroy its combat capacity, and with a direct aim of betraying it for the counter-revolutionary cause. The treacherous acts of military specialists such as Muravyov, Nosovich, Kovalevsky and others who occupied responsible posts in the Red Army and betrayed the Soviet forces caused many victims. There were especially many betrayals by old officers in 1918. But later, as the Soviet state grew in strength, their number sharply fell.

An important role in the building of the Red Army in general and in the successful use of specialists in particular was played by the military commissars. There would have been considerably more acts of betrayal and treachery and their results would have been worse, had not the Communist Party set up strict and vigilant control on the activities of the military specialists in the form of the institution of military commissars, which was established in April 1919.

By the end of 1919 the number of military commissars in the Army had reached 5,200.

Controlling the activities of the military specialists was one of the main duties of the commissars. It was in connection with the enlistment of former officers to command posts in the Red Army that it became necessary to found such an institution as military commissars. A second point was that the military commissars' control on the activities of the military specialists had to dissipate the natural distrust which the

* Central State Archives of the Soviet Army, Folio 104, File 10, Document 265, pp. 107-16.

** Ibid., Folio 4, File 10, Document 265, pp. 1-11.

*** Ibid., Folio 30, File 1, Document 86, pp. 14-15.

* G. K. Zhukov, op. cit., p. 57.

Red Army masses felt for old officers. The signature of a commissar on each order served as a guarantee that it was not a betrayal.

It would be incorrect to suppose that the duty of the commissars to control the military specialists meant that they were to force them to do what was demanded by the combat situation. It was impossible to force a battle-experienced officer to do anything against his will, to work out successful operation plans or to give battle orders simply by holding a pistol to his head. Besides, there were tens of thousands of military specialists serving in the Red Army and there were only, at the end of 1919 for example, a little more than five thousand commissars.

The duty of the military commissars consisted in showing vigilance, not giving way to unhealthy suspiciousness, and re-educating the former tsarist officers to understand the essence and meaning of the events taking place in the country so that they take up the only correct position in the battle against the interventionists and the whiteguards. Thanks to daily and laborious educational work based on trust and exactingness by the military commissars, thousands of old officers gave their knowledge and experience to the cause of the working class and the toiling peasantry.

The mutual relations between the military commissars and the command staff were regulated by special instructions and statutes. It was demanded of commissars that they create a situation of active co-operation, mutual understanding and comradeship.

Military commissars also had clearly defined rights with regard to the ex-tsarist army officer commanders. They could temporarily suspend a commander if they had serious grounds for this and even arrest him, immediately informing superior organs of it. However, in operational questions the commander had the decisive say. The commissar was obliged to sign the commander's order, even if he did not agree with it. In such cases he had the right to appeal against the commander's actions at the next level. Of course, in the practical leadership of military actions there were deviations from this rule as circumstances dictated.

A most important duty of the commissars was to explain to the Red Army men the military policy of the Communist Party, the necessity for using the ex-tsarist army military specialists and to suppress insubordination and open distrust for military specialists honestly serving the revolutionary people. Working side by side with the ex-tsarist army generals and other officers.

the military commissars learnt a lot from them and themselves became good commanders.

On the other hand, the commissars and Communist commanders helped the military specialists finally to sever all links with the past and enter the path of honest service to the socialist republic. Ex-tsarist army officers became convinced that the commissars were real patriots selflessly fighting for the freedom and independence of their Motherland. This had an immense influence on their outlook. For example, N. M. Potapov, who already has been mentioned above, noted that "the tsarist Defence Ministry's smooth transition to work with the Bolsheviks was to a great extent due to the tact shown by the then Chairman of the Petrograd Revolutionary Military Committee N. I. Podvoisky, who later became People's Commissar for Military Affairs".*

The successful re-education of the command cadres of the old army was furthered not only by the institution of military commissars but also by the whole range of Party-political work being carried out in the Army, and the attention and respect with which the military specialists who were honestly serving the Soviet state were surrounded.

Lenin wrote on the re-education of military specialists: "Hundreds and thousands of these specialists have betrayed us, and tens of thousands have come to serve us more faithfully, drawn to us in the course of the struggle itself because that revolutionary enthusiasm which did wonders in the Red Army came from our having served and satisfied the interests of the workers and peasants. This situation, in which masses of workers and peasants act in harmony and know what they are fighting for, has had its effect, and still larger and larger sections of the people who came over to our side from the other camp, some of them unknowingly, have turned and are turning into our conscious supporters."**

The whiteguard generals tried to discredit in the eyes of the Soviet state those military specialists who were honestly serving the Red Army and to frighten them with threats of violent reprisals. And if a former officer, now Red commander, was taken prisoner by the Whites he could be sure not to count on mercy. In the eyes of the whiteguard officers he was even

* N. M. Potapov, "Zapiski o pervykh shagakh sovetskogo voyennogo stroitelstva" (Notes on the Beginning of the Red Army Building). *Voyennoistorichesky zhurnal*, No. 1, 1968, p. 62.

** V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 224.

more of a "traitor to his Motherland" than even a convinced Communist. In one of their newspapers the whiteguards wrote: "While it is still possible to forgive a rank-and-file Bolshevik for crimes against the Motherland, for a general, for someone like Samoilo at that, there can be no mercy. Hang him, the traitor!"

V. I. Lenin played a particularly important role in attracting old officers to service in the Red Army. He not only stubbornly fought against the opponents of the use of former tsarist officers, but did much to strengthen the Red Army with experienced commanders, carefully following the work of the old military specialists and helping them. He knew many of them personally, advised them, sought their counsel, and took a direct part in the selection and promotion of old officers to responsible command posts.

As has been mentioned above, the command staff of the Red Army consisted to a considerable extent of ex-tsarist army officers, and they occupied, as a rule, high posts at headquarters and in the larger military units. The old military specialists had their part to play in the combat actions of the Red Army. However, in evaluating their role, one should not approach the question only from the point of view of the proportions of this group in the command staff of the Red Army.

The old military specialists were able to use their training to help the workers and peasants in the fight against the whiteguards and interventionists only due to the correct Leninist line on the use of command cadres from the old army for the defence of the young Soviet state.

The Communist Party and the Soviet Government entrusted the officers of the old army with important command posts in the Red Army even after the Civil War was over. For example, in February 1923, ex-tsarist army officers made up 82 per cent of the commanders of infantry regiments, 83 per cent of corps and division commanders, and 54 per cent of all troop commanders. They were least represented amongst cavalry commanders (41 per cent).^{*} In the Navy, for example in the Baltic Fleet, the high command consisted of 71 per cent former gentry as late as the beginning of 1927, and 90 per cent of ships' captains were also of gentry origin.^{**}

^{*} *Izvestiya VTsIK*, 23 February 1923.

^{**} A. M. Iovlev, "K istorii borby partii za perekhod k yedimonachaliyu v Krasnoi Armii (1924-1931)" (To the History of the Party's Struggle to Introduce One-Leader System in the Red Army), *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, No. 12, 1964, p. 29.

With the help of the old military specialists tens of thousands of Red Army commanders of worker and peasant origin were trained and they played a major role in the Civil War, in the further strengthening of the Red Army and in directing military operations of the Soviet troops in the Great Patriotic War.

For the majority of the military intelligentsia, as for the Russian intelligentsia as a whole, its internal regeneration and radical breaking away from its former outlooks was a complicated and painful process. Many were simply frightened by the singularity of this turning point in their destiny and by the obscurity and complexity of the situation. Nevertheless the military intelligentsia was the first to break away from the past and rapidly make a final choice. Active participation in military actions against internal and external counter-revolution, the heroism of the Red Army masses, the political work of Party organisations and military commissars, and the Bolshevik drive to make Russia a powerful and independent power, all served to further the fact that tens of thousands of old officers almost as one merged with the rest of the command staff of the Red Army. In battle, where the genuine value of both political slogans and individual personal qualities become manifest, it was easier for an honest person to see on whose side truth lay. And if in "usual" conditions a member of the intelligentsia needed years to perceive the greater meaning of the current events, in the severe battles of the Civil War a member of the military intelligentsia needed sometimes only a few months for this. Here the choice was simple: either honest service to the Soviet state or betrayal, desertion to the side of the enemy. Tens of thousands chose to serve the people.

THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL INTELLIGENTSIA

After the victory of the October Revolution the working class and toiling peasantry were faced with the immensely complicated task of rebuilding the national economy from its very foundations. In numerous speeches and articles from the end of 1917-beginning of 1918 and especially in his work "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government", Lenin clearly formulated the immediate aims of politically strengthening the Soviet state and the direct economic tasks in the socialist reconstruction of the country.

To lay the foundations of a socialist society without using all the achievements of science and technology, and it follows, without enlisting specialists in all branches of knowledge, was impossible. Lenin underlined that the building of a basis to socialist society could only be carried out successfully if it rested on a firm grounding of scientific and technological facts, that a precondition for the building of socialism was to attract scientists, engineers, technicians, etc., to carry out the tasks which faced the Soviet Republic. He wrote: "Without the guidance of experts in the various fields of knowledge, technology and experience, the transition to socialism will be impossible, because socialism calls for a conscious mass advance to greater productivity of labour compared with capitalism, and on the basis achieved by capitalism."* Therefore the enlistment of the bourgeois specialists to the solving of the economic problems which faced the working class was one of the components of the plan of launching out on the building of socialism.

Soviet bodies enlisted the co-operation of the bourgeois intelligentsia in the most varied branches of state and cultural building. This was dictated not only by economic policy considerations but also by the political necessities of the moment. It was necessary to draw the intelligentsia into the industrial and cultural life of the country, to link its activities with the practical building of the economy, to convince it that the Soviet state had set itself the aim of restoring the economy of the country on a stronger economical, political and cultural basis.

It was especially important to secure the co-operation of the more qualified cadres of the old intelligentsia—scientists, major engineers, professors and teachers in higher education. As early as January 1918 the Department for the Attraction of Scientific Forces to the Building of the State was created within the People's Commissariat for Education. In February of the same year a Council of Experts was founded at the Supreme Economic Council**, the task of which was to unite the technological and scientific forces of the country to assist in economic tasks, and in August the Scientific and Technological Department of the Supreme Economic Council was founded so as to bring science and technology closer to the needs of

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 248.

** Supreme Economic Council was set up under the Council of People's Commissars in December 1917. Its duties were the organisation of the whole national economy and finances.

production. The activity of this department assisted the mustering of scientific and technological forces and the enlistment of their co-operation with Soviet bodies. The permanent employees, members of councils, consultants and experts in this department consisted of 250 professors, 300 engineers and about 240 other specialists.

The Party and the Soviet state paid a great deal of attention to the most powerful scientific establishment in the country—the Academy of Sciences. Before the revolution the Academy of Sciences of Russia occupied a privileged position. The tsarist government guaranteed it a certain "autonomy" and at the same time government bodies had carefully verified that the Academy of Sciences did not "profane" itself by permitting "Left" views to be held within its walls.

A caste spirit and feeling of apoliticism developed in the academic midst. Many academics genuinely believed that science and politics were incompatible, and that there was no place for politics in the laboratory or the scientist's study.

Their isolation from the social life of the country led members of the Academy of Sciences to regard the October Revolution as an unexpected and "absurd" event. Some of them hoped the "evil spell" would soon break and that all would return to its normal channels. But time went on and the revolution reached deeper and spread. The workers and peasants were obviously not going to relinquish to anyone the power they had won in bitter battles. Then the attitude of the members of the Academy of Sciences towards the Soviet state began to change.

After preliminary talks the People's Commissar for Education Lunacharsky addressed himself in March 1918 to the leadership of the Academy of Sciences in an official letter in which he inquired about what participation its collective proposed to take in the building of the Soviet state. In his reply, the President of the Academy, A. P. Karpinsky, said that the Academy of Sciences offered its services to help "the most rapid and fruitful revealing of all our productive forces for the people's needs".* Appended to his letter was a note from the Commission for the Study of the Natural Productive Forces of the Country with a detailed plan for the possible participation of the Academy of Sciences in prospecting for minerals, and in the fields of energetics, the waterways, agriculture, etc.

* *Izvestiya Rossiiskoi Akademii nauk*, Series VI, No. 14, 1918, p. 1395.

The scientists' will to co-operate with the proletarian state did not mean, of course, that they had completely gone over to the Soviet side. But as the scientists were expressing the wish to help their people at a difficult time, even despite the fact that Communists were at the head of the country, the Party took it that this was a base from which to widen the co-operation and re-education of the scientists.

On 12 April 1918 the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR took the decision, in connection with the offer made by the leadership of the Academy of Sciences, to finance its work. The Government recognised that an important and pressing task was to solve the problem of the correct geographical distribution of industry and most rational use of its capacities.

Despite the desperately difficult conditions resulting from the Civil War, the Soviet Government found the means to create new scientific research institutes, amongst which were the Platinum and Rare Metals Institute, the Chemical, Hydrological and Optical institutes, the Petrograd Physico-Technological Institute, the Institute of Radioscopy, the Central Institute of Aerohydrodynamics, the Nizhny Novgorod Radiolaboratory and others. Overall, in the first two years of the existence of the Soviet state 117 new scientific institutions appeared. "However paradoxical it may seem," recalls Academician A. F. Ioffe, "in a period of hunger, cold and Civil War, it was necessary to begin to build science... We scientists believed that this was our duty and that by doing this we would fulfil our responsibilities towards the future. Therefore, very early, even in 1918, at the time of the stormiest events ... we began first of all to build scientific institutes..."

Scientists were given the most careful attention by the Soviet state. It is enough to say that only six days after the signing by the Government of the decree on the organisation of the Physico-Technological Institute, its collective was able to begin scientific work. And this was in September, when the Soviet Republic was in a desperate position.

The policy of the Communist Party and of the Soviet state on drawing in the scientific intelligentsia to the building of a new society had a beneficial effect on the political feelings and psychology of scientific and technological workers. Many of them wanted to co-operate with the new state and they expressed this desire by their active participation in the solving of problems of economics and defence. The Academic Commission for the Study of the Natural Productive Forces of the Country expanded its activity.

With the active participation of L. B. Krasin, G. M. Krzhizhanovsky and Professor M. A. Shatelen, a large number of scientists and engineers started research work in the field of electroenergetics. Research and project work began on the installation of the Shatura and Kashira electric power stations near Moscow and of the Nizhny Novgorod and Ivanovo-Voznesensk district power stations. Geological prospecting was carried out in Kazakhstan and the Southern Urals, in the Moscow coal basin and in the region of the Kursk magnetic anomaly. Zoological and botanical expeditions studied problems of importance to the national economy: methods of dealing with plant pests, investigated the fisheries, etc.

It was possible to enlist a considerable group of scientists to work on the defence needs of the country. For instance, the Central Institute of Aerohydrodynamics (TsAGI), founded in 1918 under the leadership of N. Y. Zhukovsky, carried out a series of most valuable studies for the Army and the Navy. The same can be said for the Physico-Technological Institute which did a great deal of important research in the field of explosives. In fulfilling the orders of the Red Army, scientists solved many complicated technological problems.

Scientific work in other important areas was also not interrupted. In June 1920 in Saratov at the All-Russia Selection Congress, the future founder and first president of the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences, Professor N. I. Vavilov, delivered a speech having great scientific and practical significance in which he gave an account of new principles of mutation. This theory, or as it was called by its author, the law of homological series in genetic mutation, was a most important event in world biological science, and became a central point in the work of botanists, plant breeders and agronomists. This discovery contributed not a little to the transformation in the near future of the agriculture of the country.

At the height of the Civil War a group of young scientists, M. Y. Suslin, P. S. Uryson, P. S. Alexandrov, A. Y. Khinchin, D. Y. Menshov and A. N. Kolmogorov, worked on important theoretical problems in the mathematical field. The Platinum Institute under the leadership of Academician N. S. Kurnakov contributed in many ways to broadening the research into rare metals. The work done by Academician A. F. Ioffe's laboratory laid the beginning to the study of the cohesion of crystals. The director of the Optical Institute, Professor D. S. Rozhdestvensky arrived at a most important finding about the structure of the atom in 1919, when he discovered the structure of the lithium atom.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that the first years of the existence of the Soviet state saw the foundation of the Soviet school of physics to which the world owes the first man-made satellites of the earth and moon, the first travel in space by man and highly important discoveries in the field of atomic energy.

During the Civil War years the noted inventor and scientist F. A. Tsander worked on the design of a rocket engine which could overcome the earth's gravitational force. In his autobiography he wrote: "At the end of 1920 I reported on my engine to the inventors' gubernia conference in Moscow ... and spoke about my project for interplanetary aeroships.... Vladimir Ilyich promised support. After that I worked on more intensively as I wanted to present more completely worked-out studies...."

When the blockade of the Soviet Republic was removed, the foreign scientific world with unfeigned amazement saw that a country surrounded by battle-lines and ravaged by the interventionists, a country about which everyone thought that all had fallen apart within and in which the intelligentsia had been "annihilated by the commissars", that country had obtained important successes in the most advanced branches of science and technology.

The drawing up of the plan for the electrification of Russia was a considerable achievement of scientific thought. On the initiative of V. I. Lenin in early 1920 the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia was founded. Prominent scientific and technological workers took part in its activities—Professors G. O. Graftio, Y. Y. Shulgin, A. A. Gorev, I. G. Alexandrov, K. A. Krug, M. A. Shatelen and many others. The work took place under the direct leadership of Lenin and of the distinguished Communist scientist G. M. Krzhizhanovsky. Lenin noted: "More than two hundred specialists—almost to a man opposed to the Soviet power—worked on it with keen interest, although they are not Communists. From the standpoint of technical science, however, they had to admit that this was the only correct way."*

The members of the commission did not agree as to the scale of the project and its meaning to the future of the country. One comparatively small section of the specialists did not believe in the possibility of the socialist transformation of the country and tried in all ways to reduce it to a plan of simply restoring the economy wrecked by the years of war, but the majority of

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 493.

scientists saw in the plan for the electrification of Russia the beginning of the country's rebirth on a powerful economic basis. Participation in the putting into practice of the plan was an excellent school of political re-education for them. Some eminent specialists were able to get out of their narrow bourgeois framework of ideas on the development of the forces of production and saw that the economic upsurge of the country was connected with the social changes that were taking place in Russia.

In the foreword to the plan the specialists wrote: "We were inspired by the desire to respond as best as we could to the great work of creating a new life, which fate has willed our country to introduce.... We feel sure of our future, it is in the good hands of the true builders of life...."

The fact that in the unbelievably difficult conditions of blockade, hunger, Civil War and intervention active creative thinking surged in the academic midst, that science had moved closer to the life of the people and its needs should be considered an outstanding event in the history of the Russian intelligentsia. Gorky who was in close contact with the scientific world in those years and who himself did a lot towards establishing mutual understanding between scientists and the Soviet state, later said in a letter to Academician S. F. Oldenburg: "I observed the modest heroism and stoical courage with which the creators of Russian science lived through the agonising hunger and cold, and saw how they worked, and saw how they died. During that time I became imbued with a feeling of deep and respectful enthusiasm for you, free, fearless and heroic researchers. I think that Russian scientists gave the world a wonderful lesson in stoicism by their life and work in the years of intervention and blockade and that history will tell the world about that eventful time with the same pride in the Russian people as I feel as I now write you these simple words."*

* * *

In the first years of Soviet power a highly complicated situation arose in the universities and institutes. The greater part of the old professorate found itself after the revolution at a crossroads. It did not take an active part in the anti-Soviet fighting, but at the same time by the force of long tradition, habits and outlook, it could not accept Soviet power. As for the

* *Pravda*, 4 September 1925.

students, many of those reading at higher educational institutions vacillated or bided their time and many held oppositional opinions, which arose in some cases not so much from political motives as from religious, ethical and everyday considerations. But there were students who responded to the call to defend the revolution. The democratic students in particular took part in the formation of the armed forces to repulse the German invaders. The students of Moscow University, for example, founded a students' battalion, a medical unit, etc.

The upper crust of the bourgeois professorate put forward the slogan of the non-interference of science and higher education in politics. Thus in January 1920 the board of teachers of the Moscow Institute of Mechanics and Engineering declared in one of its resolutions that it took a position "of complete non-interference in the political life of the country ... as scientific technology is in no way connected with politics". There were innumerable statements of this kind.

"Non-interference" in politics certainly did not prevent a section of the professorate from meddling both secretly and openly in the affairs of the young Soviet state and helping the whiteguard generals and interventionists in their attempts to overthrow the power of the Soviets. The reactionary professorate and teachers took part in counter-revolutionary conspiracies and uprisings, refused to work in universities and institutes, and sabotaged the measures taken by the Soviet state in the field of education.

But there were no other teachers. It was therefore necessary to entrust the training of new specialists to these professors even though they were in their majority apolitical, and sometimes even openly anti-Soviet. Superfluous fastidiousness such as the selection of professors along class lines was not possible. What had to be done was to neutralise and render harmless the reactionary upper reaches of this stratum of the intelligentsia, and bring the bulk of the teachers closer to the more progressive section of the professorate and, finally, convince the whole old professorate that only the socialist system could bring about the most favourable possibilities for a general development of science and culture.

First on the order of the day was the question of the democratisation of higher education since the old form of higher schooling could not be put to the service of the Soviet state without fundamental reforms. It was not a question of completely destroying the organisational structure of higher education and expelling all the bourgeois professors and teachers from its institutions but of restructuring it extremely

carefully in such a way as to make it higher education for the entire people and accessible to all, to change it from being a weapon for the class rule of the bourgeoisie into one for the rebuilding of society on a communist basis. The reform of university education was contemplated with a view to democratising higher education. The reform project proposed free education, the abolition of diplomas and of educational degrees as a condition for employment in the faculties, compulsory public competition for the posts of head of faculty, and the election of the professorate for terms not exceeding five years. At the head of the university would be a council of representatives from the professors, the students, the People's Commissariat for Education and the working population. The reform of curricula depending on the requirements of the national economy was also contemplated.

In conceiving the reform, the Party and Soviet bodies proposed to put it into practice without resorting to pressure or constraint, but by means of voluntary agreements with the bourgeois professorate. The university education reform project was submitted for discussion to two meetings of workers in higher education which were held in July and September 1918. It was assumed that the professorate would take a businesslike approach to discussing the urgent problems of higher education, add their comments and suggestions, and basically accept the reform project. The progressive section of the old professorate did just this. The revolutionary students also warmly welcomed the projected democratic reform in higher education.

The Right-wing professorate, however, in effect defending their old caste privileges, came out sharply against the reform project. All the actions of the opponents of the reform boiled down to a defence of the slogan of "autonomy" for higher education and non-interference by the Government in its affairs.

The whole discussion made it apparent that the Right-wing professorate would not voluntarily abandon its position and that it regarded the call for co-operation as a sign of the Soviet Government's weakness. It should also be noted that the Leftist line of the Proletcult and also of some workers in the People's Commissariat for Education made it difficult to obtain better and more positive results.

A Proletcult group submitted to the People's Commissariat for Education its own reform project for higher educational and scientific institutions in which it proposed "in the interest of ensuring the unity of the plan and economising efforts and expenditure" to close down the universities and other higher educational establishments and to found instead of them

"homogeneous educational scientific institutes", and at the same time to dissolve the Academy of Sciences.

The Communist Party could not, of course, agree with the demands made by the Left elements and began the gradual restructuring of higher education while countering the reactionary feelings and views of the old professorate. One of the main methods of influencing the old professorate was to alter the class composition of the student body by sharply increasing the numbers of students of proletarian and peasant origin. By a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR on 11 December 1917 all higher educational institutions were subordinated to the People's Commissariat for Education. On 2 August 1918 the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR passed a resolution On Enrolment in the Higher Educational Institutions of the RSFSR, which had been drafted by Lenin, and on the same day he signed the decree On Enrolment Regulations for Higher Educational Institutions. The documents were a milestone on the path towards the formation of a new, Soviet intelligentsia: these government decisions opened the doors of the higher educational establishments to all citizens aged sixteen and over. Restrictions on application to higher educational institutions because of nationality, estate or class were abolished, as were fees. The teaching of religious dogma was prohibited.

The abolition of entry exams for higher educational establishments and the material maintenance of the poorer students were a serious step towards the liquidation of what were virtually barriers against workers and peasants to higher education. At the same time it was also necessary to find such methods for organising the mass preparation of working people for higher education which would permit in the shortest possible time to fill the higher educational institutions with proletarian students.

As early as autumn 1918 a search for possible methods began. The first idea was to found short preparatory courses which would be able to give those taking them the general knowledge necessary. However these courses did not meet with success in Moscow. Then from the working masses themselves came the idea of organising workers' faculties attached to the higher educational institutions. These would have a course of study spread out over several years. It is interesting to note that the idea of founding these workers' faculties received complete approval from the professorate of the technological institutes.

The first workers' faculty came into being in January 1919, attached to the Moscow Commercial Institute (now the Plekhanov National Economy Institute), and the next at

Moscow University. On 15 September 1919 the People's Commissariat for Education passed a resolution On the Organisation of Workers' Faculties Attached to Universities, which served to forward the founding of workers' faculties at other higher educational institutions.

What was particular about the workers' faculties as educational institutions of a special, class type, was that only workers and peasants had the right to be educated there. Also of great importance to the workers' faculties was the decree On Workers' Faculties signed by V. I. Lenin on 17 September 1920 which underlined that the main task of these faculties was to "draw the proletarian and peasant masses into the realm of Higher Education".

The decrees and resolutions of the Soviet Government were of course not able instantly to solve the problem of the democratisation of the higher educational establishments. But the first breaches in the caste defences of higher education had been pushed through. Workers, the poorer peasants and Red Army men entered the auditoria of higher education. The class aspect of higher education changed with every year.

At the same time as taking measures to change the class make-up of those attending higher education, the Soviet state fought against the corporative and caste aspects of the teaching staff. The bourgeois professorate stubbornly opposed any interference in its scientific and educational activities and considered any attempts by competent bodies or persons to control the quality and contents of their lectures highly insulting. As a result university and institute departments sometimes preached the most blatant obscurantism and mysticism.

In fact this "autonomy" of professors and of higher education as a whole had a negative effect on the quality of the training of specialists and impeded the growth of young scientific and pedagogical cadres. The Soviet state strove to create the conditions for renewing the teaching cadres in higher education and at the same time to place the old professorate under control. A decree of 1 October 1918 abolished the academic degrees* of Doctor and Master of Science, and also the title of post-graduate. To stimulate the influx of fresh teachers, assistant

* The degree of Doctor of Science was restored in the USSR in 1934 and their number in 1973 reached 29,800. In 1934 the degree of Candidate of Science was established and by 1973, it was held by 288,300 scientific workers.

professors running independent courses were raised to the category of professor. The all-Russia competition for the right to occupy professorial chairs was introduced. Entry to this was allowed to persons known for their scientific works or their scientific pedagogical activities. This measure did not, actually, at first produce the desired results. In autumn 1918, on the basis of the all-Russia competition, new elections were held at which the reactionary elements succeeded in blackballing some of the progressive professors, for example, the noted Bolshevik astronomer P. K. Shternberg; the great scientist K. A. Timiryazev was elected to a professorial post with a bare majority of votes. As time went on, however, the selection by competition of the teaching cadres made it possible to enrol many genuinely talented and progressive scientists into the higher educational institutions.

Considerable changes were made in the organisational system of the leading bodies of higher educational institutions. Formerly it was representatives mostly of the Right-wing professorate who had sat at their head (the direction of higher educational institutions, faculties and departments). These bodies carried out corresponding policies—they tried to hamper the intake of the worker and peasant youth into the main faculties and organised private meetings of professors at which anti-Soviet resolutions were taken, etc.

So as to overcome the opposition of the bourgeois professorate and that of the reactionary students, a body of authorised commissars and revolutionary committees was established in higher education. The authorised commissars were nominated from highly educated Party and Soviet workers who were acquainted with higher education. Their duty was to help the revolutionary reconstruction of higher education and to assist in the organising of the proletarian students, the rallying of the progressive forces in the teaching staff and the propagation of socialism. Large powers and authority were also given to the revolutionary committees which consisted of Communists and non-Party student activists.

The undermining of the caste consciousness of the Right-wing professorate was also helped by the introduction to the collegiate bodies of the higher educational institutions of representatives from the Communist students and other groups which had taken up a position of support for the Soviet state. This enabled the proletarian students to take an active part in the running of higher education, to put a stop to hostile actions by the Right-wing professorate and to rally the progressive students.

The measures taken by the Soviet state to democratise higher education were met with opposition from the reactionary professorate and anti-Soviet students. Protests and declarations were sent to the People's Commissariat for Education, progressive professors found obstructions placed in their way, resignations were announced, etc. In 1919 in Petrograd, the United Council of Higher Educational and Scientific Establishments was set up which protested against the measures taken by the Government in the field of higher education and pressurised its members forbidding them to occupy administrative posts. But at the same time the actions of the Soviet bodies received the full support of the progressive professors and teachers as well as that of the section of the intelligentsia which realised the significance of the changes which were taking place and honestly gave its knowledge to the people.

The Communist Party devoted a great deal of attention to the use of old intelligentsia cadres in the bodies managing industry and directly at enterprises. A special decree introduced compulsory registration of all specialists including those who, though they had no special technological education, had for two years or more occupied responsible posts as technological organisers in industrial, transport or agricultural enterprises, and also of students in the last four terms of all special technological colleges. These specialists could be called up at any time.

In 1920 the Supreme Economic Council employed 14,890 specialists, the People's Commissariat for Railways 4,936, etc. Overall the Central Registration Bureau of Technological Forces numbered 50,275 economic specialists working in various commissariats.

In the bodies managing industry it was absolutely necessary to have specialists. These were former members of the higher and middle administration, commercial and technological personnel, former factory owners, engineers, technicians, scientists, etc. All the provisions for the running of nationalised enterprises constantly underlined the necessity for the participation of technological specialists in the economic management bodies in not less than one-third of their overall number.

The majority of the workers understood that the normal working of the enterprises could only be ensured with the help of bourgeois specialists. The Government received many applications from workshops, factories and mines, in which the workers asked to be sent engineers, technicians and administrators. They knew that many of the specialists were hostile to the new order and would leave the enterprises at the first

suitable opportunity, but such people were nevertheless allowed to retain responsible positions.

Of course, it was not the whole bourgeois technological intelligentsia that came to terms with the new state and went to serve it or took up a position of temporising neutrality. Many bourgeois specialists waged active or passive war against the workers' and peasants' state and tried in one way or another to counteract it.

The displaced bourgeoisie had not yet, however, set the anti-Soviet specialists the task of destroying the important economic centres and enterprises. On the contrary, being convinced that the Soviet state would soon fall and that capitalism would be restored, they were concerned with preserving the main productive capacities in the country.

The most reactionary bourgeois specialists did not limit themselves to passive sabotage but took a direct part in the military actions of the whiteguard armies and interventionists against the Soviet state, were participants or leaders in underground counter-revolutionary organisations and took part in subversive activity on the front and in the rear of the Red Army.

The Civil War period abounds with cases of anti-popular, counter-revolutionary activity by many bourgeois specialists. Their participation in open and covert sabotage and in conspiracies and rebellions was by no means a rare occurrence.

It stands to reason that the Soviet organs inflicted severe punishment on open counter-revolutionaries in accordance with the strict legislation protecting the security of the proletarian state. But a policy of repression was not brought to bear on the specialists who, though they had not been convicted of direct counter-revolution, nevertheless remained potential enemies of the Soviet state. Overcoming their opposition without making political concessions, the Soviet state tried to draw the bourgeois specialists into the creative work of founding the socialist economy.

The 9th Congress of the RCP(B) held in 1920 recommended various methods of learning from the specialists and controlling their work: 1. that the director of the enterprise be a worker and the specialist attached to him as an adviser; 2. that the specialist engineer be *de facto* director of the enterprise and have attached to him a commissar from the workers with broad powers and the duty of examining all aspects of the activity of the enterprise; 3. that one or two workers be attached as aids to the specialist director but without the right to suspend his orders, etc. Such forms of control were employed also in factory shops where

workers were promoted to responsible posts on condition they studied from the specialists.

The 9th Party Congress devoted special attention to the role of trade unions in attracting the old specialists to socialist construction. The first engineers' branches in industrial workers' trade unions appeared in the spring of 1919—first in the metallurgists' trade union and later in the union of miners.

Assimilating all the best created by bourgeois society, the proletariat educated their own specialists. Promotion, however, could not fully solve the problem of providing the national economy with specialists of worker and peasant origin. Higher education had to become the main source of such supply.

The policies of the Communist Party and the Soviet state were attracting to the side of the revolution an ever wider section of the scientific and technological intelligentsia. A considerable part of it felt a growing patriotic desire to help the people in one way or another to fight the outside enemies and the terrible results of economic dislocation.

The plans and projects proposed by the Communist Party seemed to many to be unrealisable but they were considered, argued about and here and there began to be brought into being. This set the scientific and technological circles to thinking, to try to re-evaluate truths which had previously seemed indisputable. A great many specialists broke away from the counter-revolutionary section of the intelligentsia only after seeing the concrete results of the work to which they had been enlisted by the Soviet state. Hundreds of skilful engineers arrived at building sites and enterprises in highly sceptical states of mind and complete strangers to the idea of building socialism, but after a little time had gone by in which they participated in implementing the plans of the Soviet state for the economic rebirth of the country, they began to believe in their reality.

TEACHERS AND MEDICAL WORKERS

Securing the co-operation of one of the largest branches of the intelligentsia—the teachers—was very important to the reinforcement of the young Soviet state. Teachers, especially in the villages, were a powerful, and at times the only cultural force able to have a great political influence on the population. Teachers were liked, people went to them for advice, for help and for explanations of the events then taking place in the country. Therefore, patient painstaking explanatory work by

Party organisations, state bodies and trade unions was necessary so as to set this force to serving the Soviet state.

A. V. Lunacharsky, addressing himself to the teachers, said that no one was asking the intelligentsia to imbue itself with a communist spirit and together with the Party to work actively at its side in building communism. But practical co-operation was possible if the intelligentsia would show objectivity and would rightly appreciate the gigantic work for the cultural transformation of the country outlined by the Communists. For reasons which will be dealt with later on the Soviet state did not, however, in the early days of its existence meet with such mutual understanding and practical co-operation from the better qualified teachers.

The All-Russia Union of Teachers, and especially its leadership in its Broad and Narrow Councils, constituted a serious obstacle in the way of co-operation with the Soviet state. Having failed to organise a teachers' general strike in the first months of the existence of the Soviet state, the union did not withdraw from the battle, but only changed its forms, going over from open attacks on the policies of the Bolshevik Party to more flexible and underhand methods of anti-Soviet activity. The leadership of the All-Russia Union of Teachers was obliged to take into account such an important factor as the support for the Soviet state by the popular masses. In an editorial of its official organ, it grudgingly had to recognise that "since it has become clear that the Soviet and commissarial government is to a certain extent recognised and supported by the popular masses, it is impossible to ignore it, and simply to refuse to have any dealings with it is difficult...". This of course did not mean that the union leadership having *de facto* recognised the Soviet state had decided to co-operate with it.

Screening itself behind the slogan of saving "true democracy" and the "achievements of the revolution", the upper ranks of the teachers counted particularly on the autonomy and apoliticism of schools. When fighting the tsarist autocracy the idea of the autonomy of schools had found support from the democratic section of the teachers and had been of progressive significance. But after the October Revolution when the Soviet state set itself the task of educating the broad popular masses and the interests of the state and of the schools became merged into one, then the idea of the autonomy of schools took on a counter-revolutionary meaning being fused with the idea of their "apoliticism". The leaders of the All-Russia Union of Teachers tried to divorce the school from "politics" and demanded that political and Party workers should not encroach

on the schools. But, as is shown by the activities of this union which had turned schools into an arena for political fighting against the Soviet state, schools could not remain outside politics. "Non-Party" and "apolitical" union leaders showed themselves to be experienced "politicians" with clearly expressed social sympathies and antipathies.

The All-Russia Union of Teachers represented an impressive force. Its organisations united about 50 thousand teachers who besides this were the best qualified ones. The union was influential amongst the teachers, and its printed organs—the *Izvestiya Vserossiiskogo uchitelskogo soyuza* (All-Russia Union of Teachers' News), *Uchitel* (The Teacher), *Petrogradsky uchitel* (The Petrograd Teacher) and *Narodny uchitel* (The People's Teacher) were popular with them.

The tactical line of the Party towards a public organisation with anti-Soviet leanings was regulated not only according to the type of activities the organisation engaged in but also by the masses' attitude towards it. And insofar as the teachers at first trusted the leadership of their union and in the main followed it, efforts were made to link this union with the country's general trade union movement which was led by the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions and in that way disengage the school workers who were members of the Teachers' Union from the ideological influence of the bourgeoisie. However, the Cadet and SR leadership of the union categorically refused to take part in the 1st All-Russia Trade Union Congress (in January 1918). The Party then chose a different tactic: to launch on broad explanatory work among the rank-and-file membership. This tactical line continued as the main one throughout 1918 while the battle to unite the teachers' progressive forces was being carried out.

The All-Russia Union of Teachers held its positions longer than any other organisation of the old intelligentsia. Eventually, as a result of the large-scale propaganda work denouncing the leadership's policies, carried out by Party and trade union organisations, and also because of the consolidation of Soviet power, etc., by the autumn of 1918 the union ranks began quickly to dissolve. The autumn and end of 1918 was a time of complete disintegration within what had only recently been a powerful and authoritative public organisation of teachers. It is true that its leaders still tried to continue the fight and attempted to run teachers' congresses and conferences under their banners and to abet the restoration of the old order when opportunistic arose, but an ever greater number of teachers' collectives announced their transition to the side of the Soviet state.

Thus the following resolution was passed at the Kursk gubernia congress of teachers in the beginning of May 1918 by a majority vote of 166 to 3: "We take the Soviet state to be a people's state working to rebuild the life of the country on a fair, socialist basis.... We believe that it is the sacred duty of the teacher in his social and pedagogical work not only to recognise this state but to support it in every way."* Even the most inveterate and implacable opponents of the Soviet state amongst the leadership of the All-Russia Union of Teachers had to admit that they had "no united teachers' front, no unity of thought or action".

By the end of 1918, as a result of its anti-Soviet position the All-Russia Union of Teachers lost all influence over the broad mass of teachers. The move by the teachers to co-operation with the Soviet state was at hand. Having analysed the situation, the All-Russia Central Executive Committee decreed in December 1918 that "the All-Russia Union of Teachers as represented by its central and local organisations is to be dissolved. Its printed organs, the *All-Russia Union of Teachers' News*, *The Petrograd Teacher*, *The Teacher* and other central and local organs are to be closed down...." No repressive measures against former members of the union were taken by the Soviet Government. By that time the union's authority had reached such an ebb that the liquidation of this organisation did not bring forth any protest.

The fate of the All-Russia Union of Teachers was highly instructive for the old intelligentsia. It showed that organisations of the intelligentsia which distanced themselves from the people and acted against its interests would in the long run lose their influence and authority and be obliged to quit the political arena. It also showed that no demagogical calls and slogans from the union leadership were able to entice teachers onto the path of actively fighting the Soviet state. The teachers as a whole remained true to their democratic traditions and their principle of serving the interests of the people.

It would be wrong to suppose, however, that with the dissolution of the All-Russia Union of Teachers, the large army of teachers became the active champion and defender of the policies of the Soviet state. A section of the teachers, especially in the towns, offered passive resistance to the work of the Soviet state in the field of national education while nominally carrying out their duties and did not let a chance go by to point

* *Pravda*. 10 May 1918.

out the mistakes and failures of the local branches of the national education authorities at the same time as emphasising their "apoliticism".

Since there was a grave lack of cultural forces, especially in the villages, the teachers could have played an important role not only in the education of the masses in general but also in their political enlightenment. But to do this it was necessary to educate the teachers ideologically.

The Central Committee of the Party paid great attention to questions of agitation and propaganda work amongst the teachers. To influence the teachers ideologically methods were used such as the participation of Communists in the work of teachers' congresses and conferences, the setting up of political libraries for school workers, the instruction of teachers in social disciplines, and talks and lectures to teachers on political subjects by Party workers. In the gubernia and district centres short instruction courses in the rudiments of political knowledge were set up, as were Party and Soviet Schools and courses for agitators which trained school workers to teach basic political knowledge. Agitation was carried out to encourage teachers to join the Communist Party.

Special attention was devoted to the work amongst the country teachers. At that time there were a good many teachers in the villages who sincerely sympathised with the Soviet state. It was necessary to organise and help them. A very interesting testimonial to the role of the country teachers and also of the ways of drawing them into social work is given in the instructions distributed locally by the Department of the CC of the Party for Work in the Villages: "Great attention should be paid to teachers: the teachers themselves ... are of peasant stock and it is only from backwardness that they go against communism. The teacher usually knows all the ins and outs of the village as well as all the interests of its people; one should get closer to him. If he is a good teacher but just lacks awareness, then one ... should carefully try to incline him to our side and help him in his needs, to convince him, help him with supplies of provisions, hurry up the authorities in the town to issue pencils and notebooks to him, give him a good book to read and draw him into cultural enlightenment work. Having roused a suitable teacher, he should be set to drawing other teachers into the work and they should be helped in their hard and difficult task."*

* Central Party Archives, Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CC CPSU, Folio 17, File 5, Document 25, pp. 179-80.

At the 1st All-Russia Conference on Work in the Villages which took place in November 1919, Lenin emphasised that despite the complicated political and military situation, work in the villages was an important factor in the building of socialism. He called on the Party organisations in the villages to make wide use of the bourgeois specialists. The directions adopted by the conference recommended that country teachers should without fail take part in Party work.

N. K. Krupskaya, a long-time member of the Party, comrade-in-arms and wife of V. I. Lenin, played a prominent part in the political enlightenment of the teachers. As a teacher herself, she fully understood the feelings, way of life and psychology of the teachers and could find the right approach to this group of the intelligentsia. In the first years of Soviet power there was not a single all-Russia congress of teachers or conference on questions concerning national education in which Krupskaya did not take the most active part. She very frequently spoke at teachers' meetings and gatherings to explain the policies of the Party in the field of national education, the role of teachers in the building of the new society and to criticise the slogan "the teacher and the school are outside politics" which was popular amongst a considerable section of teachers. About this, in one of her speeches she said: "There is nothing more naïve than the affirmation that pedagogics can and should be alien to politics. In the wide sense of the word, what do 'politics' mean? It means our understanding of the tasks of the moment, the ways of putting them into practice and so on. Pedagogy is a science which is three-quarters social, and for that reason there is no way in which it can be separated from the vital problems of politics, the vital problems of our time."*

Krupskaya's book *Public Education and Democracy* (1919) and also her numerous articles on questions concerning public education helped to attract to the side of the Soviet state many who were still vacillating or occupying anti-Soviet positions.

A considerable role in the ideological education of the teachers was also played by the old Bolshevik S. I. Mitskevich who on instructions from the Party led and participated in the founding of the Union of Education Workers. He knew how to get on both with the abruptly critical young and with old scientists. Many leading figures amongst the teachers did not

* N. K. Krupskaya, *Ob uchitele. Izbranniye statyi, rech'i i pisma* (The Teacher. Selected Articles, Speeches and Correspondence), Moscow, 1960, p. 78.

join the union, rebelled, founded their own commissions and petitioned the Council of People's Commissars with the most incredible demands, but Mitskevich not only did not antagonise the indignant and the sceptical, but by word and deed convinced them of the progressiveness of Soviet education.

To form a professional union of teachers was a complicated and difficult process. As a counter to the All-Russia Union of Teachers, the Union of Internationalist Teachers was founded at the end of 1917 to bring together workers in the educational field who "stood firm on social revolution and the destruction of the present school system". But this union had an extremely small membership. By the end of 1918 it had only a little more than 12 thousand members. Its negligible number of members can be explained by the fact that the Union of Internationalist Teachers had taken up an incorrect position vis-à-vis the teacher masses. Fencing itself off from the rank-and-file teachers the union admitted to its ranks only "politically mature activists". Its leaders took up sectarian positions, announcing that the Soviet state was making a serious mistake in not taking sufficiently decisive and drastic measures concerning all the old teachers, towards whom, they considered, one should not stand on ceremony as "barely one-hundredth part of them were actually of any use in fulfilling the new tasks of revolutionary education".

At the same time the Union of Internationalist Teachers did a lot towards politically stratifying the teachers and increasing the number of the Soviet state's active allies. But its activities in this direction would have been more effective had not its organisational narrowness and sectarianism prevented it from becoming a mass organisation for Soviet teachers.

In the summer of 1919 the All-Russia Trade Union of Workers in Education and Socialist Culture (which changed its name in 1921 to the Union of Education Workers) was founded on the basis of the Union of Internationalist Teachers. This actually became a mass organisation for teachers both in the towns and in the villages. It launched on large-scale work for the political enlightenment of teachers, for the protection of the professional rights of the workers in national education and for drawing them into the creation of a new type of school.

The general propaganda and agitation of the Party, the education work of local Party organisations and the creation and activity of the All-Russia Trade Union of Workers in Education did not remain without results. Reports from the Tver, Tula, Arkhangelsk, Penza, Kursk and other gubernias noted the rise in social activity by teachers, the entry of the best of them into

the ranks of the Party and the animation of cultural enlightenment work in the villages. The social life of the village gradually began to concentrate itself around the school. Many country teachers took part in the peasant gatherings, organised village houses into reading rooms and meeting places, and helped the Party organisations in carrying out the social and political campaigns.

Houses turned into reading rooms appeared everywhere and these for the most part were organised by teachers. Incomplete statistics from the People's Commissariat for Education have records of 12,007 such reading rooms by early 1919.

The Communist Party and the Soviet state devoted especial attention, despite the difficulties arising from the Civil War and the intervention, to the question of public education. The difficulties in this were very great. Because of the war and destruction the schools were in a very grave situation. The buildings themselves were in poor condition and their educational equipment had worn out. Schools suffered from a severe lack of teachers, and there were not enough textbooks, school supplies and writing material. Particular hardship was felt by schools in regions where military activities were taking place. All this had a grim effect on Soviet schools in the first years of the revolution.

Working conditions in schools were very complicated but numerous teachers went on with their activities which the people so needed, and steadfastly worked to rebuild the schools on a new basis and overcame vast difficulties. The Soviet state did all that it could in such hard times to ease the plight of both schools and teachers. As early as the beginning of 1918 a decree of the Council of People's Commissars increased the pay of teachers from 50 to 100 rubles a month and in March of the same year it was set to between 300 and 500 rubles. Due to the increase in the cost of living it was again raised from November 1918 to 600-800 rubles a month. In addition, the living space norm for teachers was made the same as for doctors and engineers and measures were taken to ease the situation of teachers who had become unfit for work.

As a result of the consolidation of the Soviet state, the victories of the Red Army, the Party propaganda and agitation work amongst the teachers and the tactful relations towards them by the Soviet Government and community, the masses of teachers gradually moved over to a position of co-operation with the Soviet state. *Pravda* commented on 4 September 1920 that "a serious change towards communist ideology can be observed amongst the vast mass of those working in the field of

national education". There was still quite a number of anti-Soviet elements amongst the teachers but by the end of the Civil War they had already lost any decisive influence.

The Communist Party took the first steps towards training workers and peasants as new teaching cadres. In 1919 more than 150 teachers' training courses were set up over the country. "The majority of those taking them," noted a statement on this subject, "is from the working population." There were some 6,500 people taking the course. Local departments of the national education system and the Soviets took energetic measures to organise short courses for improving teachers' qualifications. At these the teachers heard lectures on the fundamentals of scientific socialism, social science, the theory and practice of labour schools, and teaching methods. Congresses, conferences and courses helped the masses of teachers to comprehend the essence of the current events, explained the importance of the reforms in national education and helped them to master the basic organisational principles of the labour schools, etc.

Despite the immense difficulties the country's network of schools not only was not reduced but spread still further. In the school year of 1914-1915 there were 106,400 primary and secondary schools with 7,800,000 pupils and by the 1920-1921 school year the number of schools had risen to 118,408 with 9,781,000 pupils. Great merit in this achievement goes to the teachers.

The conditions resulting from the Civil War, the intervention and the economic disruption made it an important task for the Soviet state to enlist the co-operation of the medical workers. The not very numerous medical workers had much on their shoulders: to return the wounded back to their units, to fight the epidemics and the sicknesses caused by famine, to provide medical aid for the population, to carry out preventative health measures and much more besides. The results of a one-day census carried out by the People's Commissariat for Public Health on 25 February 1920 showed that in the Soviet Republic (excluding the Ukraine) there were in all 24,000 doctors of whom 40 per cent had been mobilised to the Red Army.

The path of the medical workers to co-operation with the Soviet state was as difficult and complicated as that of the teachers. The upper reaches of the medical intelligentsia had centres of their own which tried to lead this intelligentsia against the Soviet state. These were such centres as the Pirogov Society, the board of the All-Russia Professional Union of Doctors and the board of the All-Russia Union of Doctors'

Assistants' Unions. Just as for the teachers, 1918 was a year of change for doctors, medical assistants and nurses in their relations with the Soviet state.

After its regrettably famous call to doctors on 22 November 1917, in which it appealed to them to "show opposition to the forces now tearing the country apart" and to "take part in the battle with reaction", the leadership of the Pirogov Society continued its line of opposition to the Soviet state. The extraordinary congress of the Pirogov Society held in Moscow on 13-15 March 1918 approved the actions of saboteurs and carried a number of resolutions directed against the Soviet Government. The congress also blamed the Soviet state for the breakdown of medical and sanitary care.

Obshchestvenny vrach (The Public Doctor), the organ of the Pirogov Society, ran in its pages a campaign of lies and slander against the Soviet state and demanded its "moral isolation". Amongst other things, the journal described the workers' and peasants' state as "sheer tyranny", a "criminal experiment" which would lead to "the rule of anarchy and internecine fratricidal war". The journal also ran a column called "Doctors in the Bolshevik Camp" which was a peculiar "black list" of doctors' names so that they could be boycotted. Amongst the first to be listed in it were the Communist doctors Z. P. Solovyov, I. V. Rusakov, and N. A. Semashko.

The board of the All-Russia Union of Doctors' Assistants' Unions and its official organ *The Medical Assistants' Herald* took an equally implacable stand. In fact their speeches and articles against the Soviet state were even more unbridled and uncompromising than those of the "Pirogovites". The journal organised the persecution of medical assistants who were co-operating with Soviet public health departments and called for the others to go over from passive acceptance to active opposition.

The All-Russia Professional Union of Doctors which was founded in March 1918 and was in fact an offshoot of the Pirogov Society took up a milder but in essence equally implacable position. The organising commission of the union addressed a call to all doctors in Russia to support the ideals of "public medicine" and actually to come out against the Soviet state.

While proclaiming the "apoliticism of medicine" the upper crust of the medical intelligentsia in fact waged a war against the Soviet state which was confirmed by the character of its actions and the announcements of its "leaders" and organisations. The lies and hypocrisy of the doctors' declarations of "apoliticism"

are well illustrated by the "Address of the Doctors of the Northern Region to the Doctors of England" which was issued on 16 August 1919. It says: "We ...affirm that the Allied troops who are defending the region from the so-called Bolsheviks, are not in any way serving the interests of reaction or helping restore the old system.... We call on you, comrades English doctors, by your authoritative voice to influence your people to bring us aid in this arduous time by immediately sending armed forces to help us to organise and set up peace and order in this country which has been trampled on by the Bolsheviks." The journal *Izvestiya Narodnogo komissariata zdavookhraneniya* (The News of the People's Commissariat for Public Health) which in 1920 reprinted this address from the whiteguard newspapers as an illustration of the "apoliticism" of the doctors, added, not without sarcasm: "Any further comment is absolutely superfluous."

It would be wrong, however, to suppose that the medical workers formed a united front against the Soviet state. The October Revolution caused a deep stratification in their midst. The anti-Soviet action of the "Pirogovites" were sharply rejected by the progressive section of medical workers who took the side of the Soviet state. There was besides a substantial group of the medical intelligentsia which consisted of those who were vacillating and had not yet understood the true meaning of the events. They felt nervous at the novelty of the reforms being carried out by the Soviet state in the medical and public health field but at the same time they were revolted by the methods of fighting the state being used by the "Pirogovites" and other groups of medical workers who had announced that they "did not recognise the Soviets".

A letter by the non-Party doctor N. Shvaitsar printed on 17 March 1918 in the newspaper *Izvestiya VTsIK* is an interesting record of that period. In it, he sharply criticises the position taken by the Pirogov Society congress in March 1918. "They have learnt nothing," he wrote. "The accusations made by the Pirogovites against the Bolsheviks suffer from the same triteness and are as unconvincing to the masses as ever. The methods they propose for saving Russia are old and worn-out and even useless and criminal in the present situation; and a doctors' strike is something which can only be mentioned with a blush of shame, especially by Moscovites." At the end of his letter, Shvaitsar addressed himself to those doctors who were still continuing "not to recognise" the Soviet state: "It is possible to be an ideological opponent of the Bolsheviks and even of Bolshevism (I myself am still 'wild' and do not belong to

any party), but it is wrong only to indulge in Bolshevik-baiting and, for fear that this will help the state to consolidate itself, not take an active part in the positive building of a life which at the present time is impossible without contact with the Soviet state... Believe me, you are not what supports it and it is not you who will get rid of it. And no one will get rid of it while its roots are in the people.

"Whether you wish it or not the new social era will make you subordinate yourselves to its powerful will."

The Bolshevik Party was faced by a complicated task: to paralyse the anti-Soviet activities of the "Pirogovites", to speed up the process of stratification of the medical workers, to free the medical intelligentsia from the influence of the petty-bourgeois parties and enlist it in fruitful co-operation with the Soviet state. Lenin in his speeches during the Civil War period repeatedly referred to the question of setting up a new, Soviet medicine and called on the doctors to give their knowledge and experience to the people.

The Bolshevik doctors N. A. Semashko, Z. P. Solovyov, D. I. Ulyanov (V. I. Lenin's brother), I. V. Rusakov, M. F. Vladimirovsky, V. A. Obukh and others played leading roles in this. On numerous occasions, both in speeches and in the press, they patiently and with great tact explained to the widest circles of doctors in all fields of practice and research as well as to professors and medical assistants that their participation in the building of a medicine on new principles was dictated not from above but by the very logic of life, by the interests of the people and the very course of the development of medical science. Their own selfless service to the interests of the people was an example to be followed.

The explanations and persuasions of the Communists would not, however, have been effective, had they not reinforced them with concrete actions. After the October Revolution the situation in the public health field underwent considerable changes. The Soviet state took over the maintenance of all medical institutions allocating large sums for the purpose and in July 1918 the People's Commissariat for Public Health was created. This institution which had not existed in tsarist Russia took over all the medical and public health affairs of the country. Medical aid was free and accessible to the whole population.

Mention should also be made of the first Soviet medical journal *Izvestiya sovetskoi meditsiny* (Soviet Medical News) which later was renamed *Izvestiya Narodnogo komissariata zdavookhraneniya* (The People's Commissariat for

Public Health News) first appeared in May 1918 and actively propagandised the organisation of medical and public health affairs on a new basis; it also provided moral support for the medical workers who were co-operating with the Soviet state, sharply denouncing the anti-Soviet actions of the "Pirogovites" and other opponents of the democratisation of public health. The journal advocated the wide-scale enlistment of the medical intelligentsia in the building of a new public health system.

By the summer of 1918 the medical workers clearly showed a movement towards co-operation with the Soviet state. The general masses of doctors, medical assistants and other medical workers were working in Soviet departments and institutions. Even bodies such as the board of the Pirogov Society and the board of the All-Russia Union of Doctors' Assistants' Unions recognised the necessity of having working relations with the Soviet state. They emphasised as before the "lack of democracy" of the Soviet state, but pressure from below, from their own rank-and-file members, forced them to enter into active contacts with the Soviet departments of public health.

S. I. Mitskevich, who knew the feelings of the medical intelligentsia very well, later wrote in his memoirs about the reasons which led the workers in "public medicine" to enter into the service of the Soviet state: "A section of the doctors at first went to work in Soviet organisations because it was necessary to work somewhere so as to live; besides this the Soviet state was gaining strength monthly and hopes that it would soon fall, fostered by many at the beginning, were rapidly volatising themselves. The better part of the doctors saw that the Soviet state was aiming for the good and the happiness of the people and what grandiose perspectives it offered for the development of medical science; so that, to repeat Lenin's expression, they came to recognise communism through the facts of their own science."

The medical workers' process of going over to co-operation with the Soviet state was not, of course, an instantaneous act. In the central regions of Russia a sharp change in the political feelings of the medical intelligentsia had already taken place in the spring or summer of 1918, but in the places occupied by whiteguard forces, this process dragged itself out over a considerably longer period and was only completed after the liberation of these territories.

The process of attracting the more prominent figures of the medical intelligentsia to the side of the Soviet state was especially complicated as these, for the most part, were members of the Pirogov Society. In membership the society was

relatively small: in 1919 it had 845 members and in 1920 it had increased to 1,126. It incorporated, however, all the most qualified doctors. Their help in building Soviet medicine and in setting up a general medical aid service for the population would be extremely valuable.

The Pirogov Society was already no longer united or solid. There were even serious disagreements amongst its leadership as to the direction of its political line. The course of events and especially the measures taken by the Soviet state in the public health field, made part of the "Pirogovites" re-evaluate their views. As early as the end of 1917 and beginning of 1918 prominent doctors began to offer their co-operation to Soviet institutions. The most active "Pirogovites" could not but note the progressive work of the Soviet state in the public health field. If one considers that the Pirogov Society congress in March 1918 also adopted, besides pompous resolutions of "non-recognition" of the Soviet state, a resolution on creating a commission to fight epidemics, then it can be said that some first steps towards constructive co-operation with the new state had been made even by such an anti-Soviet body as the "Pirogovites".

After the creation of the People's Commissariat for Public Health in July 1918, the change in the attitude of the "Pirogovites" became more noticeable. Many of them began to work in branches of the Commissariat and some became members of its Scientific Council.

The stratification of the "Pirogovite" leaders, and the enrolment of the better part of them to co-operation with the Soviet state were, however, difficult and complicated processes. Semashko who was invited by the chairman of the Pirogov Society board to one of its meetings, recalled that after his speech on the principles of Soviet medicine the meeting showed strong antipathy with his views. "I was especially attacked," he later wrote, "by a member of the board, Dorf, who in paroxysms of rage reviled the Soviet state and its public health system. Only the tact and authority of L. A. Tarasevich restrained my assailant's passions. The meeting naturally did not adopt any decisions. A few days after this a group of prominent medical workers met at Tarasevich's house to discuss the situation. They all interrupted each other in their attempts to abuse the Soviet state and its public health system as if to anticipate the negative attitude towards it of the chairman of the Pirogov Society himself. However Professor Tarasevich, to the amazement of all around, suddenly announced: 'No, you are wrong to take such a negative attitude

towards the statement on the tasks of Soviet medicine. There is something to it and, moreover, it is something progressive and interesting which we ought to welcome.' Tarasevich's pronouncement made an immense impression and shook many in their negative attitude towards Soviet medicine." It should also be said that L. A. Tarasevich later took a very active part in organising medical help for the population.

P. N. Diatroptov, another prominent member of the Pirogov Society, had an equally distinctive change in his evaluation of the actions of the Soviet state despite the fact that in November 1917 he had been a signatory of an anti-Soviet call put out by the board of the Pirogov Society.

"Soon after the October Revolution," recalls N. A. Semashko, "when I was running the Moscow public health department, P. N. Diatroptov came to me and offered to help conciliate the Moscow out-patient doctors with the public health department as they had up until then been engaged in sabotage. One only has to remember what the strike was like in Moscow to appreciate this fact. The public health department of the Moscow Soviet was then being boycotted by the majority of doctors in Moscow. At times the boycott even turned into sabotage.... And then Diatroptov, an aged man with grey hair who had already seen and worked a lot in his time and who, together with his friend, L. A. Tarasevich, was practically the leader of the Pirogov Society, came offering an olive-branch to the Soviet state, and more than that, acted as an intermediary to help draw the Moscow doctors into Soviet work."

It should be said that the Soviet state had always been to the highest degree careful and tactful in its relations with the Pirogov Society, hoping that it would gradually join itself as a whole in the work of building a Soviet public health system. In fact, the majority of the doctors did break with the society but a small group of its more active members continued to cling to their old ideological positions. The society continued to exist for a few more years and was only finally dissolved in February 1925.

The foundation of the All-Russia Union of Medical Workers played a considerable part in the transition by medical workers to co-operation with the Soviet state and to active participation in the organisation and activities of the new public health system. But even after it was founded, the professional movement of the medical workers was still not a fully united one: many doctors had still not joined the new trade union and remained members of the All-Russia Professional Union of Doctors. The journal *Izvestiya Narodnogo komissariata*

zdravookhraneniya considered this to be an abnormal situation and sharply criticised the leaders of this union who were preventing the doctors from joining a single trade union and warned that if they did not change their policies they risked finding themselves in the position of officers without an army. Under pressure from medical workers the union's leaders were obliged to begin protracted negotiations for their joining the All-Russia Union of Medical Workers. By the summer of 1920, all the doctors had joined a single union.

The Soviet state took care of the material side of the life of the medical workers. It was not possible to do very much in this direction during the hard years of Civil War but the Soviet Government did, however, grant the doctors definite privileges and advantages. Thus, on 10 December 1919, V. I. Lenin signed a decree of the Defence Council On Assistance for the Medical and Health Personnel on the Fronts which gave all such personnel being sent to the front an extraordinary grant, as well as a complete outfitting, shoes and warm clothes outside the usual waiting-list. Their families received supplementary ration cards.

In the same year the Provisional Regulations for the Provision of Medical Workers in Case of Their Illness or Death from Epidemic Diseases were passed. In accordance with these regulations any medical worker who fell ill would continue to receive his former pay and would, on his recovery, receive a one-month leave outside the usual waiting-list. The families of those who had died would receive an increased pension.

The general masses of the medical workers joined in the building of socialism as they became convinced of the solidity of the Soviet state and of the effectiveness of its measures in the public health field. In the most trying conditions caused by the Civil War and the devastation, the medical workers managed to do their duty.

The medical personnel's battle against the epidemics of typhus, cholera and Spanish flu in 1919-1920 was a heroic moment in the history of Soviet medicine. "One can say without the slightest exaggeration," recalled Z. P. Solovyov, "that the campaign against the epidemics in the Civil War period was like an assault, a stubborn and bloody assault to which the military doctors true to their medical and revolutionary duty conscientiously went." The majority of medical workers also caught typhus themselves and their overall mortality rate was four times that of the rest of the population. The Red Cross workers in the country and town hospitals worked equally selflessly. For

instance, the public health directorate of the Perm Gubernia observed on several occasions that there had not been one case of refusal to work in the most dangerous areas.

The people valued highly the noble work and selflessness of the medical and health personnel. In the central and the local press, and also in the Red Army newspapers of that time, there are a multitude of letters and comments from both rural inhabitants and city-dwellers, from wounded or sick Red Army men expressing their gratitude to the medical workers. Many of them were decorated or given diplomas of honour and also valuable gifts.

The medical workers were one of the first detachments of the old intelligentsia to stop sabotaging the Soviet Government and to enter the service of the workers' and peasants' state.

THE ARTISTIC INTELLIGENTSIA

The harsh light of revolution and Civil War illuminated the real political face of the various groups within the artistic intelligentsia. Many writers, actors and other members of the artistic intelligentsia remained true to the people and to the revolution. It does not follow, however, that immediately after the October Revolution they all grasped all the complexity and contradictions brought about by the revolution and the Civil War or that their social and political views and their world outlook corresponded completely with the demands of the epoch.

The October Revolution took the stratification process deeper amongst those active in literature and art. In the very first days of the revolution there came to light a small group of writers, actors and painters for whom the revolution was absolutely unacceptable. People who only the day before had been singing praises in the highest to the people and had sworn by them began to revile these same people with terrible curses. The poet K. Balmont in 1905 wrote in one of his poems: "O worker, I am with you and I your storm do sing," but in 1918 he spoke with hatred about the fighters for freedom: "They are no longer dogs, they are worse, wolves, rabid hounds who,

slobbering at the mouth, tear with foul teeth at the hand that liberated them.”*

In March 1917 Z. Gippius sang the praises of the Red Flag and called: “Let us go out onto the springtime streets, let us go out into the golden snowstorm!” But after the October Revolution the poetess intoned: “In the name of what devil, with what dreadful nightmare hounding you, did you, O people, keep silent and kill your freedom, or not just that but flogged it to death with a knout.”**

I. A. Bunin in a Denikinite newspaper cursed the “villain of the planet” who “was sitting high on the shoulders of the Russian savage, and the Russian savage has dared to do what would have horrified even the devil himself”,*** and called for an open battle against the revolution.

Writers like Gippius, Merezhkovsky and Bunin at once decided on their political credo. They lent their talents to the enemies of the Soviet state. At least they were “good” in the sense that they did not hide their convictions and went about openly, but comparatively few were that straightforward.

However, among other groupings of the artistic intelligentsia there were quite a number of layers to a “marsh”, as it were, which distinguished itself by instability of social outlook. Attempts to represent the October Revolution as bourgeois-democratic and not socialist were very widespread.

Many famous artists drew a sharp line between art and politics. And, as a result of this, it was characteristic of them to strive not to allow “politics” to enter into the sphere of art. The famous stage director K. S. Stanislavsky said that he and his colleagues “wanted to look into the revolutionary soul of the country” but at the same time he counterposed the political tendency of a play to “the seed of ever pure human feelings and thoughts”. In 1920 at a meeting of workers in the arts held in the Bolshoi Theatre, a letter from Stanislavsky was read out in which the same idea can be found: “...the plane of our art is aesthetics, and it is impossible to transfer it with impunity to some different plane, inimical to it, such as the plane of politics or practical, utilitarian life, just as it is impossible to take politics into the plane of pure aesthetics.”****

* K. Balmont, *Revolutsioner ya ili net* (Am I a Revolutionary, or Not), Moscow, 1918, p. 3.

** Z. I. Gippius, *Posledniye stikhi* (Last Poems), Petrograd, 1918, pp. 39, 48.

*** Quoted in the magazine *Krasnaya Nov*, No. 3, 1924, p. 253.

**** Letter by Stanislavsky in *Vestnik teatra*, No. 48, 1920, p. 12.

Even those artists who sincerely accepted and warmly welcomed the revolution did not always correctly solve the problem of the correlation of politics and art. A. A. Blok who called on the intelligentsia to “listen to the music of Revolution” with all their hearts, at the same time affirmed that writers did not practise politics and that “if they practise politics then they are sinning against themselves because ‘if you chase after two hares—you won’t catch one’: they will not be practising politics and they will lose their inspiration”.*

In his article “Party Organisation and Party Literature” V. I. Lenin discussed specific forms of artists’ participation in political life. In the final analysis Lenin did not agree that the writer should abandon art for the sake of politics but that politics should find its place in forms appropriate to the essence of art itself.

Mention should also be made of such an occurrence amongst the petty-bourgeois artistic intelligentsia as propaganda for some “third, spiritual revolution”, which would come as the inevitable conclusion of the October Revolution. This idea formed the basis for the activities of the Free Philosophical Association which appeared in 1919, linking the highly disparate strata of the intelligentsia whose hostility towards the socialist character of the October Revolution brought them together.

The House of Writers and the House of Arts founded at the end of 1918 by M. Gorky collected around themselves considerable forces from the artistic intelligentsia. By organising them a distinctive endeavour was made to maintain the arts and support creative activities in the extremely difficult conditions of that time. In them manuscripts and pictures were reviewed, lectures were read, discussions took place, etc. It was also there that writers and workers in the arts ate and received their food rations.

The House of Writers, in which the tone was set by such venerable cultural figures as S. A. Vengerov, N. A. Kotlyarevsky, A. Y. Kaufman, F. K. Sologub and others, united the various trends in the “democratic” intelligentsia. Regrets about the past, hopes that the “evil times” would soon pass and that life would return to its “normal run”, complaints about hardships and wrongs, and the respectful and seemingly decent but in fact caustic and cruel persecution of workers in literature and the arts who had started on the path of co-operation with

* Alexander Blok, *Sochineniya v drukh tomakh*, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1955, pp. 227-28.

the new state—all formed the tenor of the printed or oral excursions of the “internal émigrés” who made up the core of this organisation. An impression of the political position of its leadership and their unwillingness to come to terms with the Soviet state can be obtained from the episode reported by the writer K. Fedin. After having listened to a lecture by Vengerov, he asked if he “had correctly understood from the speech that the time had come for the intelligentsia to draw closer to Soviet views; to which Vengerov replied: ‘We are socialists from the start; if anyone wishes to come closer to us, then let him: there is nothing we need change in our views!’”^{*} The leadership of the House of Arts took the same positions but with an orientation towards the capitalist West.

The progressive figures of Russian culture fought against the despondency and pessimism of the intelligentsia, sharply attacking those who saw only “universal chaos” in the revolution and did not notice the extremely important social changes that were taking place. In December 1917 the writer A. S. Serafimovich wrote angrily in the newspaper *Izvestiya TsIK*: “How can it be that members of Russian literary circles who laid themselves out for the sake of the peasants, the workers and the soldiers, should find themselves on one side of a gulf, and those same peasants, workers and soldiers on the other?”

“How can it be that Ivan Bunin, who has so subtly and artistically described the peasant, should find himself on one side of a gulf, and these very peasants on the other?!”

“How can it be that the same has happened to Yevgeny Chirikov who, although not artistically, described peasants with sympathy and pity, and to Yuli Bunin who in his youth fought for the peasants as a revolutionary? And the same with all the other members of the group [a literary society called *Sreda*] who prior to the revolution loved the workers and the peasants, and if they did not love them, were at least well-disposed towards them and pitied them?”

“How did it happen that, having suffered for the peasants and workers and even gone into penal servitude as a result, they now talk with hatred about these very peasants, workers and soldiers?!”

“This can all be explained in one word, one fateful word: the socialist revolution came and all the properties separated from the propertyless like oil from water. The peasants and workers

^{*} Konstantin Fedin, *Pisatel, iskusstvo, vremya* (Writer, Art, Time). Moscow, 1961, p. 62.

stood on one side of a great gulf, and the properties and those in any way connected with them on the other.”

“The blindness of the creative spirit”, to use a phrase coined by Serafimovich, touched even such a great artist as Gorky.

The attitude of the great writer to the dictatorship of the proletariat should be looked into, because Gorky’s mistakes are in many ways characteristic of those of the democratic intelligentsia of that time, and his evolution towards an understanding of the true meaning of the socialist revolution was an example for many of those who were in doubt and had lost their way.

For several months after power had passed into the hands of the Soviets Gorky remained extremely one-sided in his evaluation of events: he noticed only the individual failures and mistakes of the new state, indulged in “accusatoriness”, attacked almost every measure taken by “the Government of People’s Commissars”, and saw nothing but destruction and chaos in all the current events.

The writer’s mistakes are most distinctly reflected in his cycle of newspaper articles “Inopportune Thoughts”. In his pamphlet-articles “Towards Democracy”, “9 January-5 January” and in many other articles of the cycle mentioned above Gorky disagreed with the Bolsheviks on the major point: the thesis on the possibility of the victory of the socialist revolution in Russia. He maintained that the revolution would not succeed because the conditions reached by the time it took place were not right. Therefore, in rousing the proletariat to an armed uprising, Lenin was carrying out a “cruel experiment, doomed in advance to failure”.^{*} To the slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Gorky opposed one for “the unity of democracy” which promoted the idea of softening the class clashes. He maintained that the peasantry was by nature hostile to the psychology, ideas and aims of the town proletariat. In underrating the Leninist idea of an alliance of the working class and the peasantry, the writer pinned his hopes solely on the artistic and technological intelligentsia, seeing it in the role of almost single leader of the revolution.

However, the middle of 1918 saw the beginning of a process of political “enlightenment” in Gorky. He ever more frequently protested against the Bolsheviks being blamed when they were not at fault and against the hushing-up of their undoubted services to the people. He wrote about the sincerity of their

^{*} *Novaya zhizn*, 10 (23) November 1917.

convictions and the rare courage with which they fought for their ideals. "The Bolsheviks? Just think---they are also people.... And the best of them are magnificent people of whom Russian history will in due course be proud, and your children and grandchildren will glorify their energy...."

"Without knowing what in the end the results of their political activity will be, I say that the Bolsheviks have already—psychologically—rendered a great service to the people of Russia by setting its whole mass into motion and rousing the whole of it to take an active part in dealing with reality, something without which our country would have perished."*

A decisive part in Gorky's change of position (and that of a considerable section of the intelligentsia) was played by the whole course of the development of the revolution, and its indubitable successes both inside the country and in the international arena. The legend that the proletariat of Russia was completely on its own was dispelled. The Brest peace treaty gave the people a respite from the war, allowed the strengthening of the alliance between the working class and the toiling peasantry and the reinforcement of Soviet power in the gubernias and also the founding of the Red Army. Tens of millions of working people learned to govern their own state. All this proved to be unprejudiced and the honest that the Soviet state was a people's state and that it expressed the vital interests of the working people.

The attempt on the life of Lenin by the Socialist Revolutionary Kaplan pained Gorky greatly. On 4 September 1918 at a meeting with Lunacharsky, he announced that terrorist actions against the leaders of the Soviet Republic had "prompted him finally to enter on the path of honest co-operation with them"**. *Izvestiya VTsIK* (All-Russia Central Executive Committee News) in an article entitled "Maxim Gorky and the Commissariat for Education" made the first announcement of the writer's change of position and of his intention to begin work on preparing Russian and foreign classics for publication.

It cannot be said that Gorky later had no relapses of "inopportune thoughts". These did occasionally slip into his articles. From time to time he still misevaluated the constructive capabilities of the popular masses, reproached the revolutionary proletariat of Russia for a lack of magnanimity,

* *Novaya zhizn*, 26 May 1918.

** *Izvestiya VTsIK*, 10 September 1918.

announced his disagreement with certain "modes of activity" of the Soviet Government and protested against the trial of the Right-wing SRs in 1922. But in the main the author of these articles was on the side of the Bolsheviks.

The Communist Party and V. I. Lenin played an extremely important role in helping M. Gorky to overcome his political errors. Even when he was still almost daily having radically mistaken articles published in *Novaya zhizn* (New Life), the Bolshevik *Pravda* expressed its firm trust in the writer's rapid return to the correct path. In an article entitled "The Social Revolution and Gorky" on 20 January 1918, it said: "Gorky is too precious to our social revolution for us not to believe that he will soon stand in the ranks of its ideological leaders, in the place which has long belonged to him as the harbinger of world-wide social revolution...."

Lenin closely followed Gorky's searchings and was also firmly convinced that the great writer would choose the true path. He wrote many times to Gorky urgently advising him to study the life of the people in the factories and workshops, on the front, in the villages and in the workers' settlements where it was easy to see the sprouts of the new. From the middle of 1918 Gorky was already taking an active part in the building of the Soviet state and doing a large amount of organisation and propaganda work amongst the intelligentsia.

The persistent efforts of Communists to help V. G. Korolenko to reach a correct estimation of the true meaning of the revolutionary transformations in the country are also a vivid chapter in the history of the mutual relations between the Soviet state and the artistic intelligentsia. As a great realist writer and Russian literary classic Korolenko enjoyed immense authority and his words were heeded by the intelligentsia not only in Russia, but in Europe too. His stand for fairness and humanity brought him fame as a great humanist and champion of justice. Korolenko spent the last years of his life in Poltava, his native town, which underwent all the horrors of the Civil War. Taking neither of the opposing sides, he severely condemned both Reds and Whites for their cruelty, executions by firing-squad and other actions and called for clemency by both sides. Korolenko's position was characteristic of that of certain circles of the artistic intelligentsia.

After the final liberation of Poltava from the whiteguards, A. V. Lunacharsky went and had a long meeting with Korolenko. Their conversation touched on the most serious aspects of the current situation and played a considerable part in helping the writer to understand the aims of the new state. The

writer later corresponded with Lunacharsky and confided his thoughts to him.

The Communist Party devoted its energies to the task of enlisting the co-operation of the artistic intelligentsia. V. I. Lenin repeatedly addressed himself to it indicating that the Bolsheviks were the ones who were fighting for the highest ideals of the intelligentsia, that they had taken on themselves the colossal work of setting the people on their feet and showing them the path towards a life truly fit for man. The Party directed as talented a propagandist and publicist as Lunacharsky to work amongst the artistic intelligentsia. K. I. Chukovsky in his memoirs says of this choice: "Anatoly Vasilyevich was just the man to fulfil this task brilliantly.... For us members of the intelligentsia who had received their formation before the revolution, he, from the very first days of the existence of the Soviet state, represented its most fascinating embodiment. We could not but be impressed by his erudition, his scholarship, his thorough knowledge of all the currents and crossroads of world art and his conversance with artistic and philosophical questions."

For many members of the intelligentsia Lunacharsky seemed to be a living example of the transition from the old world to the world of socialist ideas. His personal influence played not a small role in the process of the "Sovietisation" of the intelligentsia, especially of the artistic one. It was not without reason that the bourgeois journal *The Literary Herald* wrote about him in these terms: "Future historians, and not just Bolshevik ones, will pay their due to the present head of the Commissariat for Education."*

Lunacharsky worked hard and successfully for the "moral winning over" of the intelligentsia to the side of the Soviet state. And he was completely right when, in a speech on 19 October 1918, he announced that he and his colleagues in the People's Commissariat for Education were "happy to have become the connecting link between the people and the Russian intelligentsia, the link which would promote the healthy development of the Russian intelligentsia".

These words can also be used quite rightly about Gorky after he had realised and overcome his mistaken views on the October Revolution. In Petrograd in unbelievably difficult conditions he carried out the immense work of enlisting the intelligentsia to co-operation with the Soviet state and helped

* *Vestnik literatury*, No. 4, 1919, p. 10.

the writers, scholars, painters and artists. He organised around himself an unofficial committee for helping writers, scholars and others in the arts, petitioned for the setting-up of canteens and the distribution of food rations, organised the publication of writings, interceded for those who had been arrested and did other similar work. In short, to use Alexander Blok's expression, fate had set Gorky as "intermediary between the people and the intelligentsia". At the same time, elements hostile to the Soviet state also grouped themselves around him and conducted counter-revolutionary agitation and it then became necessary for the organs of the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission to become involved and make arrests of the "public close to the Cadets".

Maxim Gorky, the great Russian writer and honorary member of the Academy of Sciences, had immense authority amongst the intelligentsia. His help in involving it in putting Soviet state measures into practice was therefore particularly valuable. Gorky's name and his activity played an important part in attracting the best of the intelligentsia onto the path of co-operation with the proletariat.

However, the activity of individual persons, even such prominent ones as Lunacharsky and Gorky, would not, of course, have had such tangible results, had it not had the firm support of the Party and the people.

On literally the very next day after the seizure of power by the working class, questions concerning the arts and the preservation of cultural treasures were raised as being of primary importance to the state. As early as the end of October 1917 the Commission for the Preservation of Artistic and Ancient Monuments had been founded as a "competent and plenipotentiary organ" of the Moscow Soviet. Many prominent artistic figures were active members of this commission.

In addition, a special People's Commissariat for the Artistic and Historical Property of the Republic was instituted. In April 1918 this Commissariat issued an appeal in which it laid down principles guiding the attitude of the socialist revolution towards the cultural heritage of the past. "Every ancient monument, every work of art," the appeal read, "which were for the pleasure of tsars and rich men only, have become ours: we shall never give them away and shall preserve them for ourselves and our descendants, for the generations who will come after us and want to know how people lived formerly and what interested them...."

"There is no need to ask ourselves the question: to whom previously belonged this or that artistic or historical trea-

sure—palaces, mansions, temples and suchlike, the result of the creative efforts of the people, and containing so much labour and beauty. What is important to know is who now owns them. The owner is the whole of Russia, all toiling Russia. Therefore the people will not take out its hatred for the former masters—the tsar and other oppressors—on things which are not at all to blame and which are from now on under its control, making the study and enjoyment of them available to all.”

The bearers and creators of cultural, material and spiritual values were the most important of all to the Soviet state. This was what the Russian émigré journal *The Russian Book* which could in no way be suspected of sympathy towards Bolshevism, had to recognise: “It would be unfair to accuse the Bolsheviks of individual persecution or even of being contemptuous of Russian writers and scientists. On the contrary, if one is impartial, a quality unfortunately not often to be seen nowadays, one has to admit that if anyone’s life in Russia underwent the least danger, then it was the lives of the writers and scientists. Extensive enterprises connected with publishing were set up with the support of Government circles to provide for upkeep and food for Russian writers and scientists.”*

To increase the political activity of artistic figures and defend their professional interests, the All-Russia Professional Union of Art Workers was founded in early 1919. Already existing unions such as the unions of stage and circus ring actors, of workers in the musical arts, film workers, stage hands, private ballet dancers and the International Union of Circus Artists, were incorporated into it. Its political tasks were defined in the first paragraph of the charter of the union: solidarity with the international proletarian movement, the unification of the broad masses of workers in the arts and their enlistment in the building of socialism. The participants at its first congress (May 1919) declared their support for the soonest possible nationalisation of theatres and resolved to join in the mobilisation of workers in the arts for the defence of the socialist Motherland.

At the congress the opinion was also voiced that the state should not interfere in questions concerning the arts. A. I. Yuzhin, the director of the Maly Theatre, addressed himself to the chairman of the congress in a letter in which he said that the tasks of the union should be restricted to the sphere of artistic life and defended the right of actors to have an exclusive say in the running of the life of the theatres. “The theatre stands on

* *Russkaya kniga*, No. 1. Berlin, 1921, p. 3.

one essential idea,” wrote Yuzhin, “it knows only one kind of worker who can and must by right decide all questions connected with the life of the theatre. This worker is the actor.” On the basis of the organisational principles and the tasks of the trade unions, the congress rejected Yuzhin’s proposal. “The amalgamated union of workers in the arts,” read the reply from the presidium of the congress, “must take part in the building of the state and therefore cannot confine itself purely to artistic questions.”

Representatives of the union took an active part in the work of the departments of the People’s Commissariat for Education that were concerned with the arts and in the preparation and ideological education of its workers and the reinforcing of communist influence in their midst. In May 1920 a decree of the All-Russia Professional Union of Arts Workers was the ideological education of its workers and the reinforcing of communist influence in their midst. In May 1920 a decree of the Moscow Committee of the RCP(B) made it incumbent on all Communists working in the arts to join a branch of this union and carry out the work set by the Secretary of their Communist Party branch. Similar branches were set up on the order of the CC RCP(B) in 40 towns of the RSFSR. In many town boards of the union Communists held a considerable proportion of the posts. In this way the influence of the Party was increased not only within the trade union but also amongst the mainstream of workers in the arts.

In June 1920 the 2nd Congress of the All-Russia Professional Union of Art Workers was already able to write in its resolution that “this union stands on the platform of realisation of the communist system through the dictatorship of the proletariat which brings with it emancipation for the arts”.

Having united in its ranks a considerable mass of the artistic intelligentsia, the union contributed towards its ideological reorientation and its enlistment to the cause of building a socialist culture. By establishing various forms of artistic services to the towns, the villages and the Red Army and assisting the rousing of the intelligentsia to social and political activity, the union drew the art workers into the solving of the general tasks of the building of socialism.

The work of the Communist Party amongst the artistic intelligentsia was bearing fruit. Its best representatives, despite the fact that the champions of the bourgeoisie tried to frighten them with socialism, began to help the Soviet state in the field of cultural advancement. The most healthy and democratic forces of the artistic intelligentsia, gradually, with mistakes and

vacillations, nevertheless made the decisive choice. Not all of these people were able to say as the poet Vladimir Mayakovsky: "My Revolution!", but they did not let their people down during those difficult years. Many of them remained in Russia, maybe not from "revolutionary feeling", but probably for national and patriotic reasons and from a feeling of love for their native art.

Anna Akhmatova gives us a good description of this feeling of love for one's country in some lines which have become widely known:

*There came a voice. So soft, so winning
It said: "Come over to this shore,
And leave your land so wild and sinning,
And leave your Russia evermore.
The blood from off your hands I'll lather,
The black shame from your heart drive hence,
And with another name I'll cover
The pain and ruin and dire offence."*

*But quite indifferently and firmly
Over my ears my two hands stole,
In order that this speech unworthy
Should not profane my suffering soul.**

This feeling of love for one's Motherland was the most important one for many other members of the Russian intelligentsia. One of L. V. Sobinov's stage colleagues recounts: "He not only taught us professional discipline, but also love of our Motherland: later hardly anyone from our collective of solo-artists went into emigration, even though many, including myself, were offered the opportunity to exchange 'the harsh Russian reality' for a comfortable existence in a capitalist country. During the Civil War Sobinov found himself accidentally in territory occupied by the Whites. They offered him a special steamer to take him to the West but he replied: 'No matter what happens and how things go, I shall never leave Russia for anywhere.'" A. A. Bakhrushin, one of the richest men in Moscow and founder of the theatrical museum, could have emigrated without any particular difficulty. But he too was held to his cold and hungry country by love for his Motherland and his work. Having grown from a small private collection the

* Anna Akhmatova, *Beg vremeni* (The Time's Running), Leningrad, 1965, p. 195.

Bakhrushin museum* was famous in Europe and the world over. Its owner handed it over as a gift to the city of Moscow and he himself worked actively in the People's Commissariat for Education.

Other writers and poets such as V. Veresayev, S. Sergceyev-Tsensky, K. Trenyov, S. Yesenin, V. Shishkov, A. Chapygin, A. Grin, N. Teleshov and more besides did not forsake their Motherland. They answered *The Song of the Death of the Russian Land* with an affirmation of the righteousness of the revolutionary renovation of the life of the country. On 13 May 1918, A. A. Blok wrote in answer to a questionnaire from the Union of Literary Workers: "The artist should know that the Russia which was, is no longer and never again will be. The Europe which was, is no longer and never will be.... The world has entered a new era. That civilisation, that statehood, that religion, have died. They may still return and exist, but their reality is lost, and we who were present at their ugly death-throes, are maybe now condemned to see their putrefaction and decay.... The artist should blaze with rage against anything which attempts to galvanise that dead body back to life.... The artist should prepare himself to encounter even greater events which may occur, and having met them, be able to bend before them."***

At the same time, in the fire of the Civil War new literary forces were growing who were soon to build a new, Soviet literature. D. A. Furmanov, I. E. Babel, V. P. Katayev, B. A. Lavrenyov, A. P. Gaidar, A. A. Fadeyev, N. A. Ostrovsky—could all say in the words of the poet N. S. Tikhonov: "The October Revolution made me a poet. It opened my eyes on the world."

The Soviet state encouraged the development of the theatre. In 1919 the theatres were nationalised by a Soviet Government decree and their direction passed into the hands of the People's Commissariat for Education. The best theatres received the title of Academic. Their repertoires were decided for the most part by an elected board of actors. The activity of the actors' brigades which travelled out to Red Army units and the villages was very successful. To encourage the activity of artists, the

* After the October Revolution V. I. Lenin directed that the museum take the name of its founder. It now has over half a million exhibits and contains one of the largest collections in the world on the history of the Russian and multinational Soviet theatre.

** Alexander Blok, *Sochineniya v dvukh tomakh*, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1955, p. 291.

title of People's Artist of the Republic was instituted in 1920 on the initiative of V. I. Lenin. The first person on whom this honour was conferred was the great Russian actress M. N. Yermolova. The title of People's Artist of the Republic was also conferred on K. S. Stanislavsky, A. V. Nezhdanova, L. V. Sohinov, Y. V. Geltser and others.

Despite the difficult conditions, the majority of artists worked selflessly to carry out rehearsals and performances in unheated buildings. The new spectator responded with delight to the artists and even the bourgeois theatre critics had to recognise this.

Amongst those who played a particularly large part in the development of musical culture in the first years of the revolution, we come across the names of many eminent composers, musicians and teachers of music: A. K. Glazunov, M. M. Ippolitov-Ivanov, R. M. Glière, S. N. Vasilenko, M. F. Gnesin, B. V. Asafiev, N. V. Myaskovsky, A. B. Goldenveizer, A. F. Gedike and others. Glazunov, Ippolitov-Ivanov and Glière headed the largest schools of music in the country—the Petrograd, Moscow and Kiev conservatories. Vasilenko, besides his creative work, headed the Concert Organisation Bureau which was founded in 1918, conducted a symphony orchestra in Moscow, himself gave explanatory lectures at concerts in Red Army clubs and hospitals, and also gave public lectures on the theory and history of music. Gnesin did general work on musical enlightenment, teaching and lecturing in Rostov-on-Don, and played an active part in the foundation of the Don conservatory.

* * *

The course of the workers' and peasants' battle against internal and external counter-revolution convinced large sections of the intelligentsia that a rapid return to the bourgeois order was an impossible dream. The logic of events inclined a considerable portion of the bourgeois intelligentsia to go on to co-operation with the Soviet state. Here, for example, are the words which the famous Russian psychiatrist, Professor V. M. Bekhterev, used to address the scientific intelligentsia in 1918: "At this turning point in history one must not stand at the crossroads and wait—one must have will for action, for building and constructive work, and we scientific workers, who have always given our strength to serve mankind, should not vacillate. We must consciously decide if we are with the people who, having won its freedom, wants to build its future itself and

calls on us to join it in this building.... We must therefore strive to make the period of devastation as short as possible, giving the whole sum of our knowledge and ability to constructive work in the present conditions for the benefit of the people." The great scientist backed these words by his actions. He addressed himself to V. I. Lenin with a proposal to organise advanced training courses for the Red Army medical assistants, founded one of the first Soviet scientific establishments—the Psychiatric Institute, and elaborated the project of a State Institute for the Study of the Brain.

In the periodicals of the time there appeared more and more frequently articles in which representatives of the intelligentsia tried to define their relations with the ever strengthening Soviet state. With regards to this, a document published on 3 March 1920 by the paper *Izvestiya VTsIK* and entitled the "Declaration of the Toiling Intelligentsia", is of interest. In the editorial notes it was pointed out that the document came from a group of people who were working to found the Union of the Toiling Intelligentsia. Some of the members of this group enjoyed great authority in intelligentsia circles.

The first point in the project "Statute of the Union of the Toiling Intelligentsia" which was quoted in the editorial notes set the task of "giving all possible assistance for the most effective use of the forces of the intelligentsia of Russia with the aim of reconstructing the country's cultural and economic life" and helping in "the distribution of the forces of the intelligentsia by speciality".

The authors of the declaration called on "the leaders of the social circles of Europe and America and fellow-countrymen abroad" to:

"1. End support for armed interference in the purely internal affairs of Russia;

"2. Resume cultural and trade links with Russia as fast as possible notwithstanding the social system that now existed there;

"3. Render wide-scale and all-round assistance to the Russian people in the restoration of its cultural, productive and economic forces."

At the same time the authors of the declaration explained to the White émigrés that it was "imperative for them to reconsider many of their views and convictions, as already not corresponding to contemporary needs in the country, to the feeling and outlooks of the popular masses in general and also of numerous groups of the intelligentsia who had evolved considerably during this time....

"Along what lines the Russian revolutionary process will continue, what guiding ideals will come out victorious in the end and how the current psychological change taking place in the very depths will manifest itself, are at the moment impossible to predict, and for that reason it is even harder to influence this process by coercive measures."

It is not difficult to see that through the in fact rather cloudy and cautious phrasing of this document, there appear some of the propositions of the publication *Smena Vekh* (Change of Landmarks) which was to come out the following year, in 1921.

The possibility and even necessity for the intelligentsia to execute a political volte-face was announced in a more definite way in the numerous speeches of N. A. Gredeskul, a professor of law. One of the former leaders of the Cadet Party, he came out in 1920 with a series of lectures and articles which were printed in the Soviet press, in particular in the *Izvestiya VTsIK*. The editorial board of the newspaper prefaced his articles on 11 July with the following comment: "The editorial board prints the articles of Comrade N. A. Gredeskul as being a typical reflection of the process which is now going on in intelligentsia circles."

What did a former member of the Central Committee of the Cadet Party have to say to the intelligentsia? His main theme was to define the position which the intelligentsia should occupy in the political and economic system of the Soviet state. His political line is most clearly expressed in his series of articles entitled "The Intelligentsia at the Turning Point". In these N. A. Gredeskul wrote: "It is daily becoming clearer that it is not an historical dead-end that we have before us, nor is it just a chance episode, but a great, beaten and shining road along which the process of history, and this time directed by the conscious efforts of perspicacious people, leads us to the greatest change in human history.

"The observer must yield in this direction inasmuch as he takes heed of what is happening. But we are not observers, we are immediate participants in what is happening in Russia. Even if we just stand aside, it nevertheless drives through us determining its own fate and ours as well, together with the fate of our country. We cannot just weigh the probabilities, we must save ourselves from all sorts of misfortune and carry Russia out of the economic dislocation into which it has foundered. We must therefore transfer all our reasoning and deductions away from the mental field into one of the will, we must make a decision. We must say yes or no: are we with Soviet Russia or against it? The position of detached onlookers in our own

country does not suit us and is unworthy. Finally, it is simply painful and is getting more so day by day.

"Our Russian military intelligentsia, the Russian officers with General Brusilov at their head, has done away with uncertainty, shown its will and found its decision.... We too must say: yes or no, we are here with Soviet Russia or against it.

"I think that for the sake of an affirmative reply to this question, we, in Russia, have to consider one more thing which will finally eliminate all doubt and vacillation. You wonder, will the revolution be successful; you hesitate, is it possible to pay the price it demands? But surely, this has all been done here now: the revolution has been accomplished and the whole price has already been paid.... Capitalism has been destroyed and the country is set in earnest to the task of socialist reconstruction.

"So then, do we continue to repeat that history has not gone our way, and that it must be made to turn back? And how is this to be done without counter-revolution, without another civil war? And that means, doesn't it, that blood will flow again, that there will be new ravages, and another dictatorship, a bourgeois one this time instead of a proletarian one? Or does anyone think that the former paradise can be returned through the Bolsheviks themselves? But that is surely very naïve. Leaving out the rest, history is certainly not so much in the hands of people that it can be made to go this way and that by arbitrary rule. No, our lot is cast, our Rubicon has been crossed, we are already on the other side and with the whole nation at that; we must settle here or drown in the sedition and panic of a return crossing."*

It should be said that Gredeskul's speeches at meetings of the intelligentsia drew large crowds of listeners and were met, judging by the accounts in the *Izvestiya VTsIK*, with applause and the passing of resolutions supporting the undertakings of the Soviet state.

The Declaration of the Toiling Intelligentsia, and the speeches of Bekhterev, Gredeskul and others were a sort of sign of the times and an indicator that a large section of the intelligentsia which previously had not recognised the Soviet state or had only barely done so, was now announcing its acceptance of it.

It did not matter that the final aims of this section of the intelligentsia did not entirely coincide with those of the Soviet state. But the result was that it became possible for the Soviet state to use the knowledge and experience of the old

* *Izvestiya VTsIK*, 29 July 1920.

intelligentsia. And this under the prevailing severe lack of highly qualified cadres was especially important for the young Soviet Republic. Speeches such as those described above testify as to the ever increasing momentum in the stratification process within the old intelligentsia and the separation from it of considerable groups who were loyal to the Soviet state.

But at the same time there came out of the intelligentsia rabid counter-revolutionary elements stubbornly opposed to the workers' and peasants' state. At that time, when an overwhelming majority of the so-called "specialists" was already working in enterprises and Soviet institutions, many of the "leaders" of the intelligentsia still stood on anti-Soviet positions. The poet Sergei Gorodetsky comments appropriately on this: "The specialists for long have now been at work, but the ponderers and makers are grieving before their smoke-veiled icons." The participation of representatives of the intelligentsia in conspiracies and uprisings was a rather widespread occurrence.

This was the case with the intelligentsia in the territory of the Soviet Republic, for the most part in the centre of the country. But a considerable section of the intelligentsia found itself during the Civil War on territory occupied by the whiteguards and interventionists or had fled from the Soviet regions. Many of these took no direct part in the political events but others co-operated on the Denikinite propaganda centre which carried out counter-revolutionary agitation, served in the whiteguard troops, organised the Black-Hundred riots, massacring peaceful people and prisoners.

Another section of the intelligentsia hurried to leave its homeland even earlier, in the course of the Civil War. These were high officials, political figures, lawyers, journalists and others. Many prominent figures in Russian culture went into emigration: the writers A. I. Kuprin and I. A. Bunin, the composers S. V. Rakhmaninov, N. K. Mctner and A. T. Grechaninov, and certain prominent scientists, artists and painters. The motives which led these people to go abroad were of very different kinds. Some left Russia because of "ideological disagreement" with the workers' and peasants' state. Others were frightened of the hardships of life in a ravaged and poverty-stricken country. A third group felt that Russia itself had foundered and that Russian culture had vanished together with it, and yet others hoped to wait out the hard times until better ones should come.

This, for example, is how the famous writer A. N. Tolstoi came to be in emigration. In his works written in the spring and summer of 1917 he had welcomed the birth of a "new Russia"

and spoke of the revolution as a symbol of truth and justice. But the realities of the days after October were too complicated for the writer's social and ethical ideas. The horrors of the Civil War, the cruelty on both sides, the hunger, the suffering of millions, all led him to think that the country had foundered. He left Russia in 1919.*

Many émigrés even continued the fight "against the Soviets" from abroad. They engaged in furious anti-Soviet propaganda, reviling the workers' and peasants' state in every way, accusing it of the death of civilisation and cultural values and called for a crusade against the Soviet state. The famous writer Leonid Andreyev wrote: "Like a radio-operator on a sinking ship sending a last night-time call out into the surrounding gloom; 'Help! Quickly! We're sinking! Save us!', so do I, moved by a belief in human kindness, send out my supplication for drowning people into gloomy space. The night is dark.... And the sea is frightening! But the radio-operator has trust and calls on stubbornly, calls on until the last moment, until the last fire goes out and his wireless telegraph is forever silenced."**

The first years of the revolution were a time of "great reappraisal of values" for the intelligentsia. For many members of the intelligentsia it was a first step onto the path which led them in the future to a conscious acceptance of the ideals of socialism and to active participation in the building of it. For others this same period marked a further widening in the gap between them and the people, a final transition into the camp of its enemies, the White émigré camp.

V. I. Lenin's and the Communist Party's political line in relation to the old intelligentsia: to cut off the counter-revolutionary elements and use the loyal ones, played an immense part in the consolidation of the Soviet state. In the difficult years of the Civil War, intervention and devastation, the Communist Party and the Soviet state secured the co-operation of a large section of the intelligentsia with the help of whom the working class was able to defend the country from foreign intervention and internal counter-revolution, support the national economy and make the first steps in the development of science and culture. This co-operation was secured, firstly, thanks to the steadfast strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat; secondly, thanks to the stubborn

* A. N. Tolstoi (1882-1945) returned from emigration to his Motherland in 1923 and took an active part in the building of socialist culture. He was a Deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

** L. Andreyev, *Spasite! (SOS) (Save Us!)*. Paris, 1918, p. 14.

struggle of the working people for freedom and national independence for their country; and thirdly, thanks to the correct Leninist policy of the Communist Party towards the old intelligentsia.

The fact that the main mass of the old intelligentsia entered the service of the Soviet state still did not signify that it had wholly made the transition to the positions of a socialist ideology and had made itself into the ideological champion of the building of a new society. There were many in the old intelligentsia who did not believe in "the Bolshevik experiment" and who worked only because of their patriotism, attachment to their profession or material incentives. Nevertheless, the very fact of the intelligentsia's volte-face in favour of the Soviet state was an immense victory for the Communist Party. It meant that the first and most difficult steps in disengaging the intelligentsia from the bourgeoisie had been made and that a firm foundation had been laid for creative co-operation between the men of science, technology and culture and the working class.

Chapter four THE INTELLIGENTSIA IN THE PERIOD
OF THE RESTORATION
OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

THE TRANSITION TO THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE
INTELLIGENTSIA. THE REVIVAL
OF BOURGEOIS IDEOLOGY.
SMENA VEKH MOVEMENT.
THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE IDEOLOGICAL FRONT

After the four-year-long imperialist and three-year-long civil wars, the country was in ruin. The interventionists and the whiteguards had caused vast losses to the national economy amounting to 50,000 million gold rubles.* Factories, enterprises, mines and transport had been wrecked by them. Heavy industry production in 1920 was seven times less than before the wars. Agriculture which had been overtaxed by the war could not manage to provide food for the population. There was a grave shortage of even the most necessary goods — bread, fats, shoes, clothes, salt, soap, paraffin oil and suchlike throughout the country. In 1921 many grain-producing regions (the Volga basin and Ural plains, the Caucasus, the Crimea and part of the Ukraine) were hit by drought, causing a massive famine. Another result of the war was the country's loss of a colossal number of people. Between 1918 and 1920 the Red Army alone lost one million men. Overall during that period the Soviet Republic lost about 8 million people killed, wounded or died in epidemics and famines.**

Economic dislocation, impoverishment and hunger caused great discontent amongst the peasantry. During the war it had put up with the surplus-appropriation system*** and the shor-

* *Istoriya Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuza* (History of the CPSU), Vol. 3, Book 2, Moscow, 1968, p. 562.

** *Ibid.*

*** Surplus-appropriation system: a method for the purchase by the state of agricultural products which was used by the Soviet state during the period of foreign intervention and Civil War (1918-1920). It consisted of the compulsory surrender on fixed prices to the state by the peasants of any surpluses in wheat and fodder above a set norm for personal use, sowing and feeding the cattle. The surplus-appropriation system was imperative in order to ensure that the Red Army and the towns were supplied with bread. In 1921, it was replaced by a tax in kind.

tage of goods. But after the war was over the peasants began to demand the abolishment of the surplus-appropriation system and wanted better supplies of goods. Because of material hardships and a feeling of weariness a section of the working class also showed signs of dissatisfaction. All this weakened the class basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The enemies of the Soviet state tried to use the complicated situation in the country to further their own aims. The SRs, Mensheviks and bourgeois nationalists in various regions of the country incited anti-Soviet uprisings. On 28 February 1921 the Kronstadt rebellion organised by the SRs and the Mensheviks broke out.

The difficulties which the country went through also had an effect within the Party. In the autumn of 1920 the discussion about trade unions began, pioneered by Trotsky, and the "workers' opposition" came out. Vacillations due to incorrect understanding of the further ways of socialist development became apparent amongst a section of the Communists.

Under these complicated and incredibly difficult conditions it was imperative to overcome the dislocation and restore the pre-war level of production both in industry and in agriculture. V. I. Lenin wrote: "We shall be defeated if we do not succeed in restoring our economy."*

Guided by the economic laws of the development of society and carefully taking into account the disposition of forces in the country, V. I. Lenin outlined the way to strengthen and further develop the building of socialism. This was the New Economic Policy, the decision for the transition to which was taken at the 10th Congress of the RCP(B) in March 1921.

The New Economic Policy for the transitional period from capitalism to socialism aimed for the establishment of a solid economic and political union between the working class and the toiling peasantry. This policy was the fullest possible reflection of the objective economic laws of the period. To restore the national economy and build a socialist society, the state, while retaining in its hands control of the large and medium-sized enterprises, permitted concessions, leases and private enterprises. Private commerce was allowed alongside a state monopoly in foreign trade and state co-operative trade. The peasants were granted the right to choose the form of land tenure they wished and were allowed to lease land and hire labourers. A tax in kind was brought in to replace the

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 499.

surplus-appropriation system. The state set the norms for the tax in the form of a given percentage of the crop from all the arable land of each farm after taking into account the number of able-bodied workers on each, the amount of livestock and the crop average for the area. After payment of the tax the peasants received the right to dispose of the remainder as they wished and sell it at the market. This led to an increased turnover of goods between the town and country and to the strengthening of the union between the working class and the peasantry. In the given historical conditions, this was the sole correct and possible way to achieve socialism.

The restoration of the economy took place under unusually difficult conditions. There was a shortage of industrial equipment, building materials, raw materials, money and food supplies. Considerable difficulties were also caused by a severe lack of highly qualified cadres.

The Party and Soviet organs had accrued considerable experience of work with the old intelligentsia during the Civil War years. The transition to the New Economic Policy did not cause any major changes in the character of the attitude of the Party to the intelligentsia. However, under the New Economic Policy, the problems of the rational use of the knowledge and experience of workers in science, technology and culture and their re-education in a socialist spirit became of even greater political and practical importance.

During the Civil War years the fight against internal and external counter-revolution demanded that especial attention be paid to the military specialists, but in the post-war period the problems of putting to use the knowledge and experience of the scientific and technological intelligentsia, especially the engineering cadres, came to the forefront. This also applied to the intelligentsia working in the cultural sphere.

In the general structure of Soviet society at that time, the intelligentsia formed but a thin stratum. Its largest branch was the teachers. Scientific workers, engineers, special secondary school and higher education teachers, doctors and literary and artistic figures were groupings of the intelligentsia which contained very few people. The Soviet state did not, however, have at that time any other cultural force at its disposal. It was therefore necessary for it, at the same time as training its own, Soviet intelligentsia cadres, to transform the bourgeois specialists, in V. I. Lenin's words, from servants of the capitalists into servants of the toiling masses, into friendly advisers.

How did the intelligentsia take the transition by the Soviet state to the New Economic Policy? The whole intelligentsia

of course welcomed it if only because it brought them and the whole toiling people relief in their material situation and made improvement of the standard of living possible. After the years of starvation during the Civil War this was of no little importance to the intelligentsia, and its members greeted the New Economic Policy with unanimous enthusiasm.

But as to political evaluation of the New Economic Policy and its influence on the destiny of the revolution and of the country, here unity is not a word to be used. The political aspects of the New Economic Policy were variously received by different groups of the intelligentsia. There were many reasons for this — the social heterogeneity of the intelligentsia, its connections with different parties and groups, its political experience, economic position and other factors. Despite the various evaluations, certain groups of the intelligentsia can be distinguished from the mass for “their” interpretation of the New Economic Policy and judgement of the political and economic situation of the country and the perspectives for its social, economic and cultural development.

A considerable section of the intelligentsia, having gained experience of creative co-operation with the Soviet state during the Civil War years, took the New Economic Policy as a sign of the viability and political flexibility of the new state, and correctly evaluated the possibilities of economic and cultural progress which this policy created. The intelligentsia saw that the conditions brought about by a socialist state opened to workers in science, technology and culture an unlimited field of action in which really to apply themselves to creative work using all their knowledge and experience.

Every year marked an increase in the number of workers in science, technology and culture who were genuinely helping the working class and the peasantry to overcome the immense difficulties involved in putting the dislocated economy to rights. They worked honestly and conscientiously in factories and workshops, in scientific research institutes, in schools, hospitals and the government apparatus. Such people could already with complete justification call themselves Soviet specialists. The best of them joined the ranks of the Communist Party. For example, the prominent scientist, I. M. Gubkin, wrote: “I am very glad that the Party has accorded me a great honour and admitted me into its ranks.... I value this title above all and treasure it more than any other one, however hard-earned. I treasure it more than my life, which I am ready to lay down at the first request of the Party in the great cause of liberating

labour from capital and for the wonderful future of mankind in the communist society.”*

The New Economic Policy was welcomed by a considerable section of the teachers and important changes took place in their political outlook. They were in their mass completely ready to enter into co-operation with the Soviet state. Of course, there were those who remained to a certain extent in opposition and were sometimes even hostile towards the new state, but these did not determine the true face of the teaching masses.

The scientific intelligentsia also reconsidered its seeming irrevocable attitudes and postulates. The October Revolution set the representatives of bourgeois science to serious thinking on questions of social development and to attempting to look back critically at the past and analysing what in fact had happened, what were the root causes of the events which took place in Russia, and what would be their possible consequences. Those members of the scientific intelligentsia who soberly appraised the present worked honestly in their scientific pursuits especially since the New Economic Policy was creating new possibilities for this.

A particularly wide field for applying their knowledge and experience opened up before the engineering and technological workers. The New Economic Policy signalled a sharp turn towards creative and constructive work which could not but find a response from a considerable mass of the technological intelligentsia. It therefore greeted the New Economic Policy as a positive move.

However, only part of the intelligentsia took such a realistic position. Its more reactionary members considered this policy to be a new Bolshevik “subterfuge”, a manoeuvre carried out with the aim of “deceiving the masses” and continued as before to hope that force, with the help of foreign interference, would alter the course of events.

The participation of the intelligentsia in conspiracies and rebellions in the first years of the New Economic Policy was not an unusual occurrence. The Petrograd Militant Organisation which was uncovered in 1921 was headed by Professor V. N. Tagantsev and a considerable proportion of its membership was from the intelligentsia. Members of the counter-revolutionary intelligentsia took part in the anti-Soviet activities of the All-Russia Committee for Helping the Hungry, of the Ukrainian

* Quoted in V. A. Ulyanovskaya, *Formirovaniye nauchnoi intelligentsii v SSSR. 1917-1937*, pp. 106-07.

Action Centre, the terrorist organisations of the SR Party and in the rebellions in the Tambov area, at Kronstadt, in Western Siberia and in Georgia. It was not a very numerous group of the intelligentsia but its anti-Soviet activity did represent a certain threat.

Between these two groups at either end of the scale in their relations with the Soviet state and its policies were the neutrals, the "Left" and other groups of the intelligentsia who met the New Economic Policy in ways corresponding to their political hopes and convictions.

The section of the intelligentsia which either genuinely stood on the far "Left" flank or was taking refuge in pseudo-revolutionary phraseology, evaluated this policy in a peculiar way. It was precisely in their midst that there were especially many petty-bourgeois illusions and romantic delusions. A certain tolerance of capitalist elements in the national economy was met with panic by the "Left" intelligentsia, as a surrender to capitalism on all fronts. It yelped about the approach of an "era of the smudgy" and promised to fight the Bolsheviks for ... "Bolshevik ideals". There were, of course, people among the "Left" intelligentsia who did not understand the essence of the New Economic Policy and expressed genuine alarm about the future destiny of the revolution. But this point was pursued by "revolutionaries" too, who, for the sole purpose of compromising the Bolsheviks, shouted that the "death of the revolution" had come, that it had degenerated.

The largest group, however, was that of the "neutrals", who preferred to interest themselves only in their professional affairs in the narrowest sense and not interfere in politics.

The ideological views, habits and traditions of the majority of the intelligentsia, especially those of its more highly paid section, continued to be tightly bound to the past.

Having been deprived of their former material privileges during the Civil War, these members of the intelligentsia did not trust the new state. The difficulties of everyday life engendered weariness and irritation in their midst. It should be noted that the remains of the defeated anti-Soviet parties continued to be active amongst the intelligentsia, supporting within it moods leading to political instability and absenteeism.

The New Economic Policy had an immense influence on all spheres of life in Soviet society. The bitter fight on the economic front was accompanied by a no less bitter one in the sphere of ideology, a war for the minds and hearts of people.

The New Economic Policy deepened and accelerated the stratification process which was taking place amongst the

intelligentsia. On the one hand, it brought about a quicker separation from it of the elements loyal to the Soviet state and their transition to supporting the state actively. On the other, the political conditions engendered by the carrying out of the New Economic Policy (partial toleration of capitalism in the national economy and suchlike) made it objectively possible for the Right wing of the bourgeois intelligentsia to revive its anti-Soviet activity.

The transition to the New Economic Policy was interpreted by a section of the bourgeois intelligentsia as a return to the capitalist system. The theses of the Central Committee of the Party *Twenty-Five Years of the RCP(B)* noted: "As a result of the partial restoration of capitalism within the framework of the Soviet system, the first few months of 1922 saw animated activity by the remnants of the old bourgeois intelligentsia and the creation of the so-called ideological front (the revival of bourgeois ideology)."

Amongst the bourgeois intelligentsia theories began to spread that the Soviet state would develop into a bourgeois parliamentary republic, that Bolshevism was degenerating and that the socialist economy was being transformed into a capitalist one. This "critique" of the ideals of socialism took on a covered form and was stated as a line for the "improvement" of socialism.

Besides its other negative consequences, bourgeois ideology had extremely harmful effects on the re-education of the intelligentsia. Longings for a restoration, illusions that the Soviet state lacked solidity, mysticism, idealism and religiousness, all underwent a revival.

These made their appearance in various ways. The manifestly anti-Soviet publishing houses which had been closed down during the Civil War and the disbanded societies and associations of the bourgeois intelligentsia took up their activities again with the transition to the New Economic Policy.

Thus in Petrograd in 1921 the meetings of the Philosophical Society which had its own periodical—the journal *Mysl* (Thought)—resumed. This publication was filled with obscurantist statements, mystical homilies, idealism and attacks on Marxist teaching. It also showed an evident preference for religion over science.

The reactionary intelligentsia saw the New Economic Policy as proof of a crisis in Bolshevism and its Communist ideals, as the end of the revolution and the first application of pressure on the brakes, a slowing down "away from the great utopia to taking sober stock of new reality". It was put forward that the final aim of the development of the revolution and also of the

socio-political and economic life of the country was the restoration of a bourgeois political and economic system.

A characteristic feature of the political demands of the ideologists of these strata of the intelligentsia was the aspiration to remove the most important aspects of the political and cultural life of the country from under the control of the Party and the state. The journal *Znamya* (The Banner), which was the organ of the SR-leaning intelligentsia, demanded that the Soviet system of running the national economy "be reduced to ashes, roots and all". The journal moved a programme demanding "integral socialism" which "is not attached or connected to any definite class or groups". The activists from the former All-Russia Union of Teachers propagated amongst the teachers the idea of the apoliticism of public education and agitated for schools to be withdrawn from under the control of the Party and the state. The journal *Obshchestvenny vrach* (The Public Doctor), which began publication in 1922 and was the organ of the "Pirogovites", put forward a demand for the unification of all medical and health affairs in the hands of so-called sanitary bureaus which were to be collegiate bodies with elected presidiums and independent from the Soviet state. They suggested that the medical aid network in the countryside be handed over to the Zemstvo* bodies which the journal demanded be restored. The professorate came out with statements on the independence of higher education from the state.

The bourgeois intelligentsia's "new ideology" which was coming into being certainly did not relegate to last place the idea of "national consciousness", in other words, Russian nationalism and Great-Power chauvinism. Moving the slogan for the founding of a strong "Russian state", the bourgeois ideologists slighted the national interests of the peoples living in the country. In fact they regarded the outlying regions of Russia as colonies and sources of raw materials for the home country.

The introduction of the New Economic Policy brought back into the limelight the question, which engaged so much interest in liberal circles after the February Revolution, of the place and role of the intelligentsia in the socio-political life of the country. A certain toleration of capitalist elements in the economic sphere roused the hopes of the ideologists of the bourgeoisie for a "New Economic Policy" in the field of politics too. In

* Zemstvo: local self-government bodies. These existed in certain gubernias of European Russia after 1864. They were disbanded after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

particular, demands for the political independence of the intelligentsia and even for participation in the leadership of the country on the same level as the working class became quite widespread. One of the leaders of the reactionary section of the intelligentsia A. S. Izgoyev (who also went by the pseudonym of A. S. Lande) announced that "the intelligentsia must be independent from the state in both spiritual and moral respects".*

Izgoyev went into the question of the place and role of the intelligentsia in post-revolutionary Russia at great length in his article "On the Tasks of the Intelligentsia" in which he affirmed in the name of a certain section of the bourgeois intelligentsia that it was precisely the intelligentsia which should be the "spiritual mentor" of the people. In the opinion of Izgoyev and his fellow-thinkers, the intelligentsia had a mission to act as some sort of force above classes and parties with the duty of "bringing to light the public opinion of the country and creating the conditions for groups with often contradictory and hostile interests to live peacefully together under one roof", since "in a dog-eats-dog situation a common life for different social groups is unthinkable. Human relationships must be set up."**

A. Izgoyev did not as yet raise the question of allowing the intelligentsia into the leadership of the country on an equal footing with the working class and limited its role to a mission of "spiritual mentorship". But there were "theoreticians" who, without complicating their tasks with sophisticated subtleties, put forward a direct demand for a change of state. The editor of the journal *Novaya Rossiya* (New Russia) I. Lezhnev wrote in mid-1922: "The intelligentsia must cease playing the demeaning part of a service force and obligated hireling of the state. Insofar as Russia faces an economic and cultural revival, the intelligentsia ... has the right to an independent role in state matters.... The administrative and state machine has physically worn out during these stormy years and needs some considerable repairs.... It is imperative that the apparatus be renewed.... The intelligentsia must take advantage of this opportunity to go to new breeding grounds of social energy and will, and go ... not as a third element depending on the state, but as a self-sufficing ... cultural and social force."***

* A. Izgoyev, "Vlast i lichnost" (Power and Personality), *Vestnik literatury*, No. 1, 1922, p. 3.

** A. S. Izgoyev, "O zadachakh intelligentsii" (The Intelligentsia's Tasks), *Parfenon*, Collection 1, Petrograd, 1922, p. 39.

*** I. Lezhnev, *Zapiski sovremennika* (A Contemporary's Notes), Moscow, 1936, pp. 238-39.

Bourgeois ideologists were especially worried by the destiny of the building of the economy. They put forward suggestions that heavy industry should not be kept "banned to private enterprise", that scope be given in general to personal initiative, that the monopoly in foreign trade be abolished, that foreign capital investments be allowed and that the principle of a planned economy be discarded. This programme to railroad the country onto capitalist lines bore the name of "economic liberalism". It found its most outstanding expression in the pages of the Petrograd journals *Ekonomist* and *Ekonomicheskoye vozrozhdeniye* (Economic Rebirth) published in 1922, whose board of writers consisted for the most part of people belonging to the Cadets. In a whole series of long articles they expressed definite hopes for a restoration of capitalism.

The bourgeois publicists concentrated mostly on a negative evaluation of the foundations of Marxist economic science and a revision of the policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet state on all the most important economic questions. They tried to prove that the action of the laws of economic development was spontaneous and uncontrollable and the uselessness of interference by man in the "economic mechanism". Proceeding from this, they affirmed that the Soviet state was not capable of any influence on the course of economic processes and that it was therefore better to return to the practice-tested capitalist methods of running the economy.

According to the theoreticians of restoration, the main economic principles which ought to be retained were those of capitalist enterprise. To save Russia from the chaos of dislocation they proposed to seek ways of attracting foreign capital and contended that reality made it necessary even for "convinced Communists" "to expect improvements from a partial return to free capitalism".

The journals *Ekonomist* and *Ekonomicheskoye vozrozhdeniye* devoted considerable attention to the prospects for the development of agriculture. They rejected the Leninist idea of agricultural co-operation and their writers affirmed that those who "saw the path to socialism in co-operation" were wrong. The advocates of "economic liberalism" were in fact calling for increased inequality in the countryside and were basically staking their all on the kulak, the rural capitalist.

Such were some of the concepts of the bourgeois intelligentsia's "new ideology" that was taking shape. In essence it was directed in the final count towards a restoration of the capitalist system.

Restoration tendencies were also reflected in literature and art and some writers sang high the praises of the new man — the nepman*, who had come with a mission to "revitalise and heal" Russia.

Launching the battle against reactionary tendencies amongst the intelligentsia, the Communist Party and the Soviet state made persistent efforts to draw it into building the new life. But, as has been noted above, the real meaning of what had been achieved was a long way from being grasped by the whole intelligentsia. Many of them remained "internal émigrés", even though they were taking part in the economic and cultural life of the country, and dreamed of a restoration of capitalism. While believing that a gradual regeneration of the Soviet state into a bourgeois-democratic republic was quite possible and inevitable, they took part in the reconstruction of the national economy and in the cultural life of the country.

It should be said that these feelings were nothing new for the intelligentsia at that time. The idea that Russia, having gone through a stormy period of social experimentation and cataclysms, would arrive at some "normal form of statehood", did not leave a certain section of the intelligentsia even during the Civil War. The introduction of the New Economic Policy and even the fact that a section of the influential White émigré intelligentsia had also come to the conclusion that there was a possibility that "Bolshevism would develop into parliamentarianism" only further activated these tendencies. It is therefore interesting to touch upon the characteristics of the processes which were taking place amongst the White émigrés because of the successes of the Soviet state, and the formation of the movement which has received the name *Smena Vekh* (Change of Landmarks) in Soviet literature.

The White emigration represented, it is well known, a considerable danger to the Soviet Republic. "They have preserved their class organisation abroad," said V. I. Lenin in 1921 referring to the landowners and capitalists, "as émigrés, numbering probably from 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 people, with over 50 daily newspapers of all bourgeois and 'socialist' (i.e., petty-bourgeois) parties, the remnants of an army, and numerous connections with the international bourgeoisie. These émigrés are striving, with might and main, to destroy the Soviet power and restore capitalism in Russia."**

* Nepman: from the abbreviation NEP—New Economic Policy.

** V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 455.

There was a considerable proportion of members of the intelligentsia in the White emigration. Finding themselves abroad, most of them dragged out a miserable existence. Without means of support, ignorant of the language and habits of the countries in which they had sought shelter, they served to swell the ranks of the lumpen-proletariat and the unemployed. An engineer would hire himself out as a taxi-driver, a general don a doorman's uniform and an officer join the foreign legion. The painter I. Y. Bilibin described in bitter terms his ordeals in emigration and the disenfranchised position of a member of the intelligentsia run away abroad: "From September 1917 until September 1919 I lived in the Crimea. Then I had to 'bolt' to Novorossiisk, and slept there in railway carriages and waiting rooms ... then I got caught up in the English evacuation ... was kept behind the barbed wire of a revolting and scorching-hot concentration camp lost in the desert sands at Tel-el-Kebir, and only finally found myself in the renowned town of Cairo where I have been working very hard.... The pay is absolutely miserable, just enough to scratch a living. There can be no arguments since one is a refugee and a *sansculotte*—take what you are given and thank God for that.... My favourite work—hook illustration—just does not exist. At times I am very lonely for Russia and pine for it."*

Deep disenchantment with the result of the battle against the Soviet state, pessimism, spiritual barrenness, the frenzied Black-Hundred hysterics, the implacable hatred of some for everything "Soviet" and the complete spiritual prostration and peculiar shock of others were all characteristic of the White émigrés of the period.

Meanwhile the situation in Russia was being consolidated. Its positions in the international arena were improving and the renovation work inside the country was progressing. Wide perspectives for the building of the economy and of culture could be seen to be about to open up in the near future. In this situation, many of the émigré intelligentsia not only sympathised with the plans of the Soviet Government but there grew amongst them an ever stronger desire to return to their Motherland.

Far from Russia, they became more and more deeply and painfully conscious of how just and natural it was for their people to strive to carry the battle for the rebirth of their country to a victorious finish.

* *Dom iskusstv*, No. 2, 1921, p. 130.

That was one side of the emigration. On the other, D. Merezhkovsky and Z. Gippius, D. Filosofov and B. Savinkov together with former "socialists" of the P. Struve type, daily abused and reviled the Bolsheviks, the Soviets, and the people, whom they hated so. This testifies to the fact that, influenced by the successes of the Land of Soviets, a deep-going stratification process was taking place amongst the Russian White émigrés, an attempt to understand the cataclysm which had shaken Russia and evaluate their own actions in the recent past and determine their position in the near future. Was there a way for the intelligentsia to come to terms with the Bolsheviks or had all the bridges been burnt; should one return home and help one's people through hard times or should one, even in a strange land, remain implacable, "refusing to let down the flag"?

A section of the émigrés leaned towards the idea of reconciliation with the Soviet state and the hopelessness of armed battle against it. As early as 1920, Prof. N. V. Ustryalov had a book entitled *The Battle for Russia* published in Harbin in which he rejected the method of armed intervention, condemned counter-revolutionary insurrections and called for reconciliation with the Soviets. In 1921 Professor S. Zagorsky expressed similar ideas in the Paris newspaper *Posledniye novosti* (Latest News). Cadets such as A. Gurovich, I. Yefimovsky and others also advocated in the Prague newspaper *Slavyanskaya zarya* (Slav Dawn) the necessity of "making a political volte-face", of effecting a reconciliation with the Soviet state and uniting with the section of the intelligentsia which had for a long time already "been working with the Soviets". These feelings were most precisely expressed in the collection *Smena Vekh* (Change of Landmarks) which was published in Prague in mid-1921.

The authors of this collection saw their task as one of using "the latest revolutionary experiences ... to get to know, at last, the true meaning of the revolution now in the making".*

Boldly speaking in the name of the whole Russian intelligentsia, they extended the conclusions to which they had come as a result of reconsidering their pre-revolutionary convictions to the whole intelligentsia, including the part of it which lived and worked in Soviet Russia. But though Klyuchnikov, Ustryalov and other authors of the collection enjoyed a certain influence amongst the White émigré intelligentsia, in Soviet Russia they were little known.

* *Smena Vekh*, Prague, 1921, p. 6.

The authors of *Smena Vekh* critically analysed their mistakes, repented of their sins against the people, and came to the conclusion that the contemporary intelligentsia did not understand a lot of things and was mistaken in many ways, but that as a whole, it was no longer an implacable enemy of the revolution and had matured sufficiently to be able to recognise it as an accomplished fact.

The leading article by Professor Klyuchnikov opening the collection stated: "The Civil War has been lost. Russia has for a long time now been following its own path and not ours. The crisis is over. The situation has taken shape. So either recognise this Russia you hate, or else stay without Russia, because there is no 'third Russia' conforming to your prescription and there will not be one."*

The authors had made their choice and recognised the Soviet state as the sole and lawful power in Russia. The eminent Petersburg lawyer A. Bobrishchev-Pushkin wrote in the same collection that "there cannot be any other state except the Soviet state, no one else can cope, they will all fall back to wrangling amongst themselves.... Only the Soviet state, against which there was a world-wide coalition, the White armies which had occupied three-quarters of its territory, internal disruption, hunger, and the centrifugal force of inertia drawing Russia into anarchy, could have overcome these historically unprecedented difficulties."**

The idea of reconciliation with the Soviet state reflected the feelings of many of the émigrés and therefore got a wide response. In the course of 1922 several Smenavekhovite émigré newspapers were published: *Novaya Rossiya* (New Russia) in Sofia, *Novosti zhizni* (Novelties of Life) in Harbin, *Nakanune* (On the Eve) in Berlin, *Put* (The Way) in Helsingfors and *Novy put* (The New Way) in Riga. The main body of the Smenavekhovites gathered round the newspaper *Nakanune* which was published daily from March 1922 until June 1924.

An open letter by A. N. Tolstoi to the prominent White émigré activist N. V. Chaikovsky clearly shows the path followed by a section of the intelligentsia, the choice it made and its typical methods of judgement and argumentation. It was published on 14 April 1922 in *Nakanune*.

"I represent," wrote A. N. Tolstoi, "the typical Russian émigré, that is, a person who has gone through the whole course

* *Smena Vekh*, Prague, 1921, p. 79.

** *Ibid.*, p. 86.

of miseries. In the epoch of the great war between the Whites and the Reds, I was on the side of the Whites.

"I had a physical hatred for the Bolsheviks. I considered them the destroyers of the Russian state and the cause of every misfortune...."

But then the Civil War finished. In Soviet Russia the restoration of the national economy began, as did the development of Soviet culture. The workers and peasants had no intention of taking into account whether the order being set up in the country suited or did not suit the various political groups living outside Russia. In these conditions A. N. Tolstoi came to the conclusion that the Bolshevik Government was the only real force "which alone now defends the Russian borders from the encroachment of neighbours, supports the unity of the Russian state and at the Genoa Conference alone defends Russia from possible enslavement and pillage by other countries".

Analysing the development of the revolution the writer admitted that given the circumstances within the country and outside, to plan to overthrow the Bolsheviks, as was being zealously advocated by the reactionary section of the White émigrés, would be a mistake. He considered three possible, in his opinion, courses of action to safeguard Russian statehood, and scrupulously examined the virtues and failures of each until he came to the only one which he thought to be correct.

"First course of action: to assemble an army of foreigners, hand them the remains of the routed White armies, drive in to Russia through the Polish and Rumanian frontiers and begin to fight the Reds. To set off on this, one has to take on one's conscience the blood of the Russian people killed and mangled by this action. I do not have space enough in my conscience to contain the blood of others.

"Second course of action: to take the Bolsheviks by starvation, giving some food, however, to those who are really starving. This method is equally fraught with problems: (1) an increase of mortality in Russia, (2) a reduction in Russia's powers of resistance as a state. But this requires a firm belief in the fact that the Bolshevik Government, protected by crack troops and living, as any government, in better conditions than the average citizen, can be starved out before the population of Russia dies away. I do not have this firm belief.

"Third course of action: to recognise the reality of the existence of the Government of Russia called Bolshevik, and recognise that there is no alternative one inside or outside

Russia. (To recognise this is like recognising the fact that a furious gale is blowing outside, even if one would like, standing at the window, to think that it's a fine day in May.) Having recognised this, to do everything to help the final phase of the Russian revolution go in the direction of enriching life, towards bringing all that is good and just out of the revolution and affirming this good, towards annihilating all the cruel and unjust brought by the same revolution, and finally towards strengthening our great statehood. I choose this third course of action.... My conscience calls on me not to withdraw into a cellar but to go to Russia and hammer my own nail into Russia's storm-worn ship."*

This letter played an important part in changing the political feelings of a considerable section of the White émigrés. If such a famous figure as A. N. Tolstoi, a count, a prominent writer and a person far from unknown in émigré circles, spoke publicly in favour of returning to Russia, it would clearly be an influential example. Indeed, it was influential on many exiles of lesser standing and equally so on the high-born aristocrats suffering pangs of doubt and vacillation.

The flow of those returning grew yearly. The Soviet state not only did not prevent the return of émigrés prepared to co-operate honestly with it, but encouraged them in this in every way possible with, it is true, a few understandable conditions. Addressing himself to the Russian émigrés, the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR M. I. Kalinin wrote: "If you wish to be useful to your people, go without cunning philosophising, and serve your people, but do not go expecting to rule."

The monarchists, Cadets, SRs and other ideological enemies of the Soviet state persecuted those returning, spread provocative rumours about reprisals taken by the Communists against the émigrés, and organised terrorist actions against people who called for a return to Soviet Russia. In Sofia A. M. Ageyev, the editor of the émigré newspaper *Novaya Rossiya* (New Russia), was murdered by Wrangel's men as was D. I. Chernyavsky, the editor of the Harbin paper *Novosti zhizni* (Novelties of Life). The newspaper *Nakanune* (On the Eve) waged a systematic war against the active whiteguards and the anti-Soviet émigré circles and as a result earned itself the labels "traitor", "sellout", "Soviet reptile" and others.

* Alexei Tolstoi, *Sobraniye sochinenii v 10 tomakh*, Vol. 10, Moscow, 1961, pp. 34-39.

The stratification of the émigrés and the separation of their healthier elements led to the return to Russia in the 1920s of a considerable number of members of the intelligentsia. This proved very useful in the building of the new life. On the other hand, amongst those who for some reasons had remained abroad, there were groups following the successes of socialist construction in the USSR with growing sympathy and striving in one way or another to help Russia which had become a socialist country. This was especially apparent later, when the Land of Soviets underwent the bitter trials of the Great Patriotic War.

Thus one of the main conclusions reached by a certain section of the White émigré intelligentsia was that the idea of armed warfare against the Soviet state was totally bankrupt. This idea was replaced by the thesis that it was imperative to conclude a reconciliation with the Soviet state and co-operate with it loyally or, in the expression of the time, "serve the Soviets". This was a sensible and rational way of thinking. But at the same time the authors of the collection *Change of Landmarks* as well as other ideologists in the émigré intelligentsia very straightforwardly expounded the aim of this service: to promote the transformation of the Soviet state into a bourgeois republic. They believed that "the revolution was directed against certain specific categories of property-owners from whom it was impossible to take power without taking away their property. But the affirmation that property does not exist in Russia does not accord at all with the facts. The whole structure and way of life of the nation is based, as before, on property. Finally, it all came to the repartition of what had been gained by the revolution, or as the victims would say, 'plundered'. This repartition is taking place on property-based lines.

"Everything comes right in the end: there will be property in Russia, and private initiative, and trade, and co-operation. The only thing there will not be is former property-owners thrown out abroad."*

To enable Russia to achieve its restoration more rapidly, it was, in the opinion of one of the authors of *Change of Landmarks*, S. S. Chakhotin, necessary to "participate most actively in the restoration of our Motherland". But then, he went on, some might think that "by strengthening the economic situation of the country, we are strengthening the position of the Bolsheviks". How does this tie up with the convictions of a "respectable" member of the intelligentsia honestly fighting

* *Smena Vekh*, Prague, 1921, p. 111.

against the Soviet state? "On the contrary," soothed Chakhotin, "raising the cultural level of the country and normalising its politics both hinge on getting its economic efforts to rights."*

N. V. Ustryalov was an especially vehement propounder of the theory that Bolshevism was degenerating. In his article "Patriotica" and in others published in the journal *Smena Vekh*, he affirmed that "Bolshevism, having changed its economic policy and stopped its policy of 'immediate communism', is no longer what Bolshevism was..."**

The reactionary ideology of the Smenavekhovites objectively closed up with the political aims of the Mensheviks and the SRs. They all supposed that the further political development of Russia would lead to a restoration of capitalism. On 15 September 1921 the organ of the CC of the Mensheviks *Sotsialistichesky vestnik* (The Socialist Herald) published an article by Y. Martov in which he announced that the wish of the proletariat to withdraw from the framework of bourgeois-democratic revolution was utopian. The Mensheviks considered the degeneration of the Soviet state to be inevitable. This programme was in fact supported by various pseudo-revolutionary groups calling themselves "workers" and "Communist" groups. Former leaders from the "workers' opposition" created a "workers' group" which thought of the New Economic Policy as a restoration of "normal capitalist relations" and demanded that all political parties in Russia be given freedom of speech and press.

The calls of the Smenavekhovites, even of their most Right-wing members, to co-operate with the Soviet state were, without doubt, a positive phenomenon. But what was hidden in

* *Smena Vekh*, Prague, 1921, p. 139

S. S. Chakhotin's later life is quite curious. In the 1920s, abroad, he wrote a series of articles defending the Soviet Republic which stood out sharply against the hostile tone of the foreign press. L. B. Krasin, the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade, invited S. S. Chakhotin to run the Soviet trade representation in Berlin, but he got no satisfaction from organisational work. Being a prominent biologist-experimentalist, he devoted himself to scientific research. With Soviet Government permission (he had Soviet citizenship) he moved to Italy and later back again to Germany. Scientific work, however, was not able to shield him from political storms and he did not hide from them, taking an active part in the fight against nazism. The Hitlerites threw him into a concentration camp. Released in 1944, he became one of the first organisers of the world-wide movement of scientists fighting for peace. Since the late 1940s, S.S. Chakhotin lived in the Soviet Union and worked in the Institute of Biophysics of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. He died in December 1973.

** *Smena Vekh*, 1922, p. 18.

these calls, the political aims of this co-operation, needed explaining to the masses and to the Party. In his speech at the 11th Party Congress (1922) V. I. Lenin gave a precise definition of the motives which led members of the intelligentsia like Ustryalov to go to the support of the Bolsheviks and to co-operate with them. Lenin gave an account of Ustryalov's theory and characterised his position like this: "I am in favour of supporting the Soviet Government," says Ustryalov, although he was a Constitutional-Democrat, a bourgeois, and supported intervention. 'I am in favour of supporting Soviet power because it has taken the road that will lead it to the ordinary bourgeois state.'**

In Soviet historical literature there are two points of view on the place and the time of the appearance of the *Smena Vekh* movement. Some historians believe that it made its appearance and took shape abroad and was the result of the disintegration of the counter-revolutionary camp and the serious disagreements among the White émigrés. The other researchers lean to the view that Smenavekhism as an ideological current appeared before 1921 and at home.

The latter point of view did not receive wide attention. Its authors only state it without any arguments behind it. Nevertheless, the opinion that the Smenavekhism movement actually appeared in Soviet Russia before the transition to the New Economic Policy was implemented deserves attention.

If we leave aside the various nuances in the attitudes of individuals and even groups, it can be said that the essence of Smenavekhism rests on two basic propositions: the intelligentsia must go and serve the Soviet state; the aim of this "service" is to promote the process of degeneration of the Soviet state into a bourgeois-democratic republic. That is the essence of the political tactics and theory of the *Change of Landmarks* collection. And yet it is well known that the intelligentsia, at least the major part of it, went to "serve the Soviets" neither after the proclamation of the New Economic Policy, nor after the publication of the *Change of Landmarks*. As early as December 1919 V. I. Lenin was able to note at the 8th Party Conference that the sympathies "not only of the working class, but also of extensive circles of bourgeois intellectuals are on the side of Soviet power".** Tens of thousands of military specialists served in the ranks of the Red Army, hundreds of thousands of teachers, doctors, engineers and technicians

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 286.

** *Ibid.*, Vol. 30, p. 177.

worked in the national economy and in the field of cultural development.

At the same time it would be incorrect to believe that many thousands of members of the intelligentsia went to serve the Soviet state guided by the genuine desire to help it strengthen itself. By no means all of them, despite their declared apoliticism, wished the Bolsheviks success in carrying out their plans.

It was only after the attempts at an armed overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat had failed, and after it had become apparent that the Soviet state had already basically won (and in a number of cases even before that), that there appeared on the stage the ideology of "reconciliation" with the Bolsheviks and a recognition of the necessity of co-operating with them in the work of economic and cultural construction. The nationwide support for the Soviet state and its successes, the breakdown of the counter-revolutionary camp and the logic of events as a whole led a considerable section of the intelligentsia to co-operate with the Soviet state.

The Declaration of the Toiling Intelligentsia and the speeches and articles of Gredeskul, Bekhterev and others should be seen as being in the same spirit as the statements of the Prague Smenavekhovites. Many examples can be found showing that even during the Civil War years there were, in the speeches and articles of representatives of intelligentsia circles, arguments which later were categorised as part of the Smena Vekh movement. In his book *Post-War Perspectives for Russian Industry* (Kharkov, 1919), the noted heating engineer I. V. Grinevetsky denied the socialist character of the October Revolution and tried to point out the perspectives for the restoration of the national economy in Russia on a capitalist basis.

Facts show that a complicated, difficult and painful process of change in the feelings of the Russian intelligentsia was taking place. But they also show that the bourgeois intelligentsia had both a Right and a Left wing and that the former saw the restoration of capitalism as the final aim of the country's development, while the latter expressed the views of the groups of the intelligentsia which had turned towards honest co-operation with the Soviet state.

As far as the *Change of Landmarks* is concerned, its authors only provided a "theoretical" explanation for the changing of landmarks which was going on amongst the *White émigrés* and gave it its name. In Soviet Russia, however, the process began earlier, when the intelligentsia turned to co-operating with the

Soviet state, and continued to develop during the first years of the New Economic Policy. A. S. Bubnov, who was in charge of the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the CC of the Party, wrote that in those years the defenders of the bourgeoisie "did not need to work out a new kind of ideology since they had a ready-made one. It only required some adaptation concerning place, time and space." If the term Smenavekhism (Change of Landmarks) is to be used when referring to the early 1920s, then it must only be in the sense that the views of a certain section of the intelligentsia during the Civil War years finally took definite shape at that time.

It is therefore debatable to affirm that the Smena Vekh movement owes its appearance to the White emigration. It had its roots inside the country. The serious discord amongst the White émigrés and the decision to "conclude a reconciliation with the Soviets" were all consequences of events which had taken place inside Soviet Russia. It was not accidentally that Klyuchnikov, one of the authors of the *Change of Landmarks*, recognised that it was precisely "from there, from Russia that there came the trend reflected abroad in the form of the Smena Vekh movement, and that it represented above all a change in the psychology of the Russian intelligentsia".

One of the prominent ideologists of the post-revolutionary intelligentsia Professor V. Tan-Bogoraz said about this: "A grave and essential misunderstanding hides behind the linking of Russians here with those abroad. It is not a matter of names. Call us 'Smenavekhovites' if you wish. But it is, however, absurd to say that we here in Russia have changed our orientation in a way similar to the Smenavekhovites abroad... The real, basic and vast Russia is here and not there, abroad. There is only Russia No. 2. And the real intelligentsia is here too, in genuine Russia. And it is already two years now since the Russian intelligentsia began to change landmarks, far earlier than this foreign brainstorm. It was a difficult and tormenting business."*

In his speech at the 11th Party Congress in spring 1922, V. I. Lenin plainly showed where to seek the roots of the Smena Vekh movement. "*Smena Vekh* adherents," he said, "express the sentiments of thousands and tens of thousands of bourgeois, or of Soviet employees whose function it is to operate our New Economic Policy."** V. I. Lenin had Ustryalov and his group

* *Rossiia*, No. 1, 1922, pp. 12-13.

** V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 287.

in mind here, that is, those "leaders" of the intelligentsia who represented a trend which had taken on among Russian émigrés.

The fact that the *Change of Landmarks* was issued in Prague in mid-1921 should also be taken into account. For the ideology of those who sided with the new current to be able to penetrate into wide strata of the intelligentsia inside the Land of Soviets and for them to become conscious of it and accept it, both a considerable amount of time and a large quantity of propaganda material were necessary. But, it is well known that for a number of reasons the links between Soviet Russia and other states were almost completely severed. The Smenavckhovites could not furnish large quantities of their literature from abroad to Soviet Russia. In the light of this it seems doubtful that it could have had either a large-scale or a sufficiently effective influence on the psychology of the intelligentsia.

The Smena Vekh movement should therefore be considered to be basically an internal phenomenon which made its appearance amongst the intelligentsia which had remained in Soviet Russia.

How widespread were Smena Vekh ideas amongst the old intelligentsia? An impression can be gained from figures recorded in 1922 in Moscow during unofficial friendly meetings with 230 engineers working in joint enterprises and other economic organisations. The first group of those interviewed consisted of former owners of enterprises, former members of the directoral boards of joint-stock companies and factory managers—45 people in all. The second group consisted of former ordinary engineers—185 in all. The questioning of these 230 non-Party engineers showed that 110 had ideas corresponding to the Smena Vekh movement, 46 claimed an indifferent attitude to the Soviet state, 12 were hostile to it, 34 did not reply and 28 expressed sympathy for the Soviet platform.* The figure which draws attention to itself is the number of people who were hostile to the Soviet state: 12 compared to 28 of those questioned at the same time expressing support, the remainder being neither opponents nor yet genuine supporters of the Soviet state. If these figures are applied to the intelligentsia as a whole (which, of course, can only be done with qualifications), the conclusions testify to the immense success of the Communist Party in managing to tear the intelligentsia away from the bourgeoisie.

* *Pravda*, 3 September 1922.

Having recognised the necessity for "going to serve the Soviets", the Smenavckhovites simultaneously enunciated the principles of the "neutrality" and "apoliticism" of the intelligentsia and of non-interference in the political life of the country. In 1922, for example, at the 1st All-Russia Congress of Unionised Engineers, M. G. Yevrcinov—leader of the All-Russia Association of Engineers—announced: "Our task is to safeguard the association from political performances of any kind and not make it the arena for political fighting."

The ideas of the neutrality and non-party nature of schools and art were sounded in a series of pronouncements by public education figures and workers in the arts. The film director I. Perestiani, who was also the author of the first Soviet adventure film *The Little Red Devils*, said: "Never in any of my work have I had political guidance. I work as my personal feelings dictate and believe that to mix political questions with art is a highly pernicious business, as is the question of film directors being under surveillance."

The "apoliticism" of the old intelligentsia was the result of its spinelessness and its lack of political principles. The intelligentsia as a whole understood that the old world had been utterly destroyed, but the future seemed to it to be dim and chaotic. It was unable to side once and for all with the Bolsheviks, but at the same time it could not see in the country any force with which it could join to fight the Soviet state. Hence its apolitical and non-party feelings as it waited to see what kind of turn events would take. It should be noted that the "neutrality" of the intelligentsia was an important, and maybe necessary step in its transition to the positions of the Soviet state. The intelligentsia despite its genuine belief that it stood "outside politics" was objectively setting itself on the side of the Soviet state by the mere fact of its fruitful and creative work under the new system.

Let us take a very characteristic example. In 1922-1924 the Art Theatre, headed by K. S. Stanislavsky, toured abroad. The members of the troupe did not consider themselves convinced supporters of the Bolsheviks and did not go abroad in any manner of means as propagandists for Soviet art. On the contrary, from Stanislavsky's letters at that time, one can see that he genuinely thought of himself as apolitical and far from involved in any kind of ideological battle. Stanislavsky wrote from abroad in 1922: "A tendency to bill us as a Soviet theatre has developed. Because of a liking for intrigue, they do not want to recognise us as apolitical. We must be very careful."* He

* K. S. Stanislavsky, *Sobranie sochinenii*, Vol. 8, Moscow, 1961, p. 30.

was exasperated by the bourgeois press: he told journalists the truth about Soviet Russia, that the theatres had been given autonomy, that the Government took care of old theatres and did not hinder their creative work. The next morning the papers screamed: The Moscow Art Theatre is Bolshevik and Stanislavsky an agent of the Kremlin. K. S. Stanislavsky did not understand then that he, an "apolitical" artist, had already become a "propagandist for Bolshevism" by his truthful and unbiased account of the real situation in Soviet Russia.

This episode shows that the "apoliticism" advocated by many members of the intelligentsia in fact began to change into absolutely genuine politics. The very course of events led the "apolitical" member of the intelligentsia, despite his sincere conviction that he was "above the mêlée", to be drawn into the social and political life of the country. One should add that the apolitical position met with more and more frequent criticism of principle from the ranks of the intelligentsia itself. In the press, at meetings and debates one and the same question was discussed ever more frequently: do members of the intelligentsia have the right to stand aside from everything which makes the life of the people?

A case in point is the position of the journal *Rossiia*. In it one could find articles calling on the intelligentsia to promote the restoration of capitalism and at the same time there were also others discussing the role and place of the intelligentsia in the new society and whether it had the right to remain on the sidelines of everything which was vital to the people. Their authors were progressive people and patriots.

An article by the famous energetics expert Professor I. G. Alexandrov entitled "The Russian Intelligentsia and Its Present Tasks" was published in *Rossiia* No. 9 (1923) and evoked a wide response from the intelligentsia. He wrote: "The Russian intelligentsia has not yet got rid of the severe crisis which has engulfed it in contemporary times, but to stay further in the same position has become impossible for many reasons: the country has shown itself to be capable of withstanding the destructive whirlwind of the first period of the revolution, new shoots of creative activity have appeared on the surface of life and the broad popular masses have produced new young strengths in the last years.

"To remain outside the historical process any further is impossible. It is impossible to spiritually withdraw for years from the great process of rebuilding the social structure in the country and remain unpunished. Therefrom inevitably follows spiritual death or degeneration.

"The absence of the intelligentsia from the historical arena or its participation as specialists accepting no responsibility whatsoever leads to the perversion of many valuable achievements which could improve both the forms of our intellectual development and the process of the economic rebirth of our country.... Can we remain indifferent when the revolutionary state cannot find people who can safely be charged with important work? Are none of us affected by systematic fight against the rebirth of our state being waged by our former enemies who are supported by the bourgeoisie of Europe?

"Perhaps it will not be possible to achieve everything, but the limits to our achievements are surely and above all bound to our solidarity, our energy and our will for life.

"How can the Russian intelligentsia not see beyond the broken trees to the very beautiful and powerful shoots of the new young wood growing up?"

Further on the author states that the difficulties, drawbacks and miscalculations during the revival of the national economy were to a considerable extent due to the intelligentsia's passive attitude towards the measures taken by the Soviet state, though it is true that this passivity was beginning to die out. "But that is not sufficient," noted Alexandrov, "it is not enough just to be a conscientious specialist; initiative, efforts, creative work and the search for new ways of doing things are all necessary. That tragic line which has been lying between the intelligentsia and the people must be renounced. One must not only value and understand the growing personality of the people, but join it to form one common mass of people with various talents and different kinds of knowledge, but in mutual understanding without castes and partitions."

This letter expresses the heterogeneousness and complexity of the ideological processes which were taking place amongst the Smenavekhovites. There was the ideology of Ustryalov and Lezhnev who set the intelligentsia the task of promoting the restoration of capitalism, but there was also the ideology of people who, like Professor Alexandrov, called on the intelligentsia to give their unselfish aid to the people's great work. Maybe these people were not always consistent and ideologically pure and honest, but to put them into one group with the Ustryalovs would be wrong and unjust.

An analysis of the political essence of the Smena Vekh movement gives the grounds for defining it as an eclectic and heterogeneous trend. Its various groups set themselves different aims. The more reactionary Right wing of this trend (Ustryalov

and others) thought of the country's future only in terms of a restoration of capitalism and it was with this very goal in mind that the Right-wing Smenavekhovites began to co-operate with the Soviet state. But in the same Smena Vekh movement there was a section of the intelligentsia which was relatively larger than the "ideologist" group and which understood the slogan "Change of Landmarks" in the sense of the immediate necessity of getting as close as possible to the Soviet state since it expressed the interests of the people. For them this slogan did not signify a movement towards the restoration of capitalism, but a change of landmarks in world outlook and the restructuring of their understanding of the world based on the recognition of the fact that the country was going towards socialism and not capitalism.

The Smena Vekh movement led to a large section of the intelligentsia co-operating with the Soviet state. This was a great advantage since there was a severe shortage of qualified manpower. The policy of "reconciliation" with the Bolsheviks, the calls by the Smenavekhovites to co-operate with the working class and their condemnation of the idea of armed interference in the affairs of Soviet Russia all led, on the one hand, to a deepening split in the counter-revolutionary camp, and on the other, played an objectively positive part in establishing correct mutual relations between the working class and the intelligentsia.

The Communist Party supported this side of the Smena Vekh movement in every possible way and the Soviet Government allowed the Smenavekhovites to publish journals and newspapers, give public lectures, organise debates amongst the intelligentsia and suchlike. The positive side of the Smena Vekh movement was noted in the resolution of the 12th Party Conference (August 1922). Part of it read: "The so-called Smena Vekh trend has played until now and can still play an objectively progressive role. It rallied and is rallying the émigré groups and the Russian intelligentsia which have 'reconciled' themselves with the Soviet state and are ready to work with it for the rebirth of the country. So far the Smena Vekh movement has merited and merits a positive attitude."^{*}

Simultaneously, the Communist Party waged a decided war of principle against the reactionary essence of the Smena Vekh ideology. The resolution of the 12th Party Conference already referred to warned the working class and the Party that bourgeois-restorationist tendencies were strong in the Smena

^{*} KPSS v rezolutsiyakh i resheniyakh..., Vol. 2, p. 393.

Vekh movement, and that the Smenavekhovites were united with the Mensheviks and SRs in hoping for political concessions towards bourgeois ideology to follow the economic concessions.

Therefore the Communist Party fought not against the Smena Vekh movement as a whole but against its anti-socialist tendencies and its anti-Soviet ideology. Since a differentiation process was taking place amongst the intelligentsia (and the Smena Vekh movement was an indicator of this), the Party formulated its policies towards each such group to make it as easy as possible for the more loyal elements in the intelligentsia to enter into active co-operation with the Soviet state. The resolution of the 12th Party Conference stated: "...Our Party organisations must be able to approach in a serious and businesslike manner each group that was formerly hostile to the Soviet state and is now showing even the slightest but sincere wish actually to help the working class and the peasantry in the work of re-establishing the economy, raising the cultural level of the population and suchlike. It is now more than ever necessary for the Party organisations to show by their attitude that they distinguish between the groups (and even individuals) representing science, technology, medicine, teaching and so on and so forth."

V. I. Lenin underlined that it was imperative to distinguish the side of the Smena Vekh movement which was useful to the Soviet state and not identify Smenavekhovites with the real enemies of the revolution. In May 1922 V. I. Lenin wrote the following to F. E. Dzerzhinsky:

"*Novaya Rossiya* No. 2. Closed down by the Petrograd comrades.

"Perhaps it has been closed down too early? Circulate it to the *Politbureau* members and discuss *more thoroughly*. What is its editor *Lezhnev*? Is he from *Dyen*? Could information about him be collected? Of course, *not all* the people working on the magazine are candidates for deportation."^{*} This was a reference to the Smena Vekh journal *Novaya Rossiya* edited by I. Lezhnev which began publication in 1922. As can be seen from this document, V. I. Lenin believed it was a mistake to have closed it down so hurriedly, and in fact the journal soon reappeared under the slightly altered title *Rossiia* (Russia). It continued to be published until 1926.

But at the same time Lenin set an example for the uncompromising battle of principle against the Smenavekho-

^{*} V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 45, p. 555.

vites who proclaimed "evolution" of Bolshevism. It is known that in his speech at the 11th Party Congress Lenin criticised the negative side of the Smena Vekh movement. He referred to members of the intelligentsia like Ustryalov as enemies.

When did the Smena Vekh movement as a social trend disappear? Soviet historical literature gives its far limits as 1925-1926, and usually links this to the closing down of its periodicals in the country at that time. But the change of landmarks by people of the old formation was not only a social trend, but also a purely individual and personal process of re-evaluating their world outlook and convictions and forming a new conception of reality. For many this took a number of years. It came about as a result of the downfall of restorationist illusions and also of trying to understand Soviet reality. The "change of landmarks" continued beyond 1925-1926 for many members of the intelligentsia, and for the broader strata of the intelligentsia it only finished when they had finally made their transition to the socialist position. The "change of landmarks" was achieved, but not in the way envisaged by the reactionary part. The overwhelming mass of the intelligentsia had gone over to the side of the Soviet state but the rebirth of this state into some form of bourgeois parliamentarism did not take place.

The "change of landmarks" by the intelligentsia was a natural and necessary phenomenon. A. V. Lunacharsky put it well: "How can one in general think that the intelligentsia — that part of the Soviet public and of the intelligentsia which has taken up anti-communist positions — can make itself communist without a change of landmarks. It is an absurdity." And later: "I do not believe it when I see a liberal turn into a Communist in three somersaults. I stand there as if I have just seen a clever trick which is sometimes strange, sometimes impulsive, and sometimes even just a chameleon-like change of colours. The really genuine process is a change of landmarks in which people go and accustom themselves to history by looking back at it."*

The Smena Vekh movement was therefore, in the broad sense of the term, one of the manifestations of the process of transition by the intelligentsia from bourgeois or petty-bourgeois positions to the socialist ones, which, beginning after the victory of the October Revolution, was achieved in the 1930s, when the basis of a socialist society had been built.

* Central State Archives of Literature and Art, Folio 2355, File 1, Document 5. p. 8.

While moving actively against the reactionary side of the Smena Vekh movement, the Communist Party and the Soviet state simultaneously fought against bourgeois ideology and especially when it screened itself behind the Smena Vekh ideas of the "degeneration" of the Soviet state. The danger was greatly increased by the fact of the activity in the early years of the New Economic Policy of various factional groupings inside the Party (Trotskyists, the "workers' opposition", etc.). The ideological front therefore took on an especially important meaning. Extra vigilance and attention was needed towards the various manifestations of hostile ideology. It was above all imperative to organise and deploy a wide-scale offensive against bourgeois ideology, increase the dissemination of communist propaganda amongst the masses and reinforce the theoretical front.

V. I. Lenin's article "On the Significance of Militant Materialism", published in March 1922 in the journal *Pod znamenem marxizma* (Under the Marxist Flag), played a most important part in the ideological battle. This article of his defined the tasks of the Party on the ideological front for a whole period of history and outlined a large-scale work programme, the aim of which was to uphold and develop the principles of a scientific world outlook and make them prevail in all spheres of the life of Soviet society.

V. I. Lenin's central idea in this work was the tenet that ideology has a class and Party character and that therefore one of the Communists' most important duties was to wage a systematic offensive against bourgeois ideology, philosophical reaction and every kind of idealism and mysticism. V. I. Lenin underlined that in that battle a union was necessary between Communists and consistent materialists, even if they were for the time being outside the Party. He placed especial importance on establishing the close links between Marxist philosophy and natural science and between Marxist philosophers and the representatives of the natural sciences, since "without an alliance with non-Communists in the most diverse spheres of activity there can be no question of any successful communist construction".*

The publication of the first edition of the works of V. I. Lenin, the decision for which was taken at the 9th Party Congress, was an important event in the ideological life of the Party and of the country. The demand for it was so great that a reprint was begun in 1922. Besides this, V. I. Lenin's articles on

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 227.

questions of importance to the life of the Party and of the country, as well as his speeches at Party congresses, congresses of Soviets and of the Comintern were all published in massive numbers.

An edition of the complete collected works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels was begun, together with a series of Marxist works by contemporary Soviet and foreign authors.

The periodical press played an exceptionally large part in the battle against bourgeois ideology and in strengthening ideological influence on the masses. The journal *Bolshevik* and also the newspapers *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* contributed greatly to the battle against bourgeois ideology.

The Communist Party took extremely energetic measures to organise a "counter-offensive" on the ideological front. The 12th Party Conference devoted especial attention to this question and exposed the bourgeois-restorationist tendencies in the ideology of the *Smena Vekh* movement and also in that of the Mensheviks and SRs. It recommended concrete measures to strengthen agitation and propaganda work amongst the masses, to improve the ideological and theoretical preparation of Party cadres and to enhance the role of the Party and Soviet press. While setting as a basic task "that every effort should be directed towards the ideological strengthening of the proletarian nucleus of our Party", the resolution of the 12th Party Conference of the RCP(B) entitled "Anti-Soviet Parties and Trends" at the same time pointed out that "systematic support and businesslike co-operation is imperative in our attitude to the genuinely non-Party elements amongst the technologists, scientists, teachers, writers, poets and others who have managed to understand at least in general terms the real meaning of the great revolution which has been accomplished.

"The Party must do all it can to help in the crystallisation of those trends and groups which display a genuine desire to help the workers' and peasants' state. From the capital to the district town the Party must patiently, systematically and persistently carry out this very course of action so as to promote the transition of the above-mentioned elements to co-operation with the Soviet state."

A considerable part in ideologically influencing the intelligentsia was also played by the various Marxist scientific societies organised in the higher educational institutions and scientific research establishments, Marxist study circles and political education courses and seminars. The importance of such institutions as the Socialist Academy and the Red

Professors' Institute in the development of Soviet social thought can scarcely be exaggerated.

Thus in the first half of the 1920s the Communist Party determined the most important forms of influencing the masses, including the intelligentsia, ideologically, and opposed attempts to revive bourgeois ideology by a militant offensive of socialist ideology on the Marxist-Leninist front.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ACTIVE CO-OPERATION
BETWEEN THE WORKING CLASS AND THE SPECIALISTS.
THE ROLE OF SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS
IN THE RE-EDUCATION OF THE INTELLIGENTSIA

Those members of the intelligentsia who had only in general terms understood the true meaning of the changes taking place in the country and whom it was necessary to help in gradually breaking their ties with the bourgeois past, began to take part in the building of socialism. They all had their own different ways of making this break and each made individual sense of his experience of the new Soviet reality. Gathering this experience was, however, extraordinarily difficult and painful for them.

Following V. I. Lenin's instructions on drawing the old intelligentsia into the building of socialism and re-educating it in the spirit of socialist ideology, the Communist Party undertook a series of measures to complete this task.

A great amount was done to improve material conditions for the specialists and raise the level of their scientific and technological knowledge. As early as August 1921, one of the hardest periods the country had to go through, the Soviet Government passed a special resolution dealing with measures to raise the level of engineering and technological knowledge in the country and to improve the standards of living of the engineering and technological workers of the RSFSR.

To put this resolution into practice the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council set up a special commission which was to examine the wage rates of the engineering and technological workers with a view to raising their pay, to elaborate general propositions for a collective agreement, which envisaged special clauses safeguarding the interests of the specialists. Sample research figures obtained by the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions show that by the middle of

1925 the average wage of, say, specialists in the metallurgical industry was 165 rubles a month (without extras) and up to 500-600 rubles a month for highly qualified ones. It should be realised that specialists had a very high rate of pay; labourers earned 35 rubles a month and skilled workers about 100. The level of material security of scientific workers grew rapidly.

Great attention was paid to the improvement in the material situation of the specialists working in production by the 12th Congress of the RCP(B) in April 1923. It noted in its resolution that "it is imperative to create normal work conditions in enterprises so as to satisfy morally and materially those who have been enlisted there as specialists and in particular to use the principle of encouraging in every possible way technical and economic successes obtained directly in the course of production (economies of all kinds, inventions, improvement, etc.). Administrators and technicians who have proved to be useful and shown initiative over a long time must be given recognition by the Party, Soviet organisations and trade unions as especially valuable workers, this to be done by extending to them the same social respect as that enjoyed by the specialists who are working successfully in the Red Army".

The Party and the Soviet state took great care to improve the material position of teachers. In January 1921, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR passed a resolution signed by V. I. Lenin on pensions for aged invalided teachers who had served with merit in public education. These teachers were accorded a pension two times larger than the norm.

In 1923 and the following years the Soviet state investigated the possibility of considerably increasing the allocation for public education and of raising teachers' pay. In 1923-1924 the total expenses on public education more than doubled and the pay fund increased by 150 per cent compared to the previous budgetary year.

But despite immense efforts by the Soviet Government there was a short period when improvement to the material position of teachers was impossible and it remained difficult for a number of years. In 1921 famine raged in many provinces and rural teachers were affected particularly hardly. Devotion to their cause and consciousness of their civil duty helped the teachers to overcome the immense hardships and remain at their posts.

The material factor was, however, not the most important in enlisting the intelligentsia in the building of the national economy. A number of measures of a political character had to

be undertaken. One of the most important conditions needed to fulfil Lenin's demand for creating an atmosphere of trust and comradely co-operation for the specialists was the setting up of correct mutual relations between the technological intelligentsia and the working class. This was a vital question and its positive solution was of great importance to the rapid restoration and reconstruction of the national economy.

The difficulty lay in that a certain section of the working class still retained the idea that engineers were the accomplices of the capitalists. Old wounds, memories of humiliations received by workers at the hands of reactionary engineers, beatings and unlawful fines could not vanish immediately after the revolution.

The sabotage and opposition by a section of the specialists to the Soviet state's measures in the early years of its existence were still fresh in the minds of the workers. The mood of the working masses was also influenced by the participation of some engineering and technological workers in the wrecking of state enterprises and the plundering of the national wealth. Judicial accounts of such actions had been published in the press and of course received a definite response from the workers.

It should be specially emphasised that the overall cultural development of the working class was lagging behind the growth of industry. The cultural and technological backwardness of the working class, a legacy from capitalism, was a serious hindrance to the setting up of correct mutual relations between the working class and the specialists. This made itself especially felt when a mass of semi-literate peasants arrived to work in factories and workshops. While a trained industrial worker had, under the influence of many years of Party and trade union propaganda, already as a whole learnt and understood the importance of specialists working in production and had learnt to establish correct mutual relations with them, new workers had still not rid themselves of prejudices and misconceptions about the specialists. The distrust and at times direct hostility in the attitude of workers who were not so conscious towards the engineers and technologists and their proposals for the rationalisation and redevelopment of production, for the introduction of a regime of economy and the raising of labour productivity, made it harder to strengthen the specialists' authority in production.

Such an attitude towards the specialists did not come only from the less conscious workers. Party organs repeatedly pointed out instances of the incorrect attitudes towards the

specialists of certain Party and trade union leaders and especially of economic personnel. This found its expression in unfounded dismissals of engineering and technological workers, infringements of their rights in production, disregard for their suggestions and suchlike.

"Specialist-bashing" was not a mass movement. Though there were quite frequent reports of cases of incorrect attitudes towards the specialists in the press of that time, this can be explained by the fact that the Party and trade union press gave wide publicity to each case and subjected it to sharp censure.

The press played a significant role in the establishment of comradely relations between the workers and the specialists. In their articles the workers-correspondents made special note of conscientious engineers and technicians, criticised poor work by engineering and technological personnel, reported on the incorrect and sometimes even hostile actions of one or other specialist and called for closer rallying of workers by hand and brain. Party and Government leaders repeatedly spoke out in articles in the central press about the setting up of normal mutual relations between the workers and the specialists.

The Communist Party and the Soviet state waged a decisive battle against any attempts to consider all specialists as either overt or concealed enemies of the Soviet system and against cases of incorrect and sometimes even criminal attitudes towards the specialists. In 1922 public opinion was drawn to the trial of a few Party and trade union workers who had organised the persecution of an old specialist who had been doing honest work. This was the chief engineer on the Moscow water-supply system V. V. Oldenberger who as a result of it committed suicide.

The case of Oldenberger's suicide became a matter of principle to the Soviet state in its protection of honest specialists. This, incidentally, was reinforced by the fact that the case was removed by a special decree of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on 23 January 1922 from the usual procedures and transferred to the Supreme Tribunal of the Republic.

At the trial, the state prosecutor N. V. Krylenko, in answer to the charge that in October 1917 Oldenberger had received 4,000 rubles to use for the specialists who were on strike, announced: "... If someone is, in 1922, going to blame any member of a hostile class who is connected to it by his origins for what that person did, said and thought in those critical October

days — and if political leaders are going to use that kind of evidence in today's political battles — then such political leaders should be thrown down from the tribune of political leadership, for this means that not only have they forgotten nothing but that they have learnt nothing as well!"*

The censure of those involved in the case, including Communists, testifies to the fact that the Party and the state authorities were by no means prepared to pander to any of their workers who distorted the Leninist line of attracting the bourgeois specialists to the building of a new society. It is interesting to note that the Supreme Tribunal of the Republic ordered the local tribunals to apply Article 64 of the Criminal Code (not a common murder but an act of terrorism) to those accused of attempts on the life of managers of state industrial enterprises and establishments.

Every case of violence against specialists by workers who were not conscious brought forth a wave of indignation and was evaluated in class terms by the working class. The working class understood the immense value of the specialists with their knowledge and experience in the building of socialism, and how important it was to ensure conditions which favoured their fruitful work.

While demanding that the workers have comradely relations with the specialists, the Party at the same time showed the latter that they could earn the trust of the working class only if they themselves correspondingly related to the workers in a comradely way.

The setting up of comradely relations between the specialists and the workers was a difficult and complicated problem. It was a question of breaking the old psychology both of the workers and the intelligentsia, and re-educating them, as they were members of social groups which had formerly been disunited. This was impossible to achieve just by administrative measures or by mere verbal persuasion. It was imperative that a whole complex of political education work be put into practice both amongst the workers and the specialists.

To fulfil the directions of the Party congresses and conferences, the local Party, trade union, Soviet and Komsomol organisations developed a wide-scale explanatory campaign amongst the workers. Speeches were made at the general meetings of production collectives about the role of engineering

* N. V. Krylenko, *Za pyat let. 1918-1922. Obvinitelnye rechi* (Five Years. 1918-1922. Indictments), Moscow-Petrograd, 1923, p. 438.

and technological workers in the building of socialism, joint festivities were organised for engineering and technological personnel and workers, it was arranged that there should be boards of honour with the names of engineering and technological workers, joint worker and engineer clubs, etc.

The workers' feeling of distrust and direct hostility towards engineers and technicians gradually gave way, under the influence of the educational work of Party and trade union organisations, to a viewing of the specialists as people who were of value in the building of socialism and with equal rights within the workers' collective. Of course, cases of incorrect attitude towards specialists on the part of workers and of the administration did happen later too, but they were not so plainly political as in the first years of Soviet power. A decisive role was played in this change by the workers' desire for an upsurge in production, the discipline and class self-control of the proletarian masses, and the political education work of the Communist Party.

The Party and the state could not successfully fulfil the task of re-educating the bourgeois members of the intelligentsia without involving the social organisations and firstly the trade unions.

In the years immediately after the war the trade unions had become an arena of the class struggle because of the revival of capitalist elements in connection with the New Economic Policy. The remnants of the counter-revolutionary parties and trends tried to enhance their activity and use the difficulties that the country was going through and also the intelligentsia's lack of political maturity.

The revival of anti-Soviet elements was mainly seen in the trade unions not connected with production. At the congress of doctors in the spring of 1922, one of the participants announced that they, the democrats, lived in a "communist surrounding" and that they, he said, should organise to oppose it. Several of the participants at the congress claimed that "we have always been for the dictatorship of the proletariat, we are ready always to be the servants of the proletariat, but we are not going to be the servitors of the Soviet state".

Similar outbursts took place at the agronomists' congress, the geologists' congress and at several gubernia congresses of teachers.

Restorationist tendencies revived especially in connection with the discussion about the trade unions thrust on the Party by Trotsky in the autumn of 1920. Elements hostile to the Soviet state took this to be the beginning of Party strife and thought it

was the end of a monolithic Party and that there was a hope not only of a change of course but even of a change of power. The enemies of the proletarian dictatorship amongst the intelligentsia tried to make use of the discussion about the trade unions which had been thrust on the Party to liquidate the trade union organisations of the intelligentsia.

There was also a tendency in trade unions to "coalesce" and to "turn into state organisations" which would in fact lead to their being liquidated. Another harmful phenomenon in the development of trade unions was the attempt to found sectarian unions fenced off from the general masses.

An especially bitter struggle was waged in one of the intelligentsia's larger trade unions—the education workers' union. The Mensheviks and the SRs, activists from the former All-Russia Union of Teachers, tried to restore their old influence on the masses of teachers and spread amongst them the idea that public education was non-Party and agitated for schools to be released from the control of the Party and of the state.

In 1922 at an enlarged plenum of the Central Committee of the Union of Education Workers, the Communist faction turned its attention to the necessity of a sharp upsurge of Party work in the union so as to reinforce the communist influence on the masses of teachers. Questions of work within the teachers' union preoccupied the CC of the RCP(B). It pointed out that the active participation of teachers in the building of socialism could not be ensured without corresponding political work amongst the teachers. In a special resolution taken in 1921 and entitled "Work Amongst the Education Workers" the CC of the Party called the attention of Party organisations to the mistakeness and harmfulness of the untrusting and sometimes even hostile attitude towards the teachers taken by some Party cells. "We must understand," noted the CC of the RCP(B), "that this kind of attitude is at the moment a great mistake and seriously harmful to the cause of Soviet development.... We must do everything we can to involve this highly valuable social group in the interests and creative work of the Soviet state...."

As a result of the great amount of work carried out by the Party organisations and the trade unions, the Mensheviks and the SRs lost the last of their authority over the teachers and were thrown out of the representative organs of the Union of Education Workers everywhere.

The successes of the Communist Party's work amongst the teachers were also witnessed in the congresses and conferences

of this union. Anti-Soviet elements were sharply condemned there, unity between Communists and non-Party members was established and a desire to master Marxist-Leninist theory made itself apparent.

An especially important role in the moral and political winning over of the teaching masses was played by V. I. Lenin's work *Pages from a Diary*, dictated by him on 2 January 1923. This work put public education questions amongst the most important tasks of the building of socialism and treated the country's teachers as a group vital to the achievement of the aims of the cultural revolution. "Our schoolteacher," wrote V. I. Lenin, "should be raised to a standard he has never achieved, and cannot achieve, in bourgeois society." And later he emphasised: "We must systematically step up our efforts to organise the schoolteachers so as to transform them from the bulwark of the bourgeois system that they still are in all capitalist countries without exception, into the bulwark of the Soviet system, in order, through their agency, to divert the peasantry from alliance with the bourgeoisie and to bring them into alliance with the proletariat."*

The growing political activity of the teachers not only had a distinct effect on the work of the schools themselves, but also led ever wider masses of the teachers, especially in the villages, to participate in putting the policies of the Party into practice. Many of them read or delivered speeches to the working people, organised current affair circles, village reading rooms and Houses of the People, and carried out anti-religious work.

The teachers' move to the side of the Soviet state was indeed very substantial, but it was still necessary to expend a great deal more effort to manage fully to win over the masses of teachers. The political training of teachers had still not everywhere reached a sufficiently high level, especially in the villages.

Work with the teachers was also thoroughly discussed at the 13th Congress of the RCP(B) in May 1924. The problems of the day in public education and the situation of the teachers were put before the congress and it noted the substantial changes in the political feelings of the workers in public education and their wish to link their activity with the nation-wide tasks for the building of socialism. The congress pointed out in its decisions the necessity to be active in enlisting the teachers for social

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, pp. 464-65.

and political work amongst the population, especially in the villages.

The education work done by the Party amongst the teachers had positive results. Teachers began to join the Party and the Komsomol, and began to be active in the work of local Soviets. By 1 December 1925, of the 180-thousand-strong army of teachers in the RSFSR, 8,811 were Party members or candidates, and 10,807 were members of the Komsomol. This meant that Party and Komsomol members represented 10.8 per cent of the whole. By their disinterested work, the teachers showed that the period of their divergence from the Soviet state had passed and that the time had come for the teachers to take up socialist ideology and play a conscientious part in the building of socialism. It can be said that by 1926 the Communist Party had on the whole managed to win over the majority of the teachers ideologically and gain a dependable ally in the building of Soviet culture.

Social and political work was also deployed in other sections of the intelligentsia. First steps were made on the subject of a professional union of scientific and higher education workers. This section of the intelligentsia was stubbornly refusing to join the education workers' union. The All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions made a number of compromises. Though categorically opposed to the creation of small trade unions with sectarian leanings, it nevertheless agreed on the organisation within the education workers' union of a special branch to include the scientific and higher education workers. The plenary meeting of the CC of the education workers' union which was held in April 1921 noted in its resolution: "Considering the immense importance of workers with specialised scientific knowledge to the organisation of education, it is imperative that a solution be found as soon as possible to the problem of organising, as a temporary measure, a branch of the All-Russia Union of Education Workers for the scientific workers (taking these to include teachers in higher educational institutions) which will be directly connected to the union."

At the end of 1922 scientific workers' branches began to appear. They saw their task as one of defending the professional interests of the workers in science and the higher schools and drawing them into the social life of the country. By the end of 1923, 31 branches had been organised incorporating 8,818 scientific workers and by 1 November 1924 the branches already united 85 per cent of all scientific workers.

The 1st Congress of the Unionised Scientific Workers was held in November 1923. It demonstrated the readiness of the

majority of the scientific intelligentsia to give genuine help to the Soviet state in the building of socialism. The congress resolution noted that "the former discord between the scientific workers and the working class has now become a thing of the past and is giving way more and more to a growing rapprochement in the process of joint work on the restoration of the economic and cultural life of the country. The congress calls on the scientific workers of the Union of Republics to do away with their last vacillations and hand in hand with all the working people win the fight to found a free society based on the unity of science and labour."

The process of drawing the industrial and technological intelligentsia into the trade unions was also complicated. As has been said above, the first industrial trade unions appeared as early as during the Civil War. However, the process of drawing the specialists into the trade unions developed slowly both because of the intelligentsia's inertia and because of the wish of the leadership of a number of trade unions to make them "purely workers'" unions.

The Communist Party condemned this policy of a number of trade unions as incorrect. After the 9th Congress of the RCP(B) the drawing of technological personnel into professional unions gained momentum and by the autumn of 1921 engineering and technological branches were already in existence in seven trade unions. But there were still many distortions in the definition of their role and place within the trade unions, and there was still a lack of uniformity in the enrolment conditions for engineers and technicians. In a number of cases the Party's directives on the enrolment of engineering and technological workers into the trade unions were simply ignored.

The 11th Congress of the RCP(B) pointed out that "the trade unions have in relation to the specialists the hardest and most difficult work of daily influencing the broader masses of the working people so as to set up correct mutual relations between them and the specialists, and in selecting and encouraging the more capable and hard-working ones. Furthermore, it is only this kind of work which will give serious practical results."

After the categorical directives of the Party and the decision of the 5th Trade Union Congress (September 1922) on the organisation of engineering and technological branches, the unification of the industrial and technological intelligentsia took the right course. At the end of 1922, the 1st All-Russia Congress of Unionised Engineers was held. Two hundred and seven delegates representing about 27 thousand engineering and

technological workers took part in it. The congress formed a leadership organ for the engineering branches — the All-Russia Interbranch Bureau of Engineers at the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions — and supported the Party's call for active participation in the development of the economy of the country.

The first unionised engineers' congress proved a stimulus to the organisation of engineers' branches and interbranch bureaus in a number of trade unions. By the time of the 2nd Engineers' Congress (1924) they already had branches in 11 trade unions amalgamating more than 50 thousand people (of whom 19 thousand were workers in agriculture). A decision was taken at the 2nd Engineers' Congress on the right of technicians to join the engineering branches which considerably widened and democratised their membership. By the 3rd Engineers' and Technicians' Congress in 1927 there were 105,600 engineering and technological workers in the trade unions.

The main body of the engineering and technological branches consisted of industrial workers, belonging for the most part to the middle and lower groups of the engineering and technological personnel. In the case of the more highly qualified specialists, they, as was noted in the report drawn up by the organisation department of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions* in 1925, joined the engineering and technological branches with reluctance and preferred to remain in the All-Russia Association of Engineers. By mid-1926 the membership of trade union organisations of engineers consisted of: in the Ukraine and the Urals 90 per cent of the overall number of specialists, in Leningrad 88 per cent, and in Moscow 85 per cent. In 1927 in the Soviet Union as a whole the engineering and technological branches comprised about 90 per cent of all the engineering and technological workers.

The trade unions did a great deal towards enlivening the engineering and technological branches and drawing their members into union work.

The engineers' trade union organisations put forward suggestions for the all-round development of production and the speediest liquidation of technological dependence on foreign countries. For example, the congress of Leningrad engineers in March 1924 recognised it imperative "to continue to increase the

* After the formation in 1922 of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions changed its name to the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions.

load on the metallurgical and electrical industries by attracting orders from the centre.... To this end it is necessary to fight even more energetically against the transfer of orders abroad when they can be fulfilled within the country". This new approach to evaluating the situation showed a sense of care about the economic independence of the country.

It is impossible not to mention the positive role played by the engineering trade union organisations in enhancing the cultural, industrial and technological levels of the working masses. This side of the activity of the branches grew yearly; discussions, lectures, excursions and exhibitions were organised, engineers ran discussion circles on the technological professions, taught various courses and suchlike.

In September 1925 the CC of the RCP(B) passed a resolution entitled "On the Work of the Specialists" in which it recognised as imperative that the standard of living of the specialists be improved, that they be invited to discuss questions concerning the appointment of specialists to responsible posts and that the production and economic work of the branches be revitalised. The CC of the RCP(B) bound Communists to support in every possible way the engineers' trade union organisations and strengthen their authority. The Central Committee especially emphasised that in estimating the worth of the specialists it was imperative to take their length of service in industry (especially Soviet) into account, and their services in their particular field. In no case whatsoever was it permitted to base attitudes towards the specialists on their class origins. The resolution also outlined a number of measures for the improvement of the professional capacities of the specialists, for creating favourable work conditions for scientific and technological societies, institutes and suchlike.

This resolution, taken in the transition period between the rehabilitation of the national economy and its reconstruction, lay at the base of the Party and trade union bodies' work to create more favourable conditions for the specialists.

Various congresses, conferences, seminars and suchlike played a considerable part in the re-education of the intelligentsia and in drawing it more actively into the building of socialism.

The All-Russia Congress of Scientific Workers in November 1923 and the 1st All-Russia Congress of Teachers in early 1925 proved that serious changes had taken place in the world outlook of scientists and teachers and their desire to assist to the utmost the building of the economy being carried forward in the country.

Similar congresses and conferences took place almost every year in various branches of science, technology and culture and proved to be an important school for setting up useful co-operation between the intelligentsia, the Communist Party and the Soviet state. The Party also achieved major successes in changing the attitude of the workers towards the intelligentsia. The feeling of distrust gave way to the view that the intelligentsia was an extremely valuable participant in the new construction.

CHANGES IN THE WORLD OUTLOOK OF THE SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENTSIA

In devoting its attention to re-educating the old intelligentsia in a socialist spirit, the Communist Party and the Soviet state were at the same time indefatigable in taking care that workers and peasants be trained as cadres for the intelligentsia.

During the rehabilitation period the process of promoting the better trained workers and Communists to administrative and technological posts continued, but this could not meet the tremendous lack of qualified cadres. Those promoted usually occupied posts as foremen or managers of enterprises and had former specialists as their deputies or advisers. "Red directors" while successfully carrying out the Party line in the industrial relations field, were sometimes less competent in scientific and technological matters and relied wholly upon the advice of the specialists who were quite often reactionary. The country imperatively needed specialist cadres from the ranks of the workers.

The higher educational institutions remained the basic source for new cadres. The Communist Party gave a great deal of study to the problem of transferring higher education onto new lines. The resolution of the first Party consultation on public education questions which was called under the auspices of the CC of the RCP(B) at the end of December 1920, set the task of politically winning over higher education, which is to say "firstly, that its work has a sure revolutionary direction; secondly, that all the students taking courses are given a political education; and thirdly, that higher education is used to form as great a number as possible of proletarian, and in particular Party member, specialists".

The proletarianisation of the student body was achieved by replenishing the higher educational institutions with students

passing out of the workers' faculties and by keeping to class principles when enrolling youths in higher education. The network of workers' faculties grew continuously. In 1919 there had been 14 workers' faculties in the country and by 1923 their number had risen to 106, while the number of students increased from 2,149 to 38,394. The worker and Party-Komsomol strata also grew. The 10th All-Russia Congress of Soviets (December 1922) noted with satisfaction the successes obtained in attracting workers and peasants to higher educational institutions. The congress called on the RSFSR People's Commissariat for Education and other Soviet departments to "take especial care with regard to the proletarian students, their spiritual interests and material requirements and to take every measure to ensure that these new forces in higher education should grow and become stronger".

Thousands of students finishing workers' faculties began from 1923 onwards to join the ranks of students in higher education. In 1925, for example, they made up two-thirds of the overall number of students in industrial and technological institutes of higher learning and one-half of those accepted to social science and economics institutes.

The principle for selecting students for higher education allowed for the enrolment of members of other classes besides workers and peasants. Members of the bourgeoisie, not to mention the working intelligentsia, studied in higher educational institutions. Naturally though, preference was given to people from the working class and the toiling peasantry.

In the early years of the restoration period there was a rather complicated situation in the student midst. Amongst the student body there were still quite a few who were hostile to the Soviet state and had taken part in the Civil War on the side of the whiteguards and the interventionists. They met the measures taken by the Soviet state for the democratisation of higher education with enmity and persecuted the students who came to the institutes from workers' faculties. The majority of them, however, were apathetic and bored by anything that went outside the particular science which they wanted to study for a profession.

But the revolution brought forth a new type of youth which had grown up in the revolutionary battle. Many young men and women of worker or peasant origin, who had only recently been working in factories or in the field, came to institutes from the workers' faculties. The junior courses in higher educational institutions therefore presented in those years a completely different picture. "In these," a contemporary recalls, "there was

a much more lively mood. The majority of these young people had grown accustomed to the revolution. Many had fought for the revolution on the front, risked their lives and suffered for it. The revolution taught them to be democrats. There was a considerable proportion of Communists amongst this section of the youth."

The change in the work of the higher schools and in the class composition of the students was largely promoted by their Party organisations which directly controlled the enrolment of students and carried out broad-based education work amongst the students and the professors. By the end of the restoration period the Party cells in the higher educational institutions had become powerful collectives containing hundreds of Communists. Thus in 1925 the Party cell of the Moscow Agricultural Academy had 757 members — 20 per cent of the student body; the Party cell of the Kharkov Technological Institute 403 — also 20 per cent of the student collective; the Party cell of the Moscow Institute of the National Economy 1,050 members — 27 per cent of the students and the Party cell of the First Moscow University about 1,800 members — 18 per cent of the whole student body.

In January 1925, by a decree of the Organisation Bureau of the CC of the RCP(B), the system of Party organs in higher educational institutions was reformed. Instead of independent and poorly interconnected student, scientific, teaching staff and technical workers' Party cells, single cells were created in each institution which made it possible to work more successfully at rallying the collective. Special attention was paid to increasing the activity of the Komsomol and trade union organisations in the higher educational institutions and improving their leadership by the Party.

To carry out the proletarianisation of higher education it was necessary to overcome the conservatism and sometimes even the direct sabotage that came from a certain section of the professorial and teaching staff. This was especially felt in the organisational field when regulations, programmes and suchlike were being reviewed. The professorate tried in all sorts of ways to fence off higher education from the state and from "politics" and hamper its democratisation.

The Communists understood clearly that it was impossible immediately to re-educate the old professors or to train new ones. The Communist Party therefore considered that at the same time as attracting the greatest possible number of Communist teachers to higher education, it was imperative to maintain careful and tactful relations with the old professorate.

It paid constant attention to improving leadership methods in higher education, to setting up normal mutual relations between Party, Soviet, and social organs and the staff of professors and teachers while at the same time decisively fighting against higher education "autonomy" which in fact meant retention of castes and alienation from the popular masses. The Party also made energetic efforts to obtain a situation in which methods for the running of higher education by Party and Soviet organs could be made to correspond with the specific feelings and traditions of this section of the intelligentsia and to ensure that the measures taken by the new state should not antagonise the professorate but, on the contrary, rally the better part of it round the Soviet state. In 1921, however, in a number of higher schools the professorial and teaching staff was drawn into conflict with the organs of state power. One of the more important reasons for this conflict was the incorrect policy regarding the professors and teachers of the leadership of some departments, in particular the Central Administration of Professional Education, which consisted in "tightening screws" and abuse of power.

Thus in early 1921, the head of Moscow University, the Communist professor D. P. Bogolepov, found himself unable to set up correct mutual relations with his professors and began to dismiss many of them for the sole reason that they were "old". These actions of his were supported by the Central Administration of Professional Education and also by the university's Communist Party cell which consisted mainly of students and youths from the workers' faculties. Naturally, numerous complaints reached the Government. When he found out about Bogolepov's actions, V. I. Lenin decisively opposed the practice of groundless and often absolutely unfounded persecution of professors. In May 1921 Bogolepov was replaced as head of the university by the Communist V. P. Volgin who was able to appease the professors and also carry out a good deal of work in rallying the collective.

A more serious conflict appeared in April 1921 at the Moscow Higher Technological School in connection with the nomination by the Central Administration of Professional Education of a new managing board in which a place was not given to the candidate put forward by the professors. A meeting of the professors and teachers discussed the Administration's action, found it unlawful, and decided to stop lecturing as a protest.

At V. I. Lenin's suggestion, the events in that higher school were put to the Central Committee's Politbureau for discussion

and it cancelled the nomination though it also proposed that the whole staff of professors and teachers be censured for using unacceptable forms of protest.

The statement by the People's Commissariat for Education in which it explained the decision of the Central Committee's Politbureau, also acknowledged that the head of the higher education department of the Central Administration of Professional Education was not competent to deal with the task entrusted to him and he was therefore released from this duty.

This time the incident at the Moscow Higher Technological School was settled.

On 2 September 1921 a decree entitled "On Higher Educational Institutions of the RSFSR" and signed by Lenin was passed. This clearly formulated the class tasks of higher education, the duty of which was to form specialist cadres in the various branches of knowledge, to train scientific workers and spread knowledge amongst the broad proletarian and peasant masses "whose interests must take first place". The decree was also a strong blow against higher education's notorious autonomy.

The reactionary section of the professorate stubbornly defended its privileges and traditions and met the decree on higher educational institutions with hostility. The points which made it most indignant were those in which it was stated that the Central Administration of Professional Education ratified the presiding bodies of faculties and that the People's Commissariat for Education nominated the boards of the higher educational institutions from the candidates put forward by the teacher and student collective. This, in the opinion of the old professorate, was an "infringement of the sacred traditions of the rights of higher education" on the part of the state.

Dissatisfaction about the sharp limitation to the autonomy of the higher educational institutions, appointments that were not always appropriate, the material hardships due to the bad harvest and the delayed payment of salaries led to the strikes in the winter and spring of 1922 by the professors and teachers of the Moscow Higher Technological School and also of Moscow University and other higher schools in the country.

The Central Committee's Politbureau discussed the situation in higher education several times. So as to settle the conflict quickly and peacefully, on 2 February 1922 the Politbureau resolved to form a joint commission to consider the economic problems of higher education, to clear debts in salary payments, the supply of equipment and suchlike. The leadership of the

Central Administration of Professional Education persisted, however, in having recourse to repressive measures (including arrests) against participants in strikes, for which course it found support from the Communist cells of some schools. The Politbureau of the CC of the RCP(B) explained to the People's Commissariat for Education that the Central Committee's resolution of 2 February "had as its aim the peaceful and most rapid liquidation of strikes by professors without the use of repression", and on 9 February announced the censure of Y. A. Preobrazhensky, A. V. Lunacharsky and M. N. Pokrovsky for not carrying out the Politbureau's decision. Preobrazhensky handed in his resignation from his post as head of the Central Administration of Professional Education and it was accepted. On 13 February the Politbureau ratified the proposals of the specially organised commission on the improvement of the material situation of the professorial and teaching staff. As a result of the measures taken the conflict was removed and courses were resumed in all the higher schools. In recalling the "professors' strike" Lunacharsky said that it was the most bitter conflict with the intelligentsia in all the years of Soviet power.

The Communist Party's flexible Leninist policy regarding the old intelligentsia was bringing positive results. In the spring of 1921 a group of teachers from the social sciences faculty of the University of Petrograd made an attempt to unite professors and teachers around themselves with the aim of assisting the reform of higher education and drawing closer to the Soviet state. The Red Professorate group, as it came to call itself, made a declaration in which it pointed out that the proletariat was the natural ally and real defender of science, because "the development of science is a guarantee of the victory of its final aims", and that the dictatorship of the proletariat "has for the first time in history created the conditions for the free development of science and the widespread use of its achievements in the interests of society as a whole". The declaration also noted the glaring contradictions between the state of higher education and the tasks given to it by the Soviet state. The group called on teachers to base their teaching of the social disciplines on historical materialism and to subordinate their teaching of applied sciences to the task of assisting the planned development of the productive forces of the country. The group considered that the aim of its activity was to fight against the corporative and caste aspects of higher education and came out in support of close co-operation between the Red Professorate and the students.

The Petrograd Red Professorate group limited itself in the main to propaganda of its aims and tasks. Its members spoke at public debates and at student meetings and meetings of the professorial and teaching staff. It was not, however, able to become the mouthpiece of the feelings of any large circle of professors. It was hindered in this by its political heterogeneity and also because it had taken up a sectarian position on a number of issues. For example, the head of Petrograd University Professor N. S. Derzhavin wrote that the members of the group had dissociated themselves too abruptly from the main body of scientific workers in higher education and become isolated. They did not engage with their opponents but went off to the side. He considered this to be a tactical mistake.

The Left Professorate group which appeared in Petrograd at the end of 1921 had more results. Its membership came mainly from people in the humanitarian sciences. By September 1922 the group had 80 members, growing to 116 by the end of November and by March 1923 it had risen again to 150 members of whom 42 were Communists.

At its first general meeting in the city on 14 May 1922 the group passed its charter, according to which its aim was "to launch an organised campaign for the reform and development of higher education based on the latter's ideological renovation in conformity with the new paths of science and enlightenment of the broad popular masses that had been set to higher education by the October Revolution". The group accepted professors, teachers and scientific workers as members.

One of the major issues which caused animated discussions and by which the attitude of the professorate to the Soviet state could be tested, was the question of the autonomy of higher education. The political line of the reactionary professorate was to strive to make higher education independent from the state and remove it from the control of the Soviet state. Naturally, the group of progressive activists in higher education could not but define its position on this question. It decisively rejected the autonomy slogan as serving only to alienate higher education from the people and prevent the measures taken by the Soviet state for its renovation from being put into practice. The Left Professorate group's appeal "To All Scientists and Workers in Higher Education" in September 1922, said in part: "In the new Russia higher education must not be put completely at the disposal of people who know one science or other perfectly, but who also are sometimes completely devoid of the gift of management and of the ability to see and correctly evaluate the demands of the moment. Learning, however profound it may

be, can no longer bring with it exclusive rights to run higher education. In Soviet Russia where our motto is the denial of class privileges, there is no room for a privileged caste of scientists. Scientists must only be acknowledged the right to respect and recognition of their scientific services, but not the privilege of running higher education. It, like Russia, must be run by the workers in the person of their representatives from organisations which have an interest in the well-being of higher education."

The group participated actively in restructuring the work of the higher schools, the elaboration of study plans and curricula, the selection and recommendation of candidates for the board of governors and other organs, organised widely attended meetings, debates, discussions, etc.

The CC of the RCP(B) supported the initiative of the progressive teachers of Petrograd. On 24 February 1923 at a meeting of the board of the Agitation and Propaganda Department (Agitprop) of the CC of the RCP(B) on the question "Work Amongst the Students", the following decision was taken: "...to consider it imperative that Left professorate blocs on the lines of the Petrograd group be organised in the larger centres and to charge Agitprop with giving the corresponding instructions." Gubernia, territory, and town Party organisations followed the directions of the CC of the RCP(B) and began the work of setting up Left professorate groups with Communist branches. Besides Petrograd, such groups were founded in Moscow, Kazan, Rostov-on-Don and other towns.

The Left professorate groups played a noticeable part in stratifying the professorate, in separating the more progressive elements from its mass and attracting them to active work in restructuring higher education on a new basis and finally in isolating the reactionary professorate. By the autumn of 1923 with the revival of the activity of the scientific workers' branch founded in 1921 in the Union of Education Workers, the Left professorate groups were gradually dissolved, as their aims and tasks were being fulfilled by this branch.

Considerable work was done by the Communist Party in normalising the ideological atmosphere in higher education. The country's higher schools were being freed from the reactionary professorate. In the University of Petrograd, for example, Professors N. O. Lossky, N. P. Karsavin, P. A. Sorokin, S. A. Askoldov, S. L. Frank and other reactionaries were dismissed.

The dismissal of the extreme Right-wing professorate from the faculties was dictated by the whole course of the development of Soviet higher education. In *Pravda* of 5

February 1921, V. I. Lenin wrote that "Communists alone must determine the content of the curricula, in so far as this concerns general educational subjects, and particularly philosophy, the social sciences and communist education".*

There were immense difficulties involved in the fulfilment of this task, mainly in connection with the severe shortage of specialists in the social and economic sciences. In August 1924 the CC of the RCP(B) sent more than 60 prominent Party workers to do teaching work in higher educational institutions.

The need for teaching cadres was, however, so great that it even became necessary to employ people with wavering ideological positions to lecture in the social and political sciences. These were well-versed specialists, but they had to have "an eye kept on them" to prevent them from turning their university faculty into a tribune for propagating anti-Bolshevik views.

Party and Soviet organs attached great importance to organising study courses on Marxist theory for the intelligentsia, beginning with its leading sections. V. I. Lenin devoted much attention to this question and considered that all teachers in higher educational institutions, especially teachers of social and political science, should be obliged to study the fundamentals of Marxism.

Study circles, scientific associations of Marxists, courses, seminars and symposia were organised in higher educational institutions. For instance, in 1924 many professors and teachers in the mathematics and physics faculty of Moscow University belonged to a study circle on Marxism. When a teachers' study circle on historical materialism was set up at the Urals University, interest in it surpassed all expectations. The scientific association of Marxists at Petrograd University also widened the scope of its activities.

At the same time measures were taken to give young people of worker and peasant origin and Communists training as scientific Marxist teaching cadres. In 1921, the first institute for training specialists in the social and economic sciences was created. This was the Red Professorate Institute from which there graduated hundreds of highly qualified historians, economists and philosophers. The training of social sciences specialists was also done by the institutes of the Association of Social Sciences Research Institutes of Russia and by the social sciences faculties of the universities.

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 121.

The old professorate's path to joint work with the Soviet state was a hard and difficult one. Nevertheless it was a natural and unavoidable process brought about by the whole course of social development. In the period in question, this process had not yet ended, but it was just at that time that the Party and the state managed to obtain some decisive changes in the feelings and world outlook of a majority of professors and teachers in higher education. As early as mid-1925 the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR was able to note in one of its resolutions that considerable changes had taken place in the ideological make-up and feelings of the professorate and that a volte-face by them in favour of the new system was taking place. The Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR emphasised that it attached extraordinary importance to this phenomenon as well as to the parallel change taking place in general amongst the scientists of the Republic.

The central Party and Soviet organs took measures to develop scientific research work and to create the conditions needed by the scientists. To mark the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of Professor N. Y. Zhukovsky's scientific activity and his immense merits as the father of Russian aviation, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, in a special decree, signed by Lenin, instituted a Zhukovsky Prize for the best mathematical and mechanical studies of the year and also gave a number of personal privileges to Zhukovsky himself. The Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR also passed resolutions on improving work conditions for I. P. Pavlov, K. E. Tsiolkovsky and several other scientists.

When I. M. Gubkin's research was crowned with its first big successes, Lenin suggested that the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council should provide funds for the continuation of this work and award orders (and a large sum of money) to this group of researchers.

The Central Commission for the Improvement of Conditions of Life of Scientists, which in 1921, on the initiative of Lenin and with the close participation of Gorky, was instituted by the Soviet Government, testifies to the concern for scientific workers. Two million nine hundred thousand gold rubles were released to meet the commission's primary needs. The commission engaged in the distribution of the so-called "academic rations"* and monetary grants, defended the

* A monthly grant of natural produce which was given to workers in science, technology, literature and the arts during the years of economic hardship (1918-1923).

housing rights of scientists and so on. Special rest homes for scientists and sanatoria for aged scientists and their families were opened in the Caucasus and around Moscow. The House of Scientists was opened in Moscow.

It should be emphasised that the Government's decision to create the Central Commission for the Improvement of Conditions of Life of Scientists and also a number of other enactments to improve the situation of the intelligentsia were taken during a particularly difficult period for the Soviet state, when terrible famines were raging in all the central regions of the country: workers were having to stay on hunger rations and peasants feed themselves on grass and tree-bark. These facts once again show how many heavy sacrifices the Soviet state made when it came to preserving scientific and cultural cadres.

The material help afforded to the scientists by the Soviet state was one of the factors in their change of attitude towards the dictatorship of the proletariat. But what was most important was that this made manifest the state's care about the development of science and the drawing of scientists into the quick of creative work in the building of a new economy and culture. Scientists began to see more and more clearly that in the conditions of the building of socialism science received the widest of scopes for its overall development and that a scientist had every opportunity to put his conclusions and theories into practice.

All the activities of the Soviet state clearly testified to the fact that statements about the value of science to the building of a new society were not empty phrases and that science was an absolutely necessary and basic element of this building. Becoming convinced of this by their own experience, the scientists, without agreeing with the Soviet state about everything, nevertheless entered into an efficient and creative co-operation with it.

The first Petrograd conference of scientific workers held on 5-6 November 1923 was an important event and one which occasioned a notable change in the feelings of a considerable proportion of scientists, professors and teachers in higher education. Many scientists who addressed the conference expressed their genuine desire to work in full contact with the Soviet Government. Similar conferences were held in other towns as well.

The period of restoration of the national economy was one of many considerable achievements in the development of science both in the theoretical field and that of the concrete application of theory to the building of socialism. The planned development

of science in accordance with the needs of the national economy was a new principle in the history of Soviet and world science. The idea of introducing a planned basis to science was seen by many scientists as unrealistic and a "Bolshevik invention". Some of them feared that the planning of science would limit individual creativity and that the attempt to set up an interconnection between scientific research and the national economy would lead to the decline of science.

There were, however, at that time people in the scientific world who already understood that rapid scientific and technological progress could not be achieved in the quiet of the laboratories and that "anarchism" in science and scientific research was not to be tolerated. These scientists saw that their "personal plans" must be dedicated to the scientific problems which were most important to the growth of the economy and culture of the nation.

Considerable scientific forces were enlisted in the supreme state planning organ—the USSR State Planning Commission (Gosplan). Prominent scientific personages also worked as consultants to the People's Commissariats as well as occupying important positions in the economic organs.

In June 1925, the Soviet Government passed a resolution entitled "On the Institution of the Lenin Prize for Scientific Work". This enactment meant that the Soviet state intended to encourage scientists working along the lines closest to Lenin's ideas, that is to say lines orientated towards a close link between science and practice.

Soviet reality daily confirmed the Leninist idea that the specialist would reach an understanding of the socialist ideals through the facts of his own science. For the professorial and teaching staff and the scientific workers the first half of the 1920s was a period of delimitation and great changes in world outlook. It was also one when an important step was made by this section of the intelligentsia in the transition to active participation in the building of socialism.

THE QUESTION OF "FELLOW-TRAVELLERS" IN LITERATURE AND ART

To overcome the bourgeoisie's ideological influence on the intelligentsia the Party and Soviet cadres had to show immense erudition, have a concrete understanding of the actual condi-

tions, take stock of the correlation of forces and be flexible and tactful. It was impossible to "abolish" bourgeois ideology; it could only be overcome by means of systematic ideological influence on the bearers of its remnants. The activity of the Party amongst the artistic intelligentsia is an example of the Communist Party's flexible yet determined policy of bringing ideological pressure to bear on non-proletarian elements.

Literature and art represent a most important element in the spiritual life of society. The Party was of course not indifferent as to which way the "ideological wind" was blowing there.

The main aim of the Party in the field of literature and art during the period in question was to support the development of the new culture and help the artistic intelligentsia which showed any sign of being close to the new system to overcome the influence of bourgeois ideology and take up a position of active participation in the building of socialism.

The artistic intelligentsia which had been formed before the revolution was gradually coming to understand the new reality. The differentiation process which had begun within it immediately after the October Revolution continued and penetrated further.

The transition to the New Economic Policy entailed a renewed intensification of ideological contradictions. Many members of the old artistic intelligentsia sailed under the flag of militant non-partisanship and "pure art". The poet Andrei Bely took the defence of apoliticism and non-partisanship to such an extent that it amounted to an apologia for Philistinism or even raising Philistinism to some kind of philosophical principle. "I am disgusted," he wrote, "by any smack of Party spirit, acting consciously 'for the good of others'.... Of two evils: being a small live frog, or a dead frog, torn asunder by a false strive to greatness, I prefer to remain a live frog; and—become a Philistine."

Some artists, not agreeing on everything with the Soviet state, tried to explain why they lived and worked in Soviet Russia where the working class led by the Bolshevik Party was in power. This, for instance, is what the writer Boris Pilnyak said in his book *Fragments from My Diary*: "...I am not a Communist and therefore do not recognise that I ought to be a Communist and write in a communist way. I do recognise that communist power in Russia was determined—not by the will of the Communists, but by Russia's historical destiny, and, insofar as I want to follow (as far as I am able and how my conscience and mind dictate) this historical destiny of Russia, I am with the Communists, that is to say insofar as the Communists are with

Russia, I am with them (now, today, even more than before, as my way is not with the Philistines). I acknowledge that the fate of the Communist Party of Russia is far less interesting to me than the fate of Russia: to me the Communist Party is only one link in the history of Russia."

But at the same time a considerable group in literature and the arts separated itself from the artistic intelligentsia. This group tried to accept the revolution not only as an accomplished fact but to remould its world outlook and understand what the revolution had brought to the characters of people and to human relations as a whole. Naturally, this was a very difficult and complicated process for them: writers, painters, artists and others had, first of all, to change the themes and ideological direction of their work, and this of course presumed a change of their whole world outlook. Such metamorphoses are not easy and are not achieved painlessly. In addition, the creative methods, the whole complex of descriptive means and the creative manner of the artists all of which were already formed, were of no little importance. Sometimes the artist's creative methods were good for describing pre-revolutionary reality, but turned out to be completely unfit to speak truthfully and on a high artistic level about the revolution and its people. Not only the aims and tasks of literature and art in the new society, but also the way in which the artist expressed himself became the subject of battle. Thus the conflict on socio-political and outlook grounds became intertwined with the field of aesthetics. This is why it was impossible to demand or expect artistic workers instantly to go over to the revolutionary camp. If they did not hide their political colours, and refrained from chameleon-like behaviour, but expounded as the expression then had it "non-partisan humanitarian liberalism", then this alone already made it possible for those artists to relate with understanding and show sensitivity towards all that was good and useful which, according to them, the state was doing for the people, but a state as yet still alien to them.

Lunacharsky painted a very true and vivid picture of the relations between that section of the intelligentsia and the Soviet state when speaking of the prominent artist and "elder of the Maly Theatre", A. I. Yuzhin: "It would be strange, of course, to expect revolutionary pathos from Yuzhin. It would be strange to expect a revolution in the theatre from him. In this respect he is a conservative, but a conservative in the same sense as a man protecting plants in a green-house.

"Indeed, it is pointless to look for revolutionarism in Yuzhin in the sense in which we understand the word, which is the only

correct sense. But one can imagine this dialogue between ourselves and the old artist. It did in fact take place on more than one occasion and almost word for word, not only between him and me, but also between him and other representatives of the Soviet state.

"He says to us: 'I am not demanding a miracle from you, I do not demand that you bring to the earth the socialist heaven which you promise to the popular masses. I know that yours is a difficult struggle, in which at times your strength wanes, but I believe that you do want the greatest good; I believe that you have great strength and great prospects before you. Time will tell, but in any case you must not trample down the treasures inherited from the past.'

"And we answer him: 'We too are not demanding a miracle from you. We know that you belong to another phalanx and cannot suddenly bloom with the roses of revolution, but we know that you bring us with a gentle hand the most fragrant and delicate flowers left to us by past generations, and we know that in our still very early spring, our soil still so bare of flowers is in need of the gift you bring.'

"That is the unwritten constitution which exists between the Soviet state and the best representatives of the old arts."*

While fighting their enemies, the Communist Party and the Soviet state fought also for their friends, helping them to free themselves from hostile ideological influences and gradually to come closer to the people. This process was characteristic in all fields of cultural development in the first years of Soviet power.

The Communist Party's fight to attract the so-called "fellow-travellers" to the building of socialism occupies a special page in the history of Soviet culture and of the intelligentsia. This term was applied in the 1920s to people in literature and art who were trying to understand the revolutionary changes, take part in the new life, and contribute to the measure of their strength and ability to its development. They accepted the revolution but did not have a clear grasp of its tasks and aims. The term "fellow-traveller" used in Soviet literature, especially about writers, does not express the essence and particularities of the process which the intelligentsia went through. A "fellow-traveller" is a chance companion, a person who temporarily and only outwardly joins with some social movement without being inwardly bound to it. An analysis of social life in the 1920s

* Central State Archives of Literature and Art, Folio 2328, File 1, Document 1324, pp. 151-52.

convinces one, however, that writers, artists, painters and other literary and artistic figures were not chance fellow-travellers only until a certain "station". They were people who had sought and found their way to understanding the revolution and the ideals of socialism.

In determining its attitude to the "fellow-travellers" the Party proceeded from the assumption that writers and people in the arts would, as the building of socialism continued, manage to find a way to overcome alien ideological influences.

The "fellow-travellers" issue was very complicated and serious. The Communist Party and the "fellow-travellers" themselves had a direct interest in solving it correctly. It proved to be a constituent part of a wider and more important problem, that of the assimilation of the cultural heritage of the past and including elements of it in the new culture which was growing up. Naturally, such a complicated process could not take place smoothly and painlessly and without mistakes, difficulties, conflicts or battles. All these are to be found in the cultural life of the country at that time.

The problem of the "fellow-travellers" drew the attention of the whole Soviet public. Passions boiled around it and discussions and arguments arose in which prominent Party workers, writers and critics took part. In the course of these discussions two points of view took shape, for the most part, if not completely, mutually exclusive. One of them had its main links with the journal *Krasnaya nov* (Red Virgin Soil) and its editor A. K. Voronsky, a renowned critic and organiser of literary forces of the country in the 1920s.

In the first years of its existence the monthly journal *Krasnaya nov* (founded in 1921) was successful in attracting to the side of the Soviet state the most vital forces of the old intelligentsia, including some who were still vacillating and whose political outlook had, as yet, not taken shape. It also discovered and supported new talents, created a broad front for Soviet literature and battled against bourgeois ideology and the "internal" and foreign émigrés. The journal tried to unite within its pages writers from the most different literary groups and with the most varied styles.

The writings of young Soviet authors just entering literature in those years appeared in the journal: Vsevolod Ivanov, Konstantin Fedin, Mikhail Zoshchenko, Nikolai Aseyev, Fyodor Gladkov, Lydia Scifullina, Alexander Neverov, Leonid Leonov, Alexander Malyshkin, Nikolai Lyashko, Artyom Vesoly, Larissa Reisner, Vasily Kazin, Eduard Bagritsky, Isaak Babel and many others.

Voronsky also enlisted the participation on *Krasnaya nov* of writers and poets who had entered the literary field before the revolution: Vikenty Veresayev, Konstantin Trenyov, Valery Bryusov, Alexei Tolstoi, Mikhail Prishvin, Sergei Sergeev-Tsensky, Boris Pasternak, Olga Forsh, Marietta Shaginyan, Vyacheslav Shishkov, Ilya Ehrenburg, Alexei Chapygin, Ivan Sokolov-Mikitov, Vladimir Mayakovsky, Sergei Yesenin and others.

Voronsky, defending the importance and fruitfulness of work with the non-partisan intelligentsia, said: "Work must continue in the future and further rallying of the non-partisan and vacillating writers must go on in such a way that they should link their destinies and their writings closer and more organically with the destiny of the October Revolution and of the proletariat and promote the union of the Party with the peasantry and the intelligentsia... Flexibility and caution in approaching the fellow-travellers must not, of course, be accompanied by concealment of their ideological and artistic lapses."*

A. Voronsky and the group that had united around the journal *Krasnaya nov* did, however, make some serious mistakes. While declaring the need for a tactful and delicate approach to the old writers (and actually doing this in practice), Voronsky did not believe it was possible to create a new culture. By his prejudiced approach in appraising new literary forces, Voronsky saw talents mainly amongst the "fellow-travellers" whom he considered to be the genuine descendants of the classics and to have crossed "the aesthetic bridge between the old art and the art of today". Voronsky defended the "fellow-travellers" from unfair attacks and accusations, but he also praised some writers undeservedly and was indulgent about their ideological waverings and the alien views which got into their works.

A. Voronsky's mistaken opinions and his prejudice for "fellow-traveller" writers exposed him to fair criticism from the Party and the writing community. When A. V. Lunacharsky called Voronsky "one of the most educated and serious representatives of our artistic and scientific-artistic communist world" and "the main organiser of the literary life of the intermediate period", he also commented on his mistakes: "Obligingness towards the intelligentsia which has accepted the October Revolution has been carried to the point of courting it, to exaggerating its strength and underestimating its weaknesses and the false notes in its writings. It has also led to a somewhat

* Central State Archives of Literature and Art, Folio 1968, File 1, Document 848, pp. 5-6.

scornful attitude to the rapidly rising shoots of a pure-proletarian literature.”*

However, A. Voronsky's serious mistakes, including ones of world outlook, do not, taken overall, cancel out the importance of his fruitful and useful activity in attracting vigorous literary forces to the building of socialist culture.

A contrary opinion about the “fellow-travellers” was expressed by members of some groups of proletarian writers and artists (the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers, the Artists' Association of Revolutionary Russia, the Left Artistic Front (LEF)** *Kuznitsa* (The Forge)*** and others. These groups, without a doubt, played a positive role in organising young proletarian cadres in literature and the arts. At the same time, however, there was also much that was negative in their activity: “Leftism”, splintering, sectarianism, and a tendency to vulgarise sociology in dealing with theoretical questions.

The sharp attacks by some proletarian creative groups on writers and artists who were not in these organisations had particularly negative effects. “Left” criticism treated writers and artistic figures from the democratic intelligentsia—the “fellow-travellers”—with particular prejudice and at times hostility. The resolution of the 1st All-Union Conference of Proletarian Writers (1925) shows what political meaning they gave to this term: “The most prevalent type of ‘fellow-traveller’ is a writer who misrepresents the revolution in his works and often slanders it, who is permeated by the spirit of nationalism, Great-Power chauvinism and mysticism.... ‘Fellow-traveller’ literature is basically literature directed *against* the proletarian revolution.” A classification of “fellow-travellers” was worked out in detail: plain fellow-travellers, internal fellow-travellers, Left fellow-travellers, internal émigrés, neo-bourgeois writers and so on. Criticism in the press at times turned into coarse abuse and was accompanied by threats and insults. It even reached such a pitch that in the storm of literary polemics Mayakovsky and Gorky were treated as “fellow-travellers”.

* A. Lunacharsky, “Étapy rosta sovetskoi literatury” (The Stages of Soviet Literature's Progress) in *Na literaturnom postu*, No. 22-23, 1927, p. 19.

** The Left Artistic Front was a literary group existing in Moscow in 1923-1930. The literary views of the members of the group were connected to the Futurist school. The group published the journals *Lef* (its Russian initials) from 1923-1925 and *New Lef* from 1927-1928.

*** *Kuznitsa* was a journal founded by a group of Soviet poets who had left the Proletcult in 1920. The journal's themes were the poetry of work, comradeship, class solidarity and revolutionary romanticism. Its literary group existed until 1928.

The incorrect interpretation of the meaning of “fellow-traveller” led to it being said that the “fellow-traveller” writer should be kept under the vigilant supervision of his proletarian colleagues. If a “fellow-traveller” recognised one or other group of proletarian writers as the only one expressing communist tendencies in literature, he could then count on their support and approval. But if he declined to follow the directions of the leaders of these groups, he immediately stopped being a “fellow-traveller” and was a counter-revolutionary who should be “denounced”. The organ of the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers, the journal *Na postu* (On Duty), which had taken up extreme Left positions, printed abusive and scathing political accusations and gladly attached various kinds of political labels to the “fellow-travellers” by mechanically applying the terminology of the political battles to literary and artistic phenomena.

It should also be noted that many of the “fellow-travellers” did in fact hold on to un-Soviet views and tried to force them through into print. The merit of the journal *Na postu* was that it spoke in favour of organising and supporting the young proletarian literary forces and subjected anti-Soviet tendencies in literature to deserved criticism. The editors of the journal did not, however, take into account either the concrete conditions of the development of literature or the complexity of the ideological battle. The writers who grouped themselves round the journal *Na postu* rejected the very idea that members of the old intelligentsia could “step into new shoes” and adopt a socialist ideology. They could not understand that the question was one of which policy was the most reasonable, of how to attract to oneself the most friends, and of how to isolate and neutralise ill-wishers.

The “slaughter” organised by the “Left” critics was rejected in the first place by Party organisations and in the writing community. Lunacharsky said that “when speeches are dispensed full of some kind of agitated irritation about the ‘fellow-travellers’ being chameleons and bootlickers, pot-boiler writers and so on, we must oppose this with all our strength”.

For the most part unfounded, these attacks by the narrow sectarian and vulgarised sociological critics brought rightful indignation from many writers and workers in the arts. This can be seen, for example, in the letter of a group of writers which was made public at a literary meeting at the Press Department of the CC of the RCP(B) in May 1924. The letter read in part: “We believe that the paths of contemporary Russian literature—and thus ours as well—are linked to the paths of Soviet post-

revolutionary Russia.... We welcome the new worker and peasant writers who are coming into literature now. In no way whatsoever do we contrast ourselves with them or consider them to be hostile or alien to us. Their work and our work is the common work of contemporary Russian literature going in one direction and towards a single aim.

"The new paths of the new Soviet literature are hard ones, and mistakes will inevitably be made. Our mistakes weigh heaviest on our own shoulders. But we protest against the sweeping attacks on us. The tone of such journals as *Na postu* and their criticism, which in addition gives itself out to be the opinion of the RCP as a whole, approaches our literary work in a deliberately prejudiced and unfair way. We consider it necessary to declare that such an attitude towards literature is unworthy both of literature and of the revolution and demoralises the mass of writers and readers. We, the writers of Soviet Russia, are convinced that our writer's work is both necessary and useful to it." The letter was signed by 37 people in all, amongst whom A. Tolstoi, M. Zoshchenko, V. Kaverin, M. Prishvin and S. Yesenin.

The abnormal situation which was developing in the literary world could not but alarm the CC of the RCP(B). The question of guidance for the development of literature was put on the "order of the day", to use the wording of the resolution of the 12th Party Congress.

In May 1924 an enlarged meeting at the Press Department of the CC of the RCP(B) was held, with Party workers, journalists, writers and critics taking part in its work. It dealt with the tasks of the Party in guiding the literary movement, organising the forces of proletarian literature, and those concerning the "fellow-travellers". Its resolution expressed the Party's desire to help all honest writers to take up the correct ideological position and become active defenders of the achievements of the revolution. The meeting passed a motion for the support of proletarian literature. It also condemned the incorrect and harmful tactic of "battling" the "fellow-traveller" writers.

The polemic, however, continued. In fact, the literary world split into two camps. The first was led by the journal *Krasnaya nov* which was joined by the journals *Pechat i revoliutsia* (Press and Revolution) and *Sibirskiyе ogni* (Siberian Lights) and the second consisted of the journals *Na postu*, *Molodaya gvardiya* (The Young Guard), *Oktyabr* (October), and at times *Zvezda* (The Star). The quarrel between these two "camps" broached the most important problems of the development of Soviet literature.

The Communist Party continued to devote great attention to the situation in literature. In early 1925 several meetings of the Literary Commission were held at the CC of the RCP(B). Prominent Party workers wrote articles on questions of literary policy. An article by I. Vareikis entitled "On Our Line on Literature and on the Proletarian Writers" published in *Pravda* in February 1925 was important in defining the Party line. In it he raised the problem of all-round support for worker and peasant writers and also criticised the attitude of the journal *Na postu* towards the "fellow-travellers".

At a meeting of the Literary Commission at the CC of the Party on 3 March 1925, M. V. Frunze noted the mistakes of both "camps" and announced that Comrade Voronsky, the editor of the journal *Krasnaya nov*, needed for one to meet the proletarian youth face to face and conversely that those on the journal *Na postu* should meet the "fellow-travellers".

A. V. Lunacharsky also had his say in the discussion on the role and place of the "fellow-travellers". At a debate on the subject "The First Stones of the New Culture" which took place on 9 February 1925, he said that the petty bourgeoisie was the social soil from which "fellow-travelling" emerged. Despite the "fellow-travellers" many illusions and vacillations, despite the fact that they often "waltzed with suspicious ladies now to the right and now to the left", they, Lunacharsky was firmly convinced, had a deep aversion for the bourgeois system and were not enemies of the revolution. The "fellow-travellers", in Lunacharsky's opinion, were people who "can produce a certain amount of talented works ... but they should be put in their proper place and not acquiesce in that it is they who are the real literature, and the main force in the building of our culture".

With regard to the intelligentsia, Lunacharsky proposed the formula: "He who is against the bourgeoisie is with us."*

The Party line in literature and art was most fully expressed in the resolution of the CC of the RCP(B) "Party Policy in the Field of Literature" which was passed on 18 June and published in *Pravda*. The Central Committee of the Party emphasised that it was imperative to wage a decisive battle against all manifestations of bourgeois ideology in literature, against "anti-revolutionary elements" and sharply criticised conciliatory and capitulationist attitudes. But at the same time the Central Committee of the Party cautioned against sweepingly lumping all "fellow-travellers" in the camp of the enemies of the

* A. V. Lunacharsky, *Ob intelligentsii*, Moscow, 1923, p. 19.

revolution. "A general directive must here be one of a tactful and cautious relations with them, that is to say an approach which will meet all the conditions for their speediest transition to the side of communist ideology." At the same time criticism was to "show the greatest tact, caution and patience regarding all the literary strata which could go with the proletariat and would do so".

The resolution opposed the administration of literature and supported free competition between the various groups and currents in the field of literary form. "While discerning unmistakably the social and class content of the literary trends, the Party as a whole cannot in any way adhere to any one trend in the *field of literary form*."

This document was extremely important in the ideological rallying of Soviet writers and in the elimination of distortions in the literary movement. It defined the character of the process of literary development and the path which writers ought to follow regardless of the groups to which they adhered. This resolution of the Central Committee of the Party also had a great influence on the development of the Soviet theatre, painting, sculpture and cinematography.

It was not accidental that the 1920s marked the appearance of great literary and artistic works: the young Soviet culture was coming out onto the broad road of tempestuous development.

* * *

Great changes thus took place in the position and world outlook of the intelligentsia during the first ten years of Soviet power. An overwhelming section of the intelligentsia changed from a force hostile in its mass to the ideals of socialism to one which co-operated with the Soviet state. The intelligentsia (whether individual groups within it wished it or not) was objectively a great help to the working class and the peasantry in organising the management of the economy, restoring it where it had been wrecked and in developing culture.

The delimitation process of individual groups of the intelligentsia took place both under the influence of the socialist transformation of the country and parallelly with it. One of these groups, a relatively small one (a section of the engineering, technological and scientific workers and members of the artistic intelligentsia), remained as before an enemy of the new system waiting for a suitable occasion on which to come out in support of a restoration of the bourgeois regime. This stratum of the intelligentsia consisted of the better qualified specialists

occupying important posts in the national economy or playing important parts in the cultural life of the country. It was impossible to remove them from their work since there was no one to replace them. This was a circumstance which had to be taken into consideration.

The largest group of the intelligentsia was, as formerly, a mass of for the most part politically inert people trying to keep themselves merely in the sphere of industrial or scientific interests. Nevertheless, profound changes took place in this group. The heroic work of the working class and the peasantry, the political and labour enthusiasm of the toiling masses, the policy of the Communist Party and the activity of trade union and other social organisations all gradually drew the intelligentsia into the new life. In honestly helping the Soviet state in the industrial field, the members of the intelligentsia were drawn little by little into the social life of the country and gradually became conscientious participants in the building of socialism.

Finally, one further characteristic of the period in question should be noted: the steady growth of the stratum of the intelligentsia which fully and inseparably linked its fate with the fate of the working class and the cause of building socialism. This section of the intelligentsia showed itself to be the reliable support of the Communist Party and the working class in all their undertakings and in their battle to re-educate the old intelligentsia as a new, Soviet one. The influence of this group on the remaining mass of the intelligentsia increased and expanded year by year. The years of restoration of the national economy showed that the Communist Party had chosen the correct way to solve the question of the cadres of the old society. Groups of the intelligentsia of considerable size actively co-operated with the Soviet state. This signified that important steps in breaking away the intelligentsia from the bourgeoisie had been made and that a firm foundation had been laid to the union between the intellectuals and the working class which was building socialism.

The measures put into practice by the Communist Party during the restoration period to attract the workers by brain to the service of the workers' and peasants' state were of major significance to the old intelligentsia. Nevertheless the problem was not yet completely solved. The Communist Party and the working class still needed to do a great deal to finally break away the old intelligentsia from its bourgeois past and for them to become entirely Soviet by their internal convictions.

THE OLD INTELLIGENTSIA DURING
THE PERIOD OF THE RESTORATION
OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY
AND THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN

THE PARTY'S POLICY ON THE INDUSTRIALISATION
OF THE COUNTRY AND THE COLLECTIVISATION
OF AGRICULTURE AND THE SCIENTIFIC
AND TECHNOLOGICAL INTELLIGENTSIA

The restoration of the national economy was in the main completed in 1926. The USSR reached, and in some branches of the economy exceeded, the pre-war levels of production. This was, however, insufficient for a radical reconstruction of the national economy.

Guided by the Leninist plan for the building of socialism, the Communist Party and its Central Committee elaborated a scientifically based programme for the industrialisation of the country, the collectivisation of agriculture and cultural development. This programme envisaged the priority growth of heavy industry which made the means of production. It was only on the basis of the all-round development of industry that the other major problem in the building of socialism — the collectivisation of agriculture — could be solved.

The programme for the building of socialism in the Land of Soviets was given concrete expression in Party Congress and Soviet Government resolutions and also in the five-year plans for the development of the national economy and culture of the country.

In solving the task of radically reconstructing the national economy and building socialism specific difficulties were encountered amongst which by no means the least important problem was that of providing the national economy with highly qualified specialists. During the first ten years of Soviet power educational institutions trained 340 thousand specialists with higher education and 198 thousand with special secondary education. Despite this, there was still a shortage of new workers by brain. At the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan more than one-third of the specialists working in the national

economy were members of the old intelligentsia and this proportion reached some 60 per cent in the higher educational institutions and scientific establishments.

The old intelligentsia still presented a very motley picture in its ideological and political make-up. A. V. Lunacharsky commented on this in his article "The Intelligentsia and Socialism": "Here we have as it were a whole bundle, a whole series of social types: some have not sorted themselves out at all and stick to the level of apolitical Philistinism; others are simply conscientious workers for Soviet wages; a third group sympathises with us to a certain extent but does not believe in our strength; a fourth goes and works with us but there is quite a lot it does not like and, incidentally, feels that the rights granted to the intelligentsia are insufficient; a fifth completely accepts the general line of the Party, and, while it vacillates on particular questions, is all the same a genuine ally; and a sixth can be genuine Communists without Party cards in their pockets."

The period of reconstruction of the national economy was one of a general and definitive reappraisal of values and saw the formation of a public-spirited type of intelligentsia to whom the interests of socialism were dear. The intelligentsia as a whole greeted with satisfaction the Party's course for the industrialisation of the country and the collectivisation of agriculture.

The Party and the Government enlisted a broad range of representatives of the old intelligentsia to draw up and discuss the First Five-Year Plan. Hundreds of economists, scientific workers, engineers and others worked on the drawing up of the Five-Year Plan in the planning departments of the Supreme Economic Council, in the USSR State Planning Commission and the State Planning Commissions of the Union Republics.

The programme for creating powerful agricultural production was also met with approval and support on the part of the agricultural specialists. In some places agronomy specialists organised the first kolkhozes. In 1928 the noted scientist V. R. Williams substantiated the thesis that petty individual farming was "an agronomic absurdity and a harmful utopia". This conclusion in fact corresponded to the Communist Party's agrarian programme. The natural and logical consequence of the scientist's position was Williams' declaration, handed in the same year, that he wished to be accepted into the Communist Party: "I am fully conscious that because of my age [65] I cannot take a very pronounced and active part in the work of the Party, but I make so bold as to think that my specialist knowledge may be of use in the most urgent of the Party's

tasks — the training of a young generation of Red specialists in the field now of major importance — that of attaining commanding heights in science, and the no less important field of organising agricultural production. On these fronts I remain still full of strength." Williams was very well known in the agronomic and scientific communities. His position influenced agronomists and scientists, and set them again to thinking over the importance of the gigantic work in the socialist transformation of agriculture which was being carried out by the Communist Party.

The majority of the members of the old intelligentsia joined in the work to realise the plans for the building of socialism. They were attracted to the Communist Party's plans by the perspectives they saw for a rapid upsurge in the productive forces of the country and the possibility for scientific, technological and cultural workers to put their creative and organisational talents to full use. The old intelligentsia brought forth its labour heroes on the front of the building of socialism. These were people devoted to the cause, enjoying the complete trust of the toiling masses and who had been honoured with high government awards. Thousands of workers by brain, who just a few years earlier had not believed in socialism of any kind and had observed with unconcealed scepticism the efforts of the new state to get out of the chaos of devastation, managed both to find their place in the general ranks during the tempestuous development of industry, and also to understand the grandeur of the aims of the building of socialism.

A small but very influential and authoritative section of the old intelligentsia still felt, however, a strong spirit of distrust for the aims set by the Communist Party and they generally adopted a sceptical and sometimes even hostile attitude to the industrialisation plans. It is not surprising that subversive organisations which tried to throw the country off the socialist path should have been formed in their midst.

In the late 1920s the organs of the Amalgamated State Political Administration (the new name taken in 1922 by the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission) uncovered a number of subversive counter-revolutionary organisations: the Shakhty sabotage group,* the so-called "Prompartiya"** and others.

* The Shakhty sabotage group was a subversive counter-revolutionary organisation which, on instructions from the foreign whiteguard centre and the secret services of imperialist states, operated in the Donbas coal region and in particular the Shakhty region (hence their name). The trial of the Shakhty case took place in Moscow (18 May-5 July 1928).

** The "Prompartiya" (Industrial Party) was an underground organisation

These groups consisted mainly of members of the old technological intelligentsia. The saboteurs aimed to destroy the main industrial centres and undermine the economic strength of the Soviet Union to help the imperialist powers organise intervention against the country building socialism and restore the capitalist regime.

The elements with anti-Soviet feelings who were convinced that the result of the New Economic Policy at the end of the restoration period would be a transition to the strengthening of bourgeois principles in Soviet state policy were cruelly deceived in their expectations. The transition from the restoration to the reconstruction period demonstrated that the socialist positions of the national economy were not only not shaken, but had gained considerable strength. As early as 1924-1925, the share of the socialist sector in the gross production of heavy industry was over 96 per cent. The hopes of the remains of the bourgeoisie for a degeneration of Soviet power gradually fell, and the question of the violent overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat was raised again.

One of the elements in the preparation of such an overthrow was organised sabotage by the ruling clique of the old technological intelligentsia in the more important branches of the national economy.

There was no serious political force of any kind inside the country behind the saboteurs and their main stake was therefore on foreign intervention.

The political feelings of the saboteurs did not, of course, signify that the whole technological intelligentsia was counter-revolutionary. Evidence from the "Shakhty", "Prompartiya" and other trials showed that the subversive activities of the counter-revolutionary groups of old bourgeois specialists had not found a response amongst the wider circles of the intelligentsia.

The utter defeat of the subversive organisations was therefore by no means a "judgement on the intelligentsia" as the enemies of the Soviet state tried to represent it. In 1930, after the trial of the "Prompartiya", the Central Committee of the RCP(B) emphasised that the main mass of engineering and technological workers had nothing in common with the

active in the USSR in 1926-1930. Its membership came from the bourgeois technological intelligentsia hostile to the Soviet state. They acted on instructions from émigré capitalists and foreign secret services. The leaders of the "Prompartiya" were convicted by the Supreme Court of the USSR in Moscow on 7 December 1930.

saboteurs and that these workers had proved in practice their readiness to go hand in hand with the working class.

All the honest members of the intelligentsia firmly and decisively dissociated themselves from the criminal actions of the saboteurs who defamed the very name engineer or scientist. The engineering, technological and scientific workers, in their resolutions at numerous conferences and meetings and in telegrams to the Central Committee of the Party, to the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and to the Presidium of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, sharply condemned the actions of the saboteurs and expressed their readiness to give all their strength and knowledge to the cause of building socialism.

The subversive activities of the "Shakhty group", of the members of the "Prompartiya" and of other anti-Soviet groups created serious difficulties in a number of sectors in the building of socialism. These subversive groups and organisations were crushed by Soviet organs. The Soviet court, however, took into account the complete repentance of the criminals and considered it possible to limit itself to relatively light sentences for the majority of those on trial, and the Soviet Government granted those who had been sentenced to prison terms an opportunity to atone for their guilt towards the people by honest work.

Many of the former saboteurs not only genuinely condemned their criminal past, but in a very short time made valuable contributions to the development of industry and science for which they were accorded high awards by the Soviet state. Professor L. K. Ramzin, one of the main organisers and leaders of the "Prompartiya", whom the foreign imperialists had selected for dictator of a "democratic" Russia, already during his trial understood the mistake he had made acting against the workers' and peasants' state. In court Ramzin declared that if "the proletarian court and the Soviet state find it possible to spare my life, then I give my firm and inviolable promise to use it wholly to the strengthening of the Soviet state by dedicated, selfless and tireless work in the building of socialism...".*

The Soviet state took L. K. Ramzin at his word and was not found wrong. A talented scientist and a prominent heating specialist, he made a valuable contribution to the strengthening

* *Protsess "Prompartii" 25 noyabrya - 7 dekabrya 1930 g. Stenogramma sudbnogo protsessia i materialy, priobshchennyye k delu*, Moscow, 1931, p. 505.

of the industrial might of the USSR. Ramzin was awarded a State Prize of the first order for inventing a unique single-pass boiler.

One must not, however, overlook the fact that in a number of places, the trials of the saboteurs made for a very tense and abnormal situation amongst the technological intelligentsia. Some engineers and technicians felt that they were not trusted and that, if not that day, then the next, they too would be ranked with the saboteurs and endure the corresponding consequences. The reason for such feelings was the incorrect actions and exaggerations in relation to the intelligentsia which were allowed in various localities. Sometimes even the press would take up an incorrect position. Newspapers and journals were covered with notices and articles about sabotage in enterprises and organisations and the reader got the impression that saboteurs were ensconced in every branch of the national economy and very nearly in every enterprise. There were unfortunately cases of unlawful repressions of specialists. It was found that amongst the convicted specialists there was a considerable number of people who had had nothing to do with sabotage. Similar facts were noted in Moscow, the Northern Caucasus, the Urals region and in other districts of the country. Those wrongly convicted were soon rehabilitated and had all their citizen's rights restored to them. The widespread affirmation at that time that sabotage was taking place in all branches of industry was not true.

The cases of incorrect attitudes towards the intelligentsia, and in particular the technological intelligentsia, were in no way connected with the Communist Party's Leninist line on the intelligentsia which had been verified over many years of practice.

"I can authoritatively declare," was V. V. Kuibyshev's answer to a question put to him at a meeting of engineering and technological workers, "that any talk about the Government and the Party wanting to make even the very slightest change in its policy regarding the specialists is lying and slanderous.... And I, insofar as I am able, will in every way insist on an even more attentive attitude than there has been until now towards the honest and conscientiously working engineers."*

The plenary meeting of the Leningrad Regional Party Committee in 1929 severely criticised on principle cases of

* Central Party Archives, Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CC CPSU, Folio 79, File 1, Document 489, pp. 12-13.

groundless persecution of specialists. A resolution passed after a speech by S. M. Kirov pointed to the necessity of creating a healthy work situation for engineers and technicians in enterprises. The plenary meeting of the Siberian Territory Party Committee demanded "a decisive fight against the unhealthy feelings of backward groups of workers, decisive support for all honest and conscientious specialists, and that persecuting or running them down indiscriminately should in no way be tolerated".

Finally, in April 1928, the Central Committee of the Party, even after the trial of the "Shakhty group" when all the revolting anti-popular actions of the saboteur specialists had been laid bare, again emphasised that "the wide-scale enlistment of conscientious qualified specialists to industrial and technological work must on no account be interfered with because of the presence among them of feelings and prejudices which are in fact an inevitable heritage of the past, of the bourgeois regime".*

The Party attached great importance to explanatory work amongst the intelligentsia and charged its best propagandists and publicists with speaking to the masses of the intelligentsia to explain to them the Leninist policy on the cadres of the old society, keep the intelligentsia informed about current events, expose to them the true nature of subversion and explain the role and place of the intelligentsia in the building of socialism.

But explanatory work had to be conducted not only amongst the intelligentsia. Prejudice about the intelligentsia had to be eliminated in the working masses and in some executive and Party workers, at times high-ranking ones. J. V. Stalin,** referring to the "Shakhty" affair, characterised it as economic counter-revolution organised by a section of the bourgeois specialists. He also emphasised that it would be mistaken to suppose that the whole old intelligentsia was experiencing a feeling of dissatisfaction with the Soviet state: the vast majority of its members were making the transition to the side of the Soviet state.

The Communist Party, the Soviet state, and the whole Soviet people learnt important lessons from the exposure of the subversive activities. The plenary meeting of the CC of the CPSU(B) in April 1928 discussed the question of "The Shakhty

* *KPSS v rezolutsiyakh i resheniyakh ...*, Vol. 4, p. 88.

** J. V. Stalin (1879-1953) was at that time the General Secretary of the Party. He was elected to this post at the 11th Party Congress in 1922.

Affair and Practical Tasks in Fighting the Shortcomings of the Building of the Economy". The plenary meeting underlined that it was imperative to use the scientific and technological specialists in industry, in the transport system, etc. While mercilessly punishing malicious wreckers and saboteurs, the state organs improved labour conditions for the honest specialists devoted to their work, escalated the battle to eradicate neutrality and apoliticism in the intelligentsia and to draw it into the country's active social life.

The Party and the Soviet state derived one more immensely important lesson from the exposure of subversion: they urgently raised the question of accelerating the training of the new intelligentsia which the national economy so badly needed.

THE SURMOUNTING OF APOLITICISM
AND NEUTRALISM IN SPECIALISTS.
THE DEFINITIVE TRANSITION
OF THE OLD INTELLIGENTSIA TO THE SOCIALIST POSITION

Life itself obliged every member of the intelligentsia who had been formed before the revolution definitively to determine his social position. The plenary meeting of the CC of the CPSU(B) in November 1929 noted that "socio-political instability, neutralism and even hostility" were characteristic of a certain section of the old specialists. It had still been possible during the restoration period to tolerate political neutrality amongst a certain section of the intelligentsia (it was impossible to demand at short notice that it radically change its world outlook), but when socialism was advancing on a large scale all down the line the necessary conditions to overcome political neutrality and apoliticism had matured. The Communist Party and Soviet organs put the question in this way: scientists, engineers, agronomists and suchlike could correctly find their place in Soviet society if, alongside their professional knowledge, they had an understanding of the socio-economic meaning of the work done by them.

Were there many such members of the intelligentsia in the country? Here figures are irrelevant as they would not in this case express the real situation anyway. But it is safe to say that year by year, with each socio-political or economic success of the Land of Soviets, there gradually matured in the conscious-

ness of a great many members of the intelligentsia a new, Soviet understanding of reality.

This process was stimulated by the direct influence of the whole Soviet community which carried out the decisive battle to eradicate neutralism so that the main masses of the intelligentsia should become genuinely active and conscientious participants in the building of socialism.

The contents and methods of mass work amongst the intelligentsia changed to become more widely developed and politically acute.

The All-Union Association of Workers in Science and Technology for Assisting the Building of Socialism in the USSR which was founded in 1927 played a large part in refashioning the psychology of the intelligentsia and in liquidating the caste barriers and apoliticism of scientists, engineers, technicians, doctors, etc. The declaration of the initiating group of the association was printed in *Pravda* on 15 October 1927 and stated that "the basic guiding idea which unites us is the awareness that scientific and technological workers cannot, in a class society, remain politically neutral. In view of this, the basic aim of our association is to unite and organise the socialist-minded scientific and technological workers of the country". The statement was signed by the following prominent scientific and technological figures in the country: A. I. Abrikosov, I. G. Alexandrov, A. N. Bakh, N. F. Gamaleya, Y. M. Zavadovsky, M. M. Zavadovsky, B. I. Zbarsky, V. I. Kovalenkov, N. K. Koltsov, N. S. Kurnakov, D. I. Mushketov, A. I. Oparin, A. V. Palladin, A. A. Skochinsky and others.

The all-Union conference of the association (April 1928) announced in its address to the scientific and technological workers that "the intelligentsia must not be neutral in this significant period of peaceful economic and cultural development, and must take an active part in the business of planning and executing the capital building of the country's industry".

The association paid great attention to the ideological and political education of the intelligentsia and also was very helpful in the field of scientific propaganda, in assisting the worker and peasant inspection organs, in scientific and economic research and executing the building of the country's industry".

between industry and agriculture and between town and country. The organisation enjoyed great popularity amongst the intelligentsia. This is particularly confirmed by its rate of growth. In early 1929 it had 564 members, in 1930—1,537, in 1931 membership was 2,695 and by the end of 1932 it had 11 thousand members. The association turned into a mass

organisation expanding its ranks from the numbers of young specialists and highly qualified scientific and technological workers.

Socialist competition to fulfil the First Five-Year Plan (1928-1932) ahead of schedule also influenced the change in psychology of the old intelligentsia. Socialist competition took on a mass character. Thousands of shock brigades appeared everywhere in factories and enterprises and the number of shock workers in production also grew. The labour upsurge of the working class could not but captivate the best part of the intelligentsia. In a number of enterprises, in the Moscow Region in May 1929 for example, the engineers and technicians came forward as the initiators of the competition and took the lead. The Party and trade union organisations in Ryazan noted that the engineering and technological workers were leading the working masses in the competition. By the end of 1932, 60 per cent of the engineering and technological workers were taking part in socialist competition. The participation of the technological intelligentsia in socialist competition was yet another illustration of the profound changes that had taken place in the psychology of the intelligentsia.

The energetic participation of the intelligentsia in freeing Soviet industry from foreign dependence was an interesting indicator of the growing social activity of the intelligentsia. A great deal of work was carried out with the participation of the old engineers in 1931-1932 to decrease the number of requests from enterprises for imported equipment. Brigades of engineering and technological workers checked hundreds of thousands of applications and recommended considerable reductions in the number of orders from foreign firms for machinery and equipment which could be produced in home enterprises. An immense economy of foreign currency was achieved as a result. In 1932 on the recommendation of the engineering and technological sections foreign-made goods to the value of 200 million rubles were taken off the import list. This gigantic sum was used for financing the building of new industrial enterprises.

The activity of many scientific and technological workers was noted by the Government: hundreds of specialists, enthusiastic builders of socialism, were awarded decorations. Thus by the time the 5th Congress of Engineering and Technological Workers was convened (1932), over 300 specialists—most of them members of the older generation—had been awarded the Order of Lenin or the Order of the Red Banner of Labour.

The workers too valued highly the efforts of the scientists, engineers and technicians to rationalise production. Any technological innovation or valuable initiative introduced by the specialists received warm support from them. This is what the worker D. Kochergin declared in the name of the many thousands of workers of the Hammer and Sickle Factory at the 4th Congress of Engineering and Technological Workers in 1929:

"Workers know how to appreciate and are always grateful to science and scientific thought... I will give an example from our factory. A year or so ago our engineer leaders ... began to produce manganese steel and manganese steel castings.... Previously, this kind of steel had to be bought from abroad and be paid for with our gold. When our engineers found the boldness and initiative to smelt manganese steel and it was a success and this steel was produced on a mass scale, do you think the workers were not grateful for this?... And I believe that the workers of the whole Union will be grateful to the engineers who together with us speak and think the same language and thoughts."

An important indicator of the socio-political activity of the specialists was their growing desire to join the ranks of the Communist Party. In just a few districts of the country during a part of 1930, 3,500 applications were received including many from engineers and technicians with 15 or more years in production behind them. Before the 16th Party Congress (1930) over four thousand of the best engineering and technological workers decided to become Communists.

The historical successes of the Soviet people in the building of the state, the economy, and culture during the First Five-Year Plan had a decisive influence on the feelings of the old intelligentsia. The 5th All-Union Congress of Engineering and Technological Workers noted in its resolution that there had been "a decisive swing by the majority of the old technological intelligentsia in industry to the side of the Soviet state and to active participation in the building of socialism".

The first half of the 1930s was the period when the very term "old specialist", in other words a specialist who had once been a bourgeois in world outlook, fell into disuse. "We can now say that the old engineering profession is with us," noted G. K. Orjonikidze in 1934. "We can now declare that, with the exception of a few tiny groups and individuals ... amongst both young and old cadres, the old engineering profession is working with us."

The launching of socialist industrialisation and especially the Soviet people's battle to fulfil the first five-year plans ahead of

schedule, had a strong influence on the political feelings of the old technological intelligentsia. It was during this period that the process of transition by the old specialists to the side of the Soviet state, begun in October 1917, was accomplished.

The Communist Party's fight to draw the scientific forces of the country into the active building of socialism was extremely important. Work amongst the scientific intelligentsia was a complicated and difficult task for the Party, Soviet and trade union organisations. Cautious and flexible policies, immense tact and discretion were especially necessary in this area. Though the transition to socialist construction did not bring forth an ideological reappraisal of values on the part of many of the scientists, it did in any case serve as a basis for such a reappraisal in the near future. The leading article in *Pravda* on 9 February 1927 assessed the state of affairs in the scientific midst: "One would have to be blind not to see that the nine years of proletarian dictatorship were years of *growing rapprochement* between science, scientists, and technicians on the one hand and the proletariat on the other. The intelligentsia's alienation from the working class—produced by tsarist policy and the 'domestication' of the intelligentsia by the capitalists—has been finally crushed by the victorious growth of the proletarian state."

Party and social organisations frequently had to repulse various relapses into "Leftism" and attempts groundlessly to suspect the old professorate of improper actions. Despite individual mistakes, the Communists in the higher educational institutions found the correct way to work with the professorate. In early 1929, the Bureau of the Party cell in Moscow's Higher Technological School held a joint discussion with its activists on the question "Mutual Relations with the Professorate". During the discussion the Bureau of the cell condemned as incorrect and harmful speeches by individual Communists who considered that the whole old professorate were politically suspect and demanded that "finicking around with them cease". The Bureau of the cell passed a special resolution in which it paid especial attention to the inadmissibility of "Left"-wing deviations concerning the professorate.

A great deal of work was done to raise the scientific qualifications of the professorial and teaching staff in higher education. The conferment of degrees and titles was regulated. In 1938, for example, academic degrees and titles were conferred on 4,300 scientific workers. In that same year there were, in the higher educational institutions of the country, 40,500 scientific workers on the staff, including 4,600 profes-

sors, 11,700 assistant professors and 7,800 candidates of science.

Drawing the professorial and teaching staff into the professional and social life of the country, the Soviet state also trained new cadres at an increased rate. A young Soviet professorate which had received its scientific training in the years of Soviet power was coming to the relief of the old one. In the USSR in 1930, there were three thousand post-graduates, but by 1933 there were 14,800. In three years—from 1931 to 1934—6,600 people finished post-graduate studies. The stratum of Party members amongst the post-graduates also grew rapidly. It was during these years that the final transition of the workers in higher education to positions of active participation in the building of socialism was concluded. Scientific collectives, amongst which slogans for apoliticism and neutralism had earlier been particularly popular, also began to take part in socialist construction. The most important of these was the collective of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

The Communist Party and the Soviet state treated the traditions of the Academy very cautiously and carefully. Considerable financial support was given to the Academy of Sciences and the Government protected its autonomy in internal affairs, understanding that, regarding academics, it was necessary to use not constraint but persuasion. A. V. Lunacharsky said: "What could we demand of the Academy? That it should suddenly turn itself and all its members into a Communist conference, that it should promptly convert itself to Marxism, and, laying a hand on *Capital*, swear that it has become a most orthodox Bolshevik? I doubt whether we could go along with such development without a certain feeling of disgust. A change of that kind could not be genuine."*

But, while helping the country to a certain extent in the building of socialism, the Academy of Sciences still did not integrally link its activity with the plans for socialist construction. In fact it proved to be a sort of "state within a state", developing its activity on the basis of regulations formulated back in 1836. Many members of this scientific collective were working on subjects having nothing to do with the practical building of socialism. The requirements of socialist construction and of strengthening the defences of the country and the requirements for strengthening the moral and political unity of

* Central Party Archives, Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CC CPSU, Folio 142, File 1, Document 109, p. 16.

Soviet society made it pressing that the spirit of apoliticism and non-partisanship be driven out of the Academy of Sciences—the most important scientific institution in the country, that the Academy should take an immediate and very active part in the building of socialism and that its activities should be permeated through and through by the ideals by which lived the mass of the population of the country.

A radical change in the work of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR took place in the final years of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s. At its basis lay the idea of a close link between the Academy's work and the practical building of socialism, and the subordination of this work to the interests of the Soviet state. In the Academy's statutes passed on 23 November 1935, special attention was paid to its role in the development of theoretical and applied sciences and the necessity of concentrating its activities on solving the most important scientific problems.

The reorganisation of the work of the Academy of Sciences was also done by renewing its staff. Between 1929 and 1932 the academicians' ranks were filled by new members, especially from the technological sciences, which enabled the links between the Academy and the national economy to be strengthened. In 1930 a new staff for the Presidium of the Academy was elected. Academician A. P. Karpinsky was re-elected president, the academicians V. L. Komarov, G. M. Krzhizhanovsky and N. Y. Marr were elected vice-presidents, and Academician V. P. Volgin was elected permanent secretary (these last three were Communists). In accordance with the direction of the CC of the CPSU(B) the new Presidium placed itself at the head of the work to reorganise the activities of the Academy.

The change in course and content of the activities of the Academy of Sciences and the renewal of its staff were accompanied by a bitter battle as was shown by the elections to the Academy in the winter of 1929. The preparation and execution of these attracted the attention of Soviet society in general as it rightly expected that not just scientists of particular merit but important researchers tied ideologically to the building of socialism would be elected to the Academy.

The elections which took place on 12 January 1929 showed that very strong positions in the Academy of Sciences were still held by adherents of the obsolete traditions of "pure science". The Communists elected at departmental meetings, A. M. Deborin, N. M. Lukin and V. M. Friche, did not receive a formal majority of votes at the General Meeting of the Academy

and were not elected to be academicians. The voting results were regarded by the Soviet scientific community as a political demonstration by a section of the academicians who did not want constructive changes to be made in the activities of the Academy.

A. V. Lunacharsky wrote a long and strongly-worded article on the elections to the Academy of Sciences which was published in *Izvestiya* in February 1929. He noted the caution and care with which the Soviet Government and V. I. Lenin had treated the Academy: "We granted extremely wide freedom to the workers in science; we know that nothing can be done by constraint in this matter and that persuasion must be used. We allowed scientific thought in neutral areas to go its own way, hoping that this would change given time and the gigantic force of attraction of the central principles of Marxism. We waited, we were patient...." But it then became necessary to renew the staff of the Academy and inject into it fresh scientific forces which would take the Academy forward to work in the name of socialism. "The Academy must fully understand," continued Lunacharsky, "that the Soviet community and the revolution are setting it definite conditions. The Academy must fully understand that it is going to be examined on how conscious it is of the situation, how capable it is of bearing the strain of its Sovietisation and reconstruction, whether this is still at all possible or if some other kind of reform is needed; in fact the question has arisen as to how, from a Soviet, socialist point of view, to construct our scientific world, having nothing whatsoever to do with remains of the past, completely pulling down the edifice of the past and building it up anew according to an absolutely new plan."

The Presidium of the Academy of Sciences decided to ask the Government to allow a new ballot to be taken on three candidates who had not received a majority vote at the General Meeting of the Academy but who had been elected by the departments. This request was granted. As a result of these elections held on 13 February A. M. Deborin, N. M. Lukin and V. M. Friche were elected academicians.

The Academy's Party organisation, which was formed in early 1929, carried out a great deal of work in renovating the Academy and drawing its activities closer to the needs of the building of socialism. It saw its basic task as one of changing the course of the Academy, by cleansing it of alien elements and strengthening the influence of Marxist-Leninist methodology within it, to one of serving the demands of the building of socialism and ridding it of its apolitical and non-partisan spirit.

This was a stubborn and essentially class battle against the supporters of the "former Academy".

The Party organisation in the Academy strove to exert its ideological influence on the highly qualified scientists and gradually draw them closer to a Marxist-Leninist perception of reality. It was of course aware that for many this would be a slow and difficult process and would prove impossible to some. But this was the only correct way.

From the very beginning of the Party organisation's activities, this tactical line that it had taken brought forth criticism from a section of the Communist scientific workers who thought it was useless "to galvanise the corpse" of the old Academy and called for its immediate liquidation. Another section did not take the realities of the situation into account and was striving to turn the Academy in the shortest possible time into a pure-Communist scientific centre to be linked with the Communist Academy. This was accompanied by considerable impatience with respect to the work of non-Marxist academics, going so far as to demand a ban on the publication of their works. Other kinds of project were suggested such as transferring the academicians to consultative posts with full formal removal from the leadership of the Academy, the expulsion of all non-Marxists from the departments of the Academy and suchlike. Demands were heard that the academicians should be made to "repent of their sins" and there were threats to consider all those who did not undergo this procedure as alien elements and class enemies.

In favour of the Party organisation of the Academy it should be said that it consistently carried out the Leninist line regarding the old intelligentsia. One of the memoranda of the Party organisation's leadership sent to the CC of the CPSU(B) in January 1932 noted: "In the opinion of the branch its tactical line is correct and fully in accordance with the Party's directives. In the opinion of the branch we are still in a period during which organising the forces of the non-Party specialists, drawing them closer to us and bringing them into the building of socialism, is one of our most important tasks; if we submit in this to 'Leftist' feelings and absolve ourselves of the task, then we will be doing the greatest harm to the cause of the Party and of the proletariat."

The authority, and together with it the membership of the Academy's Party organisation, grew steadily. In early 1929 it had only a few members but by 1933 membership had grown to 348 Communists.

The Party organisation of the Academy broadly developed its activity in the Marxist-Leninist education of the scientific

workers and the number of academics drawn into Marxist-Leninist studies grew year by year. In 1932 the first University of Marxism-Leninism for scientific workers was organised. The main task of such universities was to "help the engineering, technological and scientific workers to master perfectly the method of materialist dialectics and come to realise the philosophic bases of Marxism-Leninism—the world outlook of the proletariat". Twenty-three universities of Marxism-Leninism were opened in 1933-1934, in which about six thousand scientific and technological workers studied.

A great deal of attention was paid to the planning of scientific work. During the course of this it was necessary to overcome the opposition of many academicians who believed that the planning of scientific work disorganised and depersonalised scientists and that it would fetter scientific initiative.

The Academician V. P. Volgin wrote: "Many ... maybe do not realise what a battle, what efforts, what amount of talks and proofs of every kind were needed to inculcate in the Academy the simple idea of planned scientific work, nor how much effort was put into this by the Communists together with the small group of non-Party workers who had joined with them at the very beginning of their activities in the Academy of Sciences."

At the end of 1930 the Academy of Sciences of the USSR had drawn up its first production plan for 1931 and had begun elaborating a plan of scientific research work for the Second Five-Year Plan. It also co-ordinated its activities more closely with the life and needs of the national republics, and from 1931 it began organising its branches and bases. By the end of the First Five-Year Plan its Urals, Far Eastern and Transcaucasian branches had been founded and also its Kazakhstan and Tajikistan bases. The Byelorussian Academy of Sciences was founded in 1929.

Summing up the immense amount of work in reorganising the activities of the Academy of Sciences in accordance with the needs of the building of socialism, Academician V. P. Volgin commented in mid-1932: "One thing can now be considered ... finally secured: the Academy of Sciences is joined in the cause of socialist construction; this is a real, tangible fact. The battle around this question is over. We shall never again need to return to arguments on this theme within the Academy of Sciences."

The reorganisation of the work of the Academy of Sciences and of the scientific research departments, and the fact that their activities were getting closer to the practice of the building of socialism had beneficial effects on the results of scientific work in the country. The industrialisation period is notable for

the many prominent successes of Soviet science in a great variety of fields. One should also note the number of extremely important scientific and technological achievements utilised in the process of technological reconstruction (ferroalloys, special steels, light metals, plastics, new building materials, combine harvesters, new forms of raw materials, and the improvement of many technological processes).

In the late 1920s and early 1930s a number of Soviet academics were given the Lenin Prize for works of great scientific and economic significance. Amongst the first laureates were such prominent Soviet academics as V. A. Obruchev, A. D. Arkhangelsky, A. Y. Chichibabin, N. S. Kurnakov, E. V. Britske, V. G. Shukhov, I. M. Gubkin, L. V. Piszarzhevsky, A. A. Chernyshev, V. F. Mitkevich and others.

Immense changes took place in the world outlook of the scientific intelligentsia. Many of the old academics who were actively joining in the building of socialism had not only lacked firm political convictions before the revolution but also a clear natural-scientific world outlook. During the years of Soviet power a fundamental change had taken place in their outlooks. Their creative work became richer and its results more tangible. "I experienced a kind of rebirth in my scientific and social life," wrote the Academician B. A. Keller. "From being a person of indefinite Left-wing persuasions the proletarian revolution made me into a Bolshevik and member of the CPSU(B). The same proletarian revolution turned me from being a middling provincial scientist into an academician, member of two academies, the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences.

"I did not come to the Party at once. I put in a request to grant me Party membership when I had completely and with my whole being accepted two propositions:

"1. That the proletarian revolution had liberated the countless masses of workers and peasants and was leading them to the new and most glorious human culture of communism.

"2. That this culture was being born in difficult conditions, in severe class battles and that it must be defended with one's whole life."*

Profound changes also took place in the artistic intelligentsia. It developed an ever firmer understanding of the indissoluble

* B. A. Keller, *Proletarskaya revoliutsia i intelligentsia*, Moscow, 1937, pp. 26-27.

link between culture and the interests of the whole Soviet nation, and between culture and the tasks which the Communist Party had set itself and was solving.

The Communist Party devoted considerable attention to putting such a mass art medium as the theatre to use in the building of socialism. "The Soviet state," wrote Lunacharsky, "was carefully winning over the academic theatres. We did not want to destroy their living tissue, nor did we want to start by constraint.... The Soviet state earned quite widespread sympathy in the academic theatres by its delicacy and liberalism, which made and will make the work ahead easier." In May 1927 a Party conference was called to discuss questions concerning the theatre. Workers from central and local Party organs, from the People's Commissariat for Education, dramatists and theatre critics took part. Both the addresses and the speeches by the participants in the conference were mainly concerned about what kind of policy would be adhered to *vis-à-vis* the old theatre, about support for the revolutionary theatres and about the Party's tasks with respect to the theatre in the circumstances of the transition to full-scale socialist construction.

The Party conference noted in its decisions that the principles of the Party's policy on art were defined by the resolution of the CC of the CPSU(B) on 18 June 1925, "Party Policy in the Field of Literature", the basic propositions of which remained meaningful and could be applied to the development of the theatre. The conference pointed out that, as in the field of literature, the Party and the Soviet state could not tie itself to any one particular theatrical trend. At the same time it advised that every measure be taken to ensure that competition between the theatrical trends should lead to the social tasks facing the arts being better and more effectively fulfilled.

The participants in the conference emphasised that "the theatrical 'heritage' contained in the pre-revolutionary theatre was a treasure which it was imperative to treat carefully and attentively", that the transition of the old theatres to new, socialist lines could not take place rapidly and that because of its traditions and strong links with the old culture, this could only happen "by way of slow changes and frequent zigzagging". The Party conference also outlined a number of measures directed towards supporting the revolutionary theatres and drawing the old theatre closer to the tasks of socialist construction.

In the late 1920s and early 1930s great changes took place in the position of the old theatres, in the contents of their activities and in the artists' and directors' world outlook. The

repertoires of the theatres were gradually renewed with works by Soviet dramatists. Lunacharsky pointed out that in 1927 the academic theatres of Moscow and Leningrad presented 20-25 new plays. This figure is quite impressive, considering how strongly these theatres were attached to "classical" repertoires.

One of the first Soviet plays to be staged in academic theatres was Trenyov's *Lyubov Yarovaya* which was presented by the Maly Theatre in 1926. The play was an immense success. After the Maly Theatre, the play was staged by other theatres in the country. In 1927 the Art Theatre staged Vsevolod Ivanov's *Armoured Train 14-69*, and Reinhold Glière's *Red Poppy* was put on by the Bolshoi Theatre. This was the first ballet with a revolutionary theme. The number of plays by Soviet dramatists accepted for staging by the theatres increased yearly. In 1924, plays by Soviet dramatists made up 3 per cent of the repertoires; in 1927, it was 19 per cent and by 1931 their number had already grown to 35 per cent. The first half of the 1930s was notable for the staging of such works by Soviet dramatists as Maxim Gorky's *Yegor Bulychov and Others*. Vsevolod Vishnevsky's *Optimistic Tragedy*, Nikolai Pogodin's *After the Ball* and others. Socialist labour, the new social attitudes and the new hero became the central themes of the Soviet dramatists.

Soviet drama could not just bypass the processes that were taking place amongst the intelligentsia. In a number of significant works it represented both the process of formation of the new intelligentsia and the reorientation of the world outlook of the old intelligentsia (Boris Lavrenyov's *The Break*, Alexander Afinogenov's *Fear* and others).

The healthier repertoires of the theatres contributed to a considerable extent to the development of the political consciousness not only of the spectators but of the artists themselves. The process, though, was far from idyllic. There were not a few cases of theatres refusing to stage a play, and of artists refusing to act in it, for the sole reason that it was "saturated with politics". This was the case, for example, with Prov Sadovsky. When it was suggested that he take the part of Koshkin in *Lyubov Yarovaya*, he had his doubts as to whether he could impersonate a commissar. He later became one of the best actors of this role. It could not have been easy for the actor S. Kuznetsov who usually played the parts of kings, counts and abbots to break away from the type when he was suddenly given the part of the revolutionary sailor Shvandia, or for Vera Pashennaya who, after playing such parts as Mary Stuart and Ostrovsky's heroines, came out on stage in the costume of *Lyubov Yarovaya*—a teacher who had found her place in the

revolution. The old actors found the process of assimilating the new, socialist themes complicated and difficult. Some actors were for a long time not able "to squeeze themselves" into the parts of workers, peasants and revolutionaries, all of which were new to them.

Attempts by "Left"-wing Communist artistic workers to accelerate this process were made with good intentions but had manifestly negative results. "Leftist" mistakes and exaggerations with respect to the theatrical intelligentsia were severely criticised by Party and Soviet opinion. These mistakes could slow down but not stop the irreversible process leading to the final transition of the workers in the arts to socialist positions. The Communist Party and the Soviet state promoted in every possible way this process and waged a decisive battle both against "Leftist" mistakes and against Right-wing bourgeois tendencies in art. This proved to be a guarantee of the consolidation of forces on this front.

The Union of Art Workers played a considerable part during this period in the move by the artistic intelligentsia to active participation in the building of socialism and in the animation of its socio-political activities.

It displayed its activity in overcoming political neutralism, manifestations of bourgeois ideology and in effecting a rapprochement between art and the life of the nation. Theatre brigades travelled out to factories and kolkhozes and Red Army units. Great attention was devoted to the political education of workers in the arts. The discussions which developed at the end of the 1920s and in the early 1930s around economic science, philosophy, Party history and literary criticism riveted the artistic intelligentsia's attention to questions of Marxist-Leninist methodology, theory of art and world outlook.

The battle to re-educate the workers in the arts in a socialist spirit had positive results. As early as 1932, the 8th All-Union Congress of Workers in the Arts was able to note in its resolution that "the old artistic intelligentsia in the main, convinced of the power and cultural role of the Soviet state, is decisively and honestly striving to go forward in step with the working class and its Party". The final completion of this process was, however, still hindered by the organisational disjointedness of the creative unions of workers in the arts and by "Leftist" distortions of the Party line on the arts.

Ideological reorientation was a complicated and difficult process for those in literature. Many writers were still unable to understand Soviet reality and were in a state of creative depression. For example, the writer Yuri Olesha said: "I find it

difficult to understand the worker type or the revolutionary hero type. I cannot be the one or the other. It is beyond my strength and beyond my understanding. I therefore do not write about them."

The difficulties experienced by writers in making the transition to a socialist platform were aggravated by the "Leftist" position of the Association of Proletarian Writers of Russia. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the "fellow-travellers" issue in literature and art continued, as before, to be widely discussed in the press. The journal *Na literaturnom postu*, the association's organ which began publication in 1926, spoke out particularly frequently on this question. It should be noted that the criticism of the "fellow-travellers" by this journal was more controlled and objective than that which flourished in the pages of *Na postu*. The former pointed out their ideological mistakes to writers and did not hurry, however, to rate those who made them as anti-Soviet. But this, though, was at first. In the later period of the journal's existence (it was closed down in 1932), the authors of its articles were already setting themselves the task not of objectively evaluating the work of one or other writer, but trying to expose his "social and class origins" and "sociological equivalent".

The journal criticised Samuil Marshak and Kornei Chukovskiy with inadmissible rudeness. Alexei Tolstoy was placed finally and irrevocably in the category of neo-bourgeois writers as were Sergei Sergeev-Tsensky, Ilya Ehrenburg, Leonid Leonov and Marietta Shaginyan. Of Mikhail Prishvin the journal said that he had "earlier fled social themes however important and often portrayed man in seclusion with nature, and now openly speaks out against the remaking of writers and against the active participation of literature in social life, that is to say in essence against literature fulfilling the tasks of the revolution". According to the journal Vyacheslav Shishkov described "the way of life of the USSR in such a manner that it is difficult to tell it apart from the way of life of the Russian Empire".

The mechanical transplantation of the ideas of the class struggle to literary phenomena and the failure of some members of the association to understand the processes taking place in literature at the time were sharply criticised by the writing community and the Soviet press. *Pravda* repeatedly drew attention to the incorrect position taken by the leadership of the Association of Proletarian Writers of Russia and its organs. The Party repudiated attempts to transfer to literature terms and categories used in Party life. It condemned the "interdiction" methods and believed that "the point is not to ban but step by

step to drive both old and new non-proletarian trash off the stage by competition, by creating really interesting, artistic and Soviet-charactered plays which will be able to replace it".

In late 1929 an article in *Pravda* pointed out that "of course, theoretical controversy is unavoidable; one can and should argue about questions concerning practical literary policy, but there must be a limit to polemic zeal, and the narrow interests of one or other literary group should not be put above the interests of the Party which imperatively demand the consolidation of Communist forces on a Marxist-Leninist basis".

This demand for consolidation was urgently dictated by the changed socio-political circumstances, the developing moral and political unity of Soviet society and by the needs of the development of Soviet literature. The division of writers into "proletarians" and "fellow-travellers" was clearly losing its meaning. Many of those who were in the old way still called "fellow-travellers" were responding to current events in their works no less actively than the "proletarian writers". The theme of socialist construction and the formation of the new man was central in books by the "fellow-travellers" Konstantin Paustovsky (*Kara-Bogaz*), Marietta Shaginyan (*The Hydroelectric Plant*), Valentin Katayev (*Forward, Time!*), Leonid Leonov (*Sot*), Ilya Ehrenburg (*The Second Day*) and others. In his article "My Way to Proletarian Literature", the poet Vladimir Lugovskoi commented on the substantial changes which had taken place in the consciousness of writers: "Genuine originality of creative writing consists in stepping into that colossally vast world of social ideals which stands before us almost untouched and undescribed and which is so rich, and offers such a range of themes and images that it will be enough for one hundred generations ahead."

Keenly reacting to the socio-economic and political changes in the Land of Soviets, the artistic intelligentsia already spoke out in favour of socialism by the beginning of the 1930s. Not only was it loyal to the Soviet state but also actively supported it. It was natural that in these circumstances the division of artists into "proletarians" and "fellow-travellers", that is to say, into "full-fledged" and "suspect" ones, should meet with a sharp rebuff from writers, painters and artists. Alexei Tolstoi, speaking at one of the conferences on questions concerning dramaturgy in October 1930, said: "It is a very dubious and not very honouring brand on my activity as a writer.... I am speaking of the concept of fellow-traveller. Maybe this category, this pigeon-hole did have some meaning once. I do not know.... But now it is time to do away with this word. We do

not run to the side of the road at the sound of the terrible music of the *Internationale*. We are in the ranks, and I can assure you, comrades, that many of those whom you still call by the ugly cliché fellow-travellers, and who have — it seems to you — no more mental organisation than a radish which is red outside and white inside — many of us — are in the front ranks. That is the dialectic of life.... We are not fellow-travellers. We are *writers of the epoch of the great Plan*."*

Gorky greatly influenced the consolidation process of the artistic intelligentsia. He was an active opponent of cliquishness in literature and art and spoke decisively against exaggerations and scathing attacks in literary controversies, against sweeping accusations of various kinds of "distortion", and for the rallying of all cultural forces around the socialist ideals. "We," he wrote in a letter to A. Khalatov, "have decidedly entered the epoch of the building of the genuine socialist revolution. This requires the concentration of all our creative forces, all our energy."** The leitmotiv of Gorky's numerous addresses to the Soviet community was the idea of rallying everything vigorous, talented and healthy that there was in Soviet society to the solution of the great problems of socialist construction.

Taking into consideration the profound changes which had taken place in literature and art, the CC of the CPSU(B) passed a resolution on 23 April 1932 entitled "The Reconstruction of the Literary and Artistic Organisations". The CC of the Party noted that a large growth had been achieved in literature and art in the last few years on the basis of the considerable successes of socialist construction. Whereas a few years earlier alien elements had considerable influence and the cadres of proletarian literature had still been weak, now, when proletarian literary and artistic cadres had developed, the present framework of proletarian literary and artistic organisations was already too narrow and was slowing down the development of artistic creativity.

In this connection the CC of the CPSU(B) pointed out that "this creates a danger of changing these organisations from being means for the utmost mobilisation of Soviet writers and artists round the tasks of socialist construction into means of cultivating group seclusion and alienation both from current political tasks, and from considerable groups of

* Alexei Tolstoi, *Sobraniye sochinenii v 10 tomakh*, Vol. 10, Moscow, 1961, pp. 148-49.

** *Arkhiv A. M. Gorkogo*, Vol. X, *M. Gorky i sovetskaya pechat*, Book 1, Moscow, 1964, p. 217.

writers and artists who sympathise with the building of socialism”.

Proceeding from this, the CC of the CPSU(B) decreed that the Association of Proletarian Writers be dissolved and that all writers be incorporated in a single Union of Soviet Writers having a Communist branch within it. The CC of the CPSU(B) also decreed that analogous changes should be carried out in the other creative organisations of the artistic intelligentsia.

The Central Committee's decree summed up an entire period in Soviet literature and art, a period defined in the resolution of the CC of the RCP(B) on 18 June 1925. It recorded the immense changes which had taken place amongst the writers, artists and painters and which were expressed by their rallying to the task of socialist construction and the final and irrevocable transition of the old intelligentsia to the side of the Soviet state. The decree also emphatically condemned sectarian tendencies in literature and art, clannishness and cliquishness, and put an end to the artificial division of artists into “proletarians” and “fellow-travellers”. After the publication of this decree, these terms were soon no longer to be found in the press.

The First All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers in August 1934 was a major event in the life of the artistic intelligentsia. A most important result of this congress was that it demonstrated the ideological and political growth of Soviet writers and their organisational and moral unity. “In what do I see the victory of Bolshevism at this congress of writers?” rhetorically asked Gorky. “It is that those who were considered to be non-Party, ‘vacillators’ have genuinely, and I have no doubts as to this, recognised Bolshevism as the sole militant and leading idea in their work....”

In keeping with the CC of the CPSU(B)'s decree the Association of Proletarian Musicians of Russia was dissolved in 1932 and replaced by the Union of Soviet Composers which incorporated all composers and musicians who wished to take part in the building of socialism. Under its statutes, the union's first and most important task was to “rally the composers and musical figures standing on the platform of the Soviet state to participate actively in the building of socialism”. The Union of Soviet Architects and artists' unions at regional level were founded in the same year.

Important changes in the situation of the artistic intelligentsia thus took place in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Whilst only a very short time before there had been amongst the artistic intelligentsia a number of people who were vacillating, doubting and changeable, the further reinforcement of socialist positions

led the majority of them to support resolutely and actively the policy of the Bolshevik Party. The writer Leonid Leonov commented on the process of reorientation in the world outlook of the intelligentsia which had been formed before the October Revolution: “The first phase was characterised by the intelligentsia taking up this kind of social and psychological line: ‘So, I am at the service of the working class, but my old traditions and world outlook remain in their complete purity and inviolability.’ In the second phase it was characteristic for them radically to reconsider these traditions and accept the October Revolution not just as an accomplished fact, but ideologically and in their outlook, by making their final transition to the positions of the working class.”

The successes of socialism opened the eyes of writers, artists and painters to the grandiose prospects that existed for artistic creativity and were an immense stimulus to the blossoming of their gifts and talents. “The revolution,” said the stage director V. I. Nemirovich-Danchenko, “has set creativity free and broadened its ideological content,... it has bravely set vast social and closely connected artistic tasks; it has bound artists to every aspect of the life of this socialist land; and that — for us workers in the arts — is the greatest, most important, and decisive event in our lives.”*

The realities of Soviet life created the conditions for a genuine blossoming of literature and art. The artistic intelligentsia experienced the joy of creating for its own people and for the sake of realising mankind's most noble ideals. “I have only come to know,” declared Alexei Tolstoi, “genuine freedom of creativity and breadth of theme, the richness of which cannot be grasped in one life alone, now that I am mastering the Marxist approach to history, now that this great doctrine, having gone through the experience of the October Revolution, has given me clarity of purpose and method in reading the book of life.”**

“Prior to 1917,” he also said, “I did not know for whom I was writing (incidentally, my books were at best printed in editions of 3,000 copies). Now I feel a live reader whom I need, who enriches me and who needs me. Twenty-five years ago I took up literature because it was a pleasant occupation, a kind of amusement. Now I can clearly see that literature is a potent weapon in the proletariat's battle for world-wide culture, and

* V. I. Nemirovich-Danchenko, *Statyi, rechi, besedy, pisma. Teatralnoye naslediye*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1952, p. 49.

** Alexei Tolstoi, *Sobraniye sochinenii v 10 tomakh*, Vol. 10, p. 202.

insofar as I am able, I give my abilities to this battle. The consciousness of this within me is a key factor in my creative work."*

These are the words of a man who had met the revolution with hostility. But the great truth of socialism became the irresistible force which not only returned the mistaken writer from his emigration but also made him a classic of Soviet literature.

The Soviet people and the Communist Party valued highly the work of Soviet writers, artists and painters. Many of them were given high government awards. In 1936 the title People's Artist of the USSR was instituted. Amongst the first to be accorded this honour were K. S. Stanislavsky, V. I. Nemirovich-Danchenko, V. I. Kachalov, I. M. Moskvin, A. V. Nezhdanova and other masters of the stage. A large group of writers, artists, and other cultural figures combined their creative work with public and governmental work. The writers A. A. Fadeyev, A. N. Tolstoi, M. A. Sholokhov, the artists V. V. Barsova, I. M. Moskvin, N. P. Khmelev, L. M. Leonidov, A. K. Tarasova, N. K. Cherkasov and others were elected deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and to local Soviets. "My life is forever bound to the people, and I will give all my gifts and all my abilities to my socialist Motherland." Moskvin's words at an electoral meeting did not express the feelings of this artist alone. They could well have been said by thousands and tens of thousands of people in literature and art who had managed to break away completely from their former world outlook and become active participants in the building of socialism.

The intelligentsia's authority abroad grew apace with its increasing activity in the building of socialism. Soviet academics were prominent in their participation at various international scientific congresses and conferences and their works won high appraisal from the world scientific community.

The Soviet intelligentsia took the part of peace against the oncoming threats of a new world war. In March 1932, Gorky called on the intelligentsia of the world in his impassioned address "On Whose Side Are You, Masters of Culture?" to join in a united front against reaction and war. Spain became a most important front in the battle against the forces of fascism and war and the Soviet intelligentsia took part in that battle.

The successes of socialist construction, the intelligentsia's active role in constructive work, and the education of the new

* Alexei Tolstoi, *Sobraniye sochinenii v 10 tomakh*, fVol. 10, pp. 190-91.

man had an ever more intensive effect on the feelings of the section of the intelligentsia which had remained in emigration. The split in its midst became deeper. One section of the White émigrés continued in its hatred of the Soviet system and the other joined in the battle for the freedom of the Spanish people, was warmly sympathetic to the progress of the Soviet state and was proud of the successes of the Soviet people. In several countries associations of friends of the USSR began to be founded and the émigré intelligentsia formed committees which called for the cessation of political activities against the Soviet Union. Some émigrés took up Soviet citizenship or returned home.

The painter I. Y. Bilibin wrote in 1935 about the motives which led him to ask for permission to return home from France: "Having during these last years followed in the local press and from hearsay what is happening in my homeland, I have become fully and absolutely convinced that to remain here is an absurdity and an immense mistake.... And seeing now the unusual and unprecedented growth of my country, I dream of giving my full strength and abilities to work in my speciality for my own country and to be useful in every possible way." He received permission to return home. The noted general and diplomat A. A. Ignatyev also returned from France in 1935. In 1939 the talented poetess M. I. Tsvetayeva renewed her Soviet citizenship and returned from emigration. A. I. Kuprin returned to his country at the end of his life; he had sufficient civic courage to show by the fact of his return that he recognised his tragic mistake and guilt before his people which he had abandoned in its time of hardship.

* * *

In the very earliest days of Soviet power Lenin had expressed his firm belief that "the sum total of their experience will, in the long run, inevitably bring the intelligentsia into our ranks..."* He was completely right in his forecast. In the end, an absolute majority of the old intelligentsia came over to the side of socialism. Some understood their errors and mistakes sooner, others later, but the transition was finally accomplished. At the end of the period of building the basis of socialism the old intelligentsia in the Soviet Union was an equally competent and active builder of the new system as the working class and the collective-farm peasantry.

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 235.

At the same time as attracting the old intelligentsia to the building of socialism and re-educating it, the Party and the Soviet state were solving another difficult and complicated problem—that of forming numerous cadres for the Soviet intelligentsia from the worker and peasant midst. Had this failed it would have been impossible to turn the USSR from being a backward country into an advanced one and from being an agrarian country into an industrialised one.

The socialist revolution created all the necessary conditions and prerequisites for solving the problem of educating a new intelligentsia. Having done away with the privileges of the overthrown exploiting classes, it opened the doors of schools and higher educational institutions to the working people.

The formation of a new, people's intelligentsia was just as unusual a task as building a socialist society. To this end the Party and the state again enlisted cadres from the old intelligentsia since there was no one from whom to learn if not them. It was only with their help that millions of people of working class or peasant origins became highly qualified specialists in every branch of science, technology and culture. This once again confirmed the correctness of the Leninist proposition: to build a new society with the help of the intelligentsia inherited from the bourgeois system.

Especially important successes in the training of the new intelligentsia were achieved during the pre-war five-year plan. In just 11 years (1928-1938) the higher educational institutions of the Soviet Union trained 672 thousand specialists and special secondary educational institutions—1,144,000, making overall about two million specialists for all the branches of the national economy and culture. Considerable numbers of capable workers and peasants were promoted to administrative and lower technological posts, to work in the Soviet state apparatus and in Party and social organisations. The cadres of the creative intelligentsia also increased. Before the Great Patriotic War (1941) the Soviet intelligentsia numbered in all in its ranks about 12 million people. The creation of this army of the intelligentsia was one of the greatest victories of the socialist revolution.

The building of the basis of socialism in the USSR caused profound changes in the structure of its society and in the destiny of its classes and other social groups, the intelligentsia included. As the new social system consolidated itself, the old intelligentsia merged organically with the new intelligentsia which was just one body with the people and utterly devoted to the cause of communism.

The Soviet intelligentsia worked selflessly in unison with the whole nation and made its own notable contributions to the cause of building socialism in every field: in the industrialisation of the country, in the collectivisation of agriculture, in strengthening the defence potential of the Soviet state and in the development of Soviet culture. The fact that an absolute majority of the old intelligentsia in the Soviet Union sooner or later irrevocably renounced its bourgeois ideology and went over to the positions of socialism was a momentous victory for the Communist Party and the teachings of Marxism-Leninism. It was hard for the working class and its Party to gain victory on the fronts in the Civil War, but it was no less hard for the Communist Party and the working class to "win the minds" of people who were not only far removed from a socialist world outlook, but sometimes even its opponents. This first successful experience in the history of human society in re-educating the bourgeois intelligentsia and enlisting it in the building of socialism is of world-wide historic importance.

ERRATA:

Page 12, delete line 3 from top
Page 19, para 2, line 7 from top

Page 27, line 15 from bottom

Page 125, lines 13-18 from top

SHOULD READ:

Party Congress (1917) noted that "the flow, which began in with the purported aim of defending the professional interest implementation of all the most important state measures concerning the arts. One of the most urgent tasks of the All-Russia Professional Union of Arts Workers was the ideological education of its workers and the reinforcing of communist influence in their midst. In May 1920 a decree of the Moscow Committee of the RCP(B) made it incumbent on all

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This book deals with one of the most complicated social questions, the question of drawing the intelligentsia into the work of building socialism after the revolution of October 1917.

S. A. Fedyukin, D. Sc. (Hist.), devoted many years of research to this subject, covering a wide range of material from books, documents and periodical publications of that time.

The author depicts the particularities of the transition of the intelligentsia to the socialist position, showing both the concrete historical background of the age as well as dealing with the personal fate of individuals. As a scientific researcher he in no way attempts to vulgarise this process in all its many complications and contradictions, but

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rather reveals its basic tendencies and the connection between the cultural and historical phenomena in the country as they were affected by the Leninist programme for the building of a new society. The author also shows the change in the relationship between the working class, the working people, and scientists, engineers, teachers, doctors and military specialists who had entered the path of service to their people.

The book also describes how the nihilistic feelings of certain Communists towards the intelligentsia were overcome and how the Communist Party fought against opportunist tendencies in this field.

Of particular interest is the evidence testifying to the exceptional influence of V. I. Lenin's personality on representatives of the intelligentsia.
